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Abstract
This thesis develops an ecological performance practice using a practice-as-research 
methodology. It explores how performance can engage the ecological, where performance (in 
process and product) is understood as an ecology of diverse humans and nonhumans, which 
participates within the wider ecology of Earth. Whilst recent publications have given 
sustained attention to the ways performance can respond to ecological imperatives (Allen and 
Preece, 2015; Heddon and Mackey, 2012; Bottoms, Franks and Kramer, 2012; Arons and May, 
2011; Kershaw, 2007; Bottoms and Goulish, 2007), there has been scarce attention paid to 
how performance practices and creative process can be and do ecology. In attending to that 
gap, this research develops a critically-engaged practice of performance (in) ecology, 
exploring how performance – in its very methods, modes and live moments of practice – can 
enact the ecological. 
The project developed an ecological practice through intergenerational and professional-
nonprofessional collaboration. It was led by two performance works – Age-Old (2013) and Wild 
Life (2014). Age-Old involved collaborating with a seven-year-old girl to co-devise a new 
performance and it formed a developmental period of the research inquiry from which key 
methods were taken into the more ambitious work, Wild Life. This performance explored 
‘wildness’ and was a collaboration with eight professional and nonprofessional performers, 
aged between nine and 60 years old. It presents the main body of the research. The written 
component of the thesis frames and elucidates the practice-based research findings. The 
thesis proposes that involving collaborators of diverse ages and skills presents a dynamic 
performance ecology through which an inclusive ecological practice can be developed. Its 
claim is that collaborative practice offers a potentially radical enactment of ecological 
qualities and dynamics, where this enactment is the ‘wilding’ of performance. 
Conducted through a Collaborative Doctoral Award from the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council, the project was supported by Catherine Wheels Theatre Company. It offers new 
approaches for practice and scholarship in the fields of performance and ecology, devised 
performance, movement and ecology, and intergenerational practice. It also contributes to 
wider meanings of ‘ecology’ as advanced by scientific views, including posthumanist and 
rewilding perspectives.
Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................3
List of Accompanying Online Files.......................................................................6
Acknowledgements.........................................................................................7
Introduction..................................................................................................8
Collaborative Doctoral Award.............................................................................11
Past Research and Practice................................................................................12
Revising the Research Inquiry.............................................................................14
Thesis Structure.............................................................................................16
Section One – Research Context and Methodology..................................................18
Chapter One – Performance.............................................................................19
Introduction.................................................................................................19
Performance and Ecology..................................................................................20
Collaboration and Directing in Devised Performance.................................................34
Movement and Ecology.....................................................................................41
Performance and Nonprofessional Performers.........................................................45
Chapter Two – Ecology....................................................................................54
Introduction.................................................................................................54
Conceptualising Betweens: Rhizomes and Arborescence in the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari................................................................................................55
Conceptualising Human-Nonhuman Collaboration: Jane Bennett and Vibrant 
Matter.........................................................................................................57
Conteptualising Entanglements and Boundaries: Karen Barad and Agential 
Realism.......................................................................................................61
Chapter Three – Methodology...........................................................................67
Section Two – Research Findings.......................................................................77
Chapter Four – Exploring Ecological Performance through Intergenerational Practice: Age-
Old............................................................................................................78
Project Structure...........................................................................................78
Starting Points...............................................................................................79
The Performance............................................................................................81
Enacting and Representing the Nonhuman in the Human............................................82
Immanent Authorship......................................................................................86
Place-Based Practice.......................................................................................90
Exposing Theatre’s Role in Constructing ‘Nature’.....................................................94
Collaborating with Materials..............................................................................98
Age-Old into Wild Life....................................................................................104
Chapter Five – Wilding Performance: Wild Life....................................................107
Project Structure..........................................................................................107
The Performance..........................................................................................109
Rewilding...................................................................................................112
Introducing Wilding Performance.......................................................................113
Wilding Performance Containers........................................................................115
Instant Performances: the Separated and the Relational...........................................125
Enacting Entanglement...................................................................................138
Wilding Performance Through a Just Doing-ness Approach.........................................145
The Interpretation Practice: Responsively and Responsibly Participating in the Agency of 
Performance Practice.....................................................................................151
Conclusion: Towards an Ecological Politics and Ethics............................................169
Appendix A: Age-Old programme.....................................................................178
Appendix B: Wild Life programme....................................................................179
Appendix C: Age-Old review...........................................................................181
Appendix D: Wild Life review.........................................................................182
Bibliography...............................................................................................183
List of Accompanying Online Files
Age-Old Full Length
Clip 1 Enactment and Representation, Animal Improvisation
Clip 2 Immanent Authorship, Mountain Movements
Clip 3 Betweens Leading, Flying with Bags
Clip 4 Nonhuman in Human, Bags and Carragh
Clip 5 Unpredictability, Bags, Carragh and Sarah
Wild Life Full Length
Clip 1 Practice-as-Research, Issues of Translating Theory into Practice
Clip 2 Wilding Performance Containers, Feeling Faces
Clip 3 Wilding Performance Containers, Playing with Boundaries
Clip 4 Wilding Performance Containers, All Messy Hair
Clip 5 Vibrant Humans and Nonhumans, Water Fight
Clip 6 Working With and As Vibrant Matter, Sliding Stones
Clip 7 The Agency of Practice, Interpretation Practices
Clip 8 The Agency of Practice, Leaping and Being Leapt
Clip 9 Over General Instruction, Bending
Acknowledgements
Professor Dee Heddon and Professor Adrienne Scullion supervised this research with 
encouragement, commitment and insight. They have supported me to keep learning and 
developing as an artist and researcher. I will always be grateful.
Thank you 
– Arts and Humanities Research Council for making this research possible.
– Paul Fitzpatrick for your intelligent and thoughtful feedback.
– Gill Robertson and Catherine Wheels Theatre Company. Your interest and 
encouragement spurred me on.
– Matt Addicott for your heartening trust and support.
– Platform, Buzzcut, Imaginate, Manipulate, Summerhall, Tramway and Hillhead 
Primary School for hosting my work.
– Lennon Che Campbell, Geraldine Heaney, Archie Lacey, Peter Lannon, Liz Lumsden, 
Graham Mack, Gaby McCann and Carragh McLavin. Working with you has been a special 
joy. I look forward to our future collaborations.
– Laura Bradshaw, Jodie Wilkinson, Thom Scullion, Becki Gerrard, Dan Serridge and Jess 
Allen for your friendship and artistic perception.
– Deborah Richardson-Webb and Robert Walton for believing I could do it.
– Mary Brennan for your unique and poetic perspective and support.
– Margaret Kerr for the calm, open and enlightening conversations over the years. Your 
ability to listen and respond to my thoughts continues to be a gift.
– Val Hopfinger, my dear mother, for your unwavering and loving belief in me, and 
Emily Hopfinger, my brilliant sister, and Grahame Rourke, my good friend. 
Conversations with all three of you have enriched my research and life.
– my dear friends. You have been a wonderful support and have helped me to smile 
throughout my PhD journey.
– my two cats, Molly and Tiger, for keeping me warm and at ease whilst writing.
Introduction
This thesis explores and develops an ecological performance practice. My research responds 
to my awareness – as performance practitioner, researcher and spectator – of a lack of critical 
and creative engagement with the complexities of ecology in contemporary theatre and 
performance. My research is a response to some of the most pressing concerns of our time; it 
asks how to live as part of ecology and how to develop ecological ways of being and doing. I 
am interested in how humans can enact and experience – how we can do – the ecological 
through the creative modes of performance process and the theatrical production itself. I also 
explore how performance ecology might impact on wider meanings of ‘ecology’ and, crucially, 
what performance ecology can uniquely tell us about what it means to be part of the diverse 
ecologies of Earth. In order to find out about the ecological potentials of performance my 
practice-based inquiry is driven by the question ‘how can a performance practice be 
ecological?’
For the past eight years I have been exploring ecological ideas and questions through 
performance. In that time I have become aware of how little attention the performance field 
has given to ecology both in terms of scholarly discussion and creative engagement: indeed, 
performance scholar Stephen Bottoms asks why the theatre and performance sectors have 
been ‘slow to pick up the ecological baton?’ (2010, p. 121). Since Bottoms’ observation in 
2010 there have been an increasing number of initiatives aimed towards making theatre a 
greener and more environmentally friendly art form. In the UK, organisations including Julie’s 
Bicycle, the Green Theatres Initiative and The Centre for Sustainable Practice in the Arts have 
all focused on making theatre more ecological insofar as decreasing its environmental impact. 
There are also an increasing number of UK practitioners and companies using performance as 
a way to engage with environmental issues and ecological concerns: Nic Green makes work 
with an ecological focus including her autobiographical performance Fatherland, Motherland 
(2012) which ‘investigates and celebrates the complexity and beauty of ecopsychological and 
psycho-geographical relationships [and] one’s place in the world’ (http://
www.nicgreen.org.uk/#!__fatherland-motherland, no date); Fevered Sleep, which creates 
work for children and adults, often deals with environmental concerns, for example the 
performance installation Above Me The Wide Blue Sky (2013) ‘explores our profound 
connectedness to the natural world’ (Fevered Sleep, 2016a); Feral Theatre focuses on 
environmental issues, such as the outdoor performance Lost Species (2011), which is framed 
as a funeral for extinct species (http://feraltheatre.co.uk/funeral-for-lost-species/, no date); 
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and, Whirlybird Theatre Company (formerly Eco Drama) creates theatre to ‘entertain and 
inspire people of all ages to value and care for our natural world’ (Eco Drama, 2015a). 
However, despite greater environmental awareness across the theatre sector, and an 
expanding body of performance work engaging with ecological ideas, there is a scarcity of 
practitioners experimenting with how performance, in its very processes, modes and forms of 
creative practice, can be ecological. 
This gap is reflected in the critical literature. Whilst recent publications have given sustained 
attention to the ways performance can explore and respond to ecological imperatives (Allen 
and Preece, 2015; Heddon and Mackey, 2012; Bottoms, Franks and Kramer, 2012; Arons and 
May, 2011; Kershaw, 2007), there has been scarce attention paid to how performance 
practices and methods, and how the creative performance process, can be ecological. There 
is one study that goes some way in doing this: Small Acts of Repair: Performance, Ecology and 
Goat Island by Stephen Bottoms and Matthew Goulish, in which the authors discuss Goat 
Island’s performance work ‘through the critical lens of ecological thinking’ (2007, n.p.) and 
provide important insights into how the company’s collaborative process is analogous to an 
environmental ecosystem. My research builds on their perspective by working with 
performance ecology from the outset and by drawing out the ecological potentials of 
collaborative devising practices, rather than (only) making reflective analogies between 
performance and environmental ecosystems.
My meaning of ‘performance ecology’ extends from Baz Kershaw’s use of the phrase to 
reference ‘performances as ecosystems’ (2007, p. 15). He draws on a general and familiar 
definition of ‘ecology’ from the sciences, defining it as the ‘interdependence between 
organisms and environments’, and thus proposes that ‘“theatre ecology” (or “performance 
ecology”) refers to the interrelationships of all the factors of particular theatrical (or 
performance) systems, including their organic and inorganic components and ranging from the 
smallest and / or simplest to the greatest and / or most complex’ (2007, p. 15-16). For me, 
performance ecology refers to the complex system of diverse humans and nonhumans that 
materially figure (and emerge) in theatrical performance processes and performances 
themselves. This involves an understanding that any one ‘component’ of the performance 
ecology is intrinsically entangled with (human and nonhuman) others. This meaning of 
performance ecology relates to the definition of ‘deep ecology’ as advanced by Arne Naess. In 
deep ecology a ‘total view’ is encouraged, whereby we ‘arrive, not at things themselves, but 
at networks or fields of relations in which things participate and from which they cannot be 
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isolated’ (Naess, 1976, p. 49). Therefore, any one ‘thing’ is always already in relation ‘with 
other things’ (Naess, 1976, p. 10). For me, ‘performance ecology’ means that systems of 
theatrical performance (in both creative process and public event) are unavoidably 
interrelated with other ecologies: a performance ecology continuously and unavoidably 
interacts with(in) wider social and environmental ecologies. This develops from Kershaw’s 
conceptualisation that theatre ecology and performance ecology ‘refer to the 
interrelationships between theatres (or performances) and their environments’ (2007, p. 
15-16). In proposing the interrelation of performance ecology with(in) other ecologies I also 
draw on the ecologist Gregory Bateson and the political and ecological thinker Félix Guattari. 
For Bateson the ‘mind’ or ‘thinking’ is not limited to humans or culture but is also located 
throughout environmental processes (1972, p. 488-489). Bateson implies that what we call 
‘culture’ and ‘nature’ are aspects of the same systemic and material processes. Bateson uses 
the example of humans dumping pollutant waste into Lake Erie, proposing that you ‘forget 
that the eco-mental system called Lake Erie is part of your wider eco-mental system - and 
that if Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity is incorporated in the larger system of your 
thoughts and experience’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 489-490). This resonates with Guattari’s proposal 
of an ‘ecosophy’, which involves a concept of the three ecologies: ‘social ecology, mental 
ecology and environmental ecology’ (Guattari, 1989, p. 41). He proposes that complex 
interactions and interconnections exist across all three ecologies such that, for example, 
species becoming  extinct in environmental ecologies are inextricably linked to the ways in 
which ‘the words, phrases, and gestures of human solidarity’ are becoming extinct in social 
ecologies (1989, p. 43). In this sense ‘nature cannot be separated from culture . . . [and] we 
must learn to think “transversally”’ across the three ecologies (1989, p. 43). Taking Bateson’s 
and Guattari’s complex meanings of ‘ecology’ into account, to focus on any ecology - whether 
it is a particular performance ecology or a specific environmental ecology - is to inevitably 
interact with wider ecological systems and processes. Furthermore, if environmental, social 
and mental ecologies are interrelated, then to explore a specific social performance ecology 
(which involves a particular combination of diverse humans and nonhuman materials) is to 
inevitably engage with (and learn about) wider Earthly ecology. 
In attending to the gaps in the performance and ecology field, my research is concerned with 
the modes and forms of practice which emerge when performance is treated as an ecosystem 
that inevitably participates with(in) ecological processes and other ecological systems. It is 
my view that new approaches to doing performance are required in order to account for the 
reality that performance is always already a system of distinct yet entangled human and 
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nonhuman parts. I coin the phrase ‘performance (in) ecology’ in order to simultaneously refer 
to performance as an ecosystem and performance’s interrelations with(in) the wider 
ecosystems of Earth. Through my practice-as-research approach I explore and elucidate how 
the methods of creative collaborative practice and performances themselves can be – in their 
enactments – ecological. I have thus sought to find out how performance can do the 
ecological through its modes of creation, exploring and developing a critically-engaged 
practice of performance (in) ecology.
  
Collaborative Doctoral Award 
My doctoral project was fully-funded via an AHRC Collaborative Doctoral Award (CDA) 
between the University of Glasgow and Catherine Wheels Theatre Company. As the AHRC 
describes, CDAs provide funding for doctoral studentship projects which are initiated by an 
academic institution to work with an organisation outside of higher education (AHRC, 2015). I 
was appointed to this CDA project in September 2012 and with it I inherited the partnership 
with Catherine Wheels and a specific research title ‘Sustaining the Imagination: Theatre and 
learning for sustainability’. My supervisory team was made up of two academic supervisors – 
Deirdre Heddon and Adrienne Scullion – and two non-academic supervisors – Catherine Wheels 
artistic director Gill Robertson and company producer Paul Fitzpatrick.1 There was an agreed 
partnership with two primary schools – Hillhead and East Linton Primary Schools – in which the 
anticipated fieldwork would take place. The project was planned to focus on the creative and 
imaginative ways in which site-oriented theatre can be used to engage children in 
environmental sustainability. The work would contribute to and extend the fields of theatre-
in-education, children’s theatre, theatre and environmentalism and site-oriented theatre 
practices. I therefore began a studentship which had a pre-established research question, 
along with a complex set of relationships. This presented a rich but challenging context 
within which to embark on my research, not only in terms of the  diverse resources and 
knowledges available to me but also the various expectations of the multiple stakeholders – 
the University of Glasgow, the AHRC, the two primary schools and Catherine Wheels.
When I was awarded this CDA, I brought my own skills, experiences and interests to this 
existing mix of resources, relationships, expectations and, indeed, research question. Indeed, 
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1  During year three of my PhD, Fitzpatrick became the executive director for the childrenʼs theatre organisation 
Imaginate. He left his role as Catherine Wheels producer, but this did not effect his supervisory role and he 
continued to offer me advice and support throughout my research.
the CDA format demands that the appointed student takes ownership of the project and so I 
began an early process of renegotiating and refocusing the research. I initially changed the 
research inquiry in two crucial ways. Firstly, I translated the focus of working solely with 
children to exploring a collaborative intergenerational practice of working with children and 
adults and with professional and nonprofessional performers. Secondly, I changed the focus 
from exploring how theatre can offer imaginative approaches to engaging children in 
sustainability learning, to exploring how performance practice – in its very process and 
methods – can enact ecology. These two renegotiations sprang directly from my experiences 
and expertise as a professional artist working in a diversity of performance contexts.
Past Research and Practice
During my undergraduate degree in Contemporary Performance Practice (CPP) at the Royal 
Conservatoire of Scotland (RCS) (2006-2010), I explored collaborative and socially engaged 
devising approaches and I became interested in working with diverse groups of people that 
are not normally seen on stage, including children and non-trained performers. As part of that 
degree I worked with Glasgow-based theatre company Glas(s) Performance, a creative 
partnership between Jess Thorpe and Tashi Gore who make performance work with a diverse 
range of people, replacing trained actors with people telling their own ‘stories’ (Glas(s) 
Performance, 2016). I worked with Glas(s) on a project which involved 12 performance 
students collaborating and performing with 12 adults with disabilities. I was inspired by the 
approach Glas(s) took of working with the participants and their ideas, and I developed a 
critical concern for the politics and creative possibilities of collaborating with performers who 
are not trained in performance. However, during my first two years on CPP, I was troubled by 
the way in which the collaborative devising and socially engaged performance approaches 
that I learned about, and had first-hand experience of, were focused wholly on the human 
social realm; the emphasis was on performance as a way of exploring (only) human 
relationships, identities and stories. Therefore, for my dissertation research project I decided 
to explore the connections between performance and ecology. I researched the performance 
practice of Goat Island, proposing that its collaborative approach could be understood as 
ecological. I explored how Goat Island’s process of collaboration reflected the ecological 
principles of interconnection, diversity and change, rather than exploring whether the 
subject matter of their work was ecological or not. As a result of that work I wanted to 
develop my arts practice not so much as a means to communicate ecological issues but as a 
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means of experiencing, and providing experiences of, our human interconnections within 
ecology.
Following my undergraduate dissertation, I created Small is Beautiful as my final degree 
piece. In creating this performance I sought to test and develop the desk-based research from 
my dissertation. Small is Beautiful involved a creative inquiry into the question ‘where do we 
come from?’ I spent time working with my mother in the devising and performing of the piece 
and I experimented with materials, such as cardboard, moss and twigs. Through the practical 
process of creating and publicly performing Small is Beautiful I developed a notion of the 
performance process and product as an ecology of diverse parts. The piece involved: 
performing with my mother; making a miniature landscape using the cardboard, twigs and 
moss; re-enacting scenes from The Lord of the Rings in reference to me growing up in a 
‘shire’ (Herefordshire); dressing up as a ‘hobbit’ by taping moss to my feet; movement 
sequences developed by spending time in Herefordshire landscapes; and autobiographical 
texts about my mother and my partner at the time. I felt that it was the complex mix of 
diverse elements, ideas and performance forms that, in part, made the process and 
performance ecological. I also developed an idea that working collaboratively both with 
nonprofessional performers and with nonhuman materials was a key part of my ecological 
approach. On reflection I knew that my collaboration with my mother had not been a full one 
and there had been little space for experimenting with how she could meaningfully 
contribute to the creative process and composition of the piece. I knew that I wanted to 
explore further a practice of working with people (not trained in performance) over the 
whole creative process, and see whether this kind of work might be a key part of an 
ecological approach.
After graduating I worked as apprentice on an intergenerational community project called A 
Little Patch of Ground (2011). This project was conceived of and led by Encounters Arts, a 
company that specialise in designing and delivering participatory arts projects for ‘people of 
all ages and cultures’ (Encounters Arts, 2011a). A Little Patch of Ground is a performance and 
community project that Encounters continues to deliver in urban and rural communities 
across the UK. The particular project I worked on involved two intergenerational groups of 25 
people between five and 85 years meeting in their respective locations (Toynbee Halls in the 
East End of London and Dartington in Devon). The project involved the groups growing their 
own permaculture inspired vegetable garden and, through a variety of media and 
performance activities, exploring thoughts on resources, climate change and sustainability. 
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The project culminated with each group performing in a ‘multi-media performance about 
relationships with the natural world’ (Encounters Arts, 2011b). Through working on the 
project, I was able to explore and affirm my suspicion that simply focusing on environmental 
issues is not necessarily the best way to engage with ecology in its complexity, and I 
experienced the issues and potentials of intergenerational performance as an ecological way 
of working. I found that when activities were focused on environmental issues, participants 
became rather disconnected from each other: adults tended to dominate and there was an 
obvious divide between children and adults. Conversely, when activities focused on creative 
exploration, strong relationships and connections between different participants emerged. 
For example, one activity involved participants telling each other personal stories about a 
moment of connection in nature. During this and other activities I saw the potential of 
intergenerational collaboration: the talents and unique energies of the participants emerged 
in unexpected ways and the group ecology became, as it were, more open and dynamic. 
Unfortunately, the structure of A Little Patch of Ground, with its emphasis on exploring 
environmental issues, meant that there was little opportunity to develop and experiment 
with these more dynamic collaborative performance activities. Indeed, the final performance 
did not evolve through a process of collaboration with the participants, but was structured 
and scripted by the project director, Ruth Ben-Tovim, and then taught to the participants in 
the final four weeks of the five month project. The performance product seemed to be 
overlaid onto the group in a top down approach, and I found this method of working very 
troubling. It resulted in a performance that was not connected to, nor creatively owned by, 
the performers themselves. For me, this approach disrespected the creativities and abilities 
of the participants, as well as the complexities and potentials of performance as a 
collaborative practice. As a result of working on A Little Patch of Ground, I was inspired and 
driven to develop an alternative way of working with children and adults, one that would 
treat them as full, capable and skilled collaborators who are vital parts of an ongoing, open 
and dynamic performance ecology.2
Revising the Research Inquiry
In light of my dissertation research, Small is Beautiful and A Little Patch of Ground, I came to 
the CDA with two research questions in mind. Firstly, I wanted to explore whether 
understanding performance – in process and product – as an ecology would enable me to 
develop methods and practices that enact the ecological. Secondly, I wanted to test out 
14
2 For documentation of Small is Beautiful and A Little Patch of Ground, www.sarahhopfinger.org.uk.
whether intergenerational collaboration would be a particularly dynamic and diverse 
performance ecology through which to develop an ecological practice. So, rather than 
investigate how place-based theatre practices can replace issue-based methods for more 
creative and experiential sustainability learning in schools (as the original brief had 
proposed), my professional artistic and critical research experiences had led me to see that 
there was a pressing gap in practice and scholarship when it came to enacting ecology 
through performance, and this was a gap that I had the artistic expertise and experience to 
explore. I chose, therefore, not to conduct my research at the two primary schools that the 
initial project scoping allowed for, as I wanted to focus on experimenting with the creative 
process of making professional performance and the school context was not necessarily the 
right one for my revised inquiry. (However, I did stay in contact with both schools and their 
head teachers in order to share my research with them. I delivered two workshops with a 
Primary 3 class (seven to eight year olds) at Hillhead early on in my research in order to scope 
out my methods of working with children. I also brought the first performance I created, Age-
Old, to Hillhead, showing it to an intergenerational audience of pupils, teachers and parents. 
The school was an invaluable resource for me in gaining audience feedback from the pupils, 
and I delivered workshops to the pupils who saw Age-Old to get their responses and insights 
into the work, which I then took on board as my research progressed.) At the beginning of my 
CDA I was still committed to exploring place-based performance since this was a field that 
posed relevant questions about how performance can be part of the ecology of a place (see 
Wilkie, 2002; Pearson, 2010). Grasping the potential of the intergenerational as offering a 
distinctive and even definitive response to the challenge of ecological performance making I 
proposed a revised overarching research question – how can a performance practice be 
ecological? I also formulated three sub questions: what does an intergenerational 
performance ecology tell us about wider ecology?; what kind of performance practice 
emerges from an ecological thinking and doing?; and what understandings of ecology emerge 
through the thinking and doing of performance?
My revised questions reflected my creative practice and critical research leading up to 
embarking on my CDA. Given the research context and gaps I had identified within 
performance practice and scholarship, I found that my new questions demonstrated a more 
appropriate and pressing research inquiry than the original brief. My re-negotiations of this 
CDA project also reflect the needs of the non-academic partner. For Catherine Wheels, a key 
motivation for supporting a practice-as-research PhD was to open up to new ways of working. 
My background and expertise in devised non-narrative and movement-based performance and 
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my experiences of working with non-trained performers, differed from the approach taken by 
Catherine Wheels: their shows are largely narrative and character based and the company 
collaborates with playwrights and works with professional actors. These differences in our 
artistic forms and approaches provided an exciting context within which both partners could 
gain new understandings and perspectives on performance. By shifting the research to a more 
relevant inquiry in terms of my professional practice, interests and skills, I could offer 
Catherine Wheels knowledge in what was, for them, a new artistic approach. This exchange 
of practice took place through the mentoring meetings I had with Fitzpatrick and through me 
giving presentations and research updates to the company throughout my CDA.
Thesis Structure
In response to my new research question I chose to work towards a doctoral project that 
would consist of a balanced practice-based thesis. For my research I created two 
performances Age-Old (2012-2013) and Wild Life (2014): Wild Life presents the main body of 
my research, whilst Age-Old worked as a scoping out phase of my inquiry and questions. This 
written thesis frames, elucidates and extends my practice-based findings. This written 
component is structured in two sections: the first explains the research context of my new 
questions and explores the fields of existing work that pertain to my inquiry; and the second 
describes and analyses Age-Old and Wild Life, demonstrating my research process and 
findings.3
Section One consists of three chapters. In Chapter One, ‘Performance’, I discuss the scholarly 
debates and practices in theatre and performance that are relevant to my work, exploring 
what I think they mean for my research and how my research contributes to and extends 
these fields. In Chapter Two, ‘Ecology’, I contextualise and propose my conceptualisation of 
‘ecology’ as a key word in this thesis, exploring specific ecological theories on matter put 
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3  I have shared my research in various contexts throughout my PhD process. These include two publications: a 
conference review about my experiences at the ASSITEJ Next Generations programme in Linz. Austria, in the 
journal Research in Drama Education (2013); and an Artistʼs Pages article, ʻWilding Performanceʼ, in the 
Performing Ecos edition of Performing Ethos (Allen and Preece, 2015). I was interviewed about my research and 
its impact beyond the academy for the University of Glasgowʼs ʻCollege of Art Engagement Blogʼ http://
www.keblog.arts.gla.ac.uk/2016/02/10/the-wildness-of-performance/. I have presented at national and international 
conferences and performance festivals, sharing my research through critical-creative performance papers, 
including Earth Matters on Stage, Reno (2015), Performance, Ecology and Responsibility, Canterbury University 
(2015), Unfix Festival, Centre for Contemporary Arts, Glasgow (2015), Into The New Symposium, Arches, Glasgow 
(2014), Performance & the Environment: New Perspectives on Ecological Performance Making Symposium, 
London (2013), Creative Carbon Scotland, Summerhall, Edinburgh (2013) and Intergenerational Performance, 
MacRobert Art Centre, Stirling (2013).
forward by Jane Bennett and Karen Barad. Given this research context, in Chapter Three, 
‘Methodology’, I explore and demonstrate why a practice-as-research (PaR) methodology was 
the most appropriate and timely approach for exploring my research questions and making an 
original contribution to new knowledge. Section Two consists of two chapters and my 
conclusion. Chapter Four, ‘Exploring Ecological Performance through Intergenerational 
Practice: Age-Old’ and Chapter Five, ‘Wilding Performance: Wild Life’, describe my research 
process and elucidate my findings. For Age-Old I collaborated with a seven year-old girl, 
Carragh McLavin, working with her to co-create a performance that explored and shared our 
intergenerational relationship. I wanted to test whether intergenerational collaboration may 
be a particularly dynamic performance ecology through which to understand and develop an 
ecological practice. For Wild Life I collaborated with eight professional and nonprofessional 
performers aged between nine and 60 years, facilitating a process and directing them in a 
performance that aimed to explore and enact ‘wildness’. My findings from Age-Old were 
included and furthered in Wild Life. With Wild Life I sought to develop an ecological practice 
of intergenerational and human-nonhuman collaboration. Age-Old and Wild Life are 
documented on the accompanying online files as part of this written thesis. The online files 
include full length recordings of both performances as well as specific excerpts from 
rehearsals and performances which highlight elements of my findings. I direct the reader to 
watch these excerpts where appropriate. Finally, my thesis concludes with an assessment of 
what my key findings mean for practices and scholarship within and beyond performance and 
theatre.
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Section One
Research Context and Methodology
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Chapter One – Performance
Introduction
My arts practice has been inspired and influenced by specific approaches to and modes of 
contemporary theatre and performance. I create collaboratively devised process-led 
performance that incorporates a large degree of movement and choreography approaches and 
involves a diverse range of professional and nonprofessional performers.4 My practice has 
been informed by practitioners and scholars woking in the areas of performance and ecology, 
collaboration and directing in devised performance, movement and ecology, and performance 
and nonprofessional performers. In this chapter I discuss how each of these areas represent 
the research context of my work and in what ways they inform my practice-as-research 
inquiry into how performance can be and do the ecological. In doing so, I propose how my 
research attends to specific limitations and gaps within these areas of practice and 
scholarship. Firstly, however, I introduce and discuss my key term of this chapter: 
performance.
Throughout my thesis I use the term ‘performance’. It is necessary to briefly introduce the 
ways in which I use this term in order to qualify the different processes of performance 
engaged with in this thesis. I predominantly use ‘performance’ to refer to the creative artistic  
process of making performance and to the theatrical productions themselves, which have 
been created through that process. Hence, I refer to the performance process or the 
production itself depending on whether I am discussing the practices of making and creating 
or the public event of the performance. However, the distinctions between process and 
performance are not always clear cut and a key idea of my thesis is that process and product 
are not separable domains of performance practice. I propose that the performance event is 
a kind of carrying on of the creative process as opposed to an end product of it. Whilst there 
are no tidy ways of separating out processes and products, I make distinctions between them 
as much as possible. I sometimes use the phrase ‘performance practice’ to refer 
simultaneously to the artistic process of making and the performance event itself. Working 
with the distinctions between, and inseparability of, process and product is a vital part of my 
reflexive analysis of how performance practice can be ecological.
19
4 For more details about my practice, www.sarahhopfinger.org.uk.
At specific points in this written thesis I use the term ‘performance’ in a broader sense to 
refer to the performances of diverse humans and nonhumans - their performativity. This use 
of ‘performance’ extends from the performative turn that has taken place across academic 
disciplines within and beyond performance studies (a key expounder of this broader notion of 
performance is Judith Butler who discusses gender as performative (1988)). Since the 1960s 
performance has come to be understood in terms of all human and cultural activities (see, for 
example, Schechner, 2006). Under this broad definition of ‘performance’, what and how we 
(humans) act - how we perform - is understood to (re)constitute our various individual and 
collective identities; identities are performed as opposed to essentially existing. 
Performance, in this usage, is read across all human activity, and so, for example, the 
quotidian performances of gender are what (re)construct gender identities (Butler, 1988). 
However, in my thesis I draw on theorists who discuss performativity not only in relation to 
the human but also to the nonhuman (Barad, 2007 and Bennett, 2010). Extending from this I 
also use ‘performance’ in relation to ecologies themselves, whereby I contend that any 
ecology (whether it be an environmental, social or performance ecology) has the capacity to 
effect and be effected by other ecologies: the ecosystem as a system performs. This 
approach resonates with the idea presented by Baz Kershaw that ‘we are fundamentally 
performed by Earth’s ecologies’ (2015, p. 113, italics in original). I return to this idea later in 
the chapter.
 
Performance and Ecology
I have identified two main critical approaches to ‘performance’ and ‘ecology’ in this field of 
practice and scholarship. The first, led by US scholars Una Chaudhuri, Theresa May and Wendy 
Arons, focuses on how theatre and performance can ‘represent and thematize’ ecology and 
ecological issues from a ‘material’ (Arons and May, 2012, p. 2) or ‘literal’ (Chaudhuri, 1994, p. 
29) standpoint. The second applies a concept of ecology to performance and can be identified 
in Bonnie Marranca’s Ecologies of Theater (1996) and in the approach Bottoms and Goulish 
take of reflecting on Goat Island’s performance work through the frame of ‘ecological 
thinking’ (2007, n.p.). I show that there are some limitations in these two main approaches 
for my project, and therefore go on to explore the small number of other perspectives in the 
field that offer more complex treatments of ‘performance’ and ‘ecology’.
In her essay ‘There Must Be A Lot of Fish in That Lake: Towards an Ecological Theatre’ 
Chaudhuri poses the rhetorical question ‘are we human beings – and our activities, such as 
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theater – an integral part of nature, or are we somehow radically separate from it?’ (1994, p. 
27). Her question implicates theatre events, and the creative practices of making theatre, as 
inevitably part of ‘nature’. She proposes that theatre can demonstrate its integral part in 
‘nature’ by doing away with natural ‘metaphors’ and making ‘a turn towards the 
literal’ (1994, p. 29). Arons and May follow suit, calling for performance practice and 
scholarship to take a ‘material-ecological standpoint’, rather than reduce ecology to a 
metaphorical ‘aesthetic systems theory’ that describes relations between ‘production and 
reception, actors and space, or theater and its social context’ (2012, p. 2-3). Their notion of 
involving ecology in material rather than metaphorical ways can be identified in theatre 
companies who aim to bring greater awareness to the environment and environmental issues. 
Whirlybird Theatre Company uses both manufactured and ‘natural’ materials in their 
performances (in their production The Worm – An Underground Adventure, a wormery with 
real worms and soil was part of the performance).5 In my reading of their work, the actuality 
of ‘natural’ objects onstage is part of their aim to bring attention to the ‘natural world’ (Eco 
Drama, 2015a). In a different but related vein, Sue Palmer discusses the solo show Let’s get 
some weather in here by performance artist Mary Southcott: Palmer reflects on a moment in 
the performance where Southcott switches on a fan that blows the real daffodils that are 
onstage, describing it as a moment where ‘the outside is suddenly on the inside . . . The 
daffodils have performed for us’ (Palmer, 2015, p. 60). In both of these productions the 
emphasis is on bringing the more-than-human onto the stage. Arons and May imply that by 
representing ‘ecology’ through literally including the more-than-human onstage, a greater 
awareness of the materiality of ecology and of ecological issues can be achieved for an 
audience. These critical perspectives and performance practices seem to usefully challenge 
anti-ecological presumptions about the separation between inside and outside and culture 
and nature. By avoiding the reduction of ‘nature’ to metaphor through literally bringing 
objects from ‘the outdoor environment’ onto the theatre stage, practitioners may indeed 
draw attention to ecology as a material reality. Focusing on these material-ecological 
representations, as opposed to rendering ‘ecology’ merely as a conceptual idea that we can 
apply to a performance system to better understand its relations, may indeed challenge the 
‘binary thinking’ that is ‘carrying us to the brink of ecological collapse’ (Arons and May, 2012, 
p. 1). This focus on ecology in literal and material terms is something that my practice-as-
research projects tested out and expanded upon, wherein I explored how theatrical 
performances may succeed in being ecological insomuch as they can demonstrate how we 
humans and our cultural practices of performance are inseparable from the wider ecologies of 
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5 I saw this performance at Paisley Arts Centre, February 2014.
environment and the more-than-human. However, upon further examination of these artistic 
and scholarly approaches to performance and ecology, there is a risk that the complexity of 
ecologies is ignored due to underlying presumptions about ‘ecology’ being some ‘thing’ that 
needs to be brought onto the stage.
Whilst Arons and May emphasise ecology as materiality, they also call for practitioners and 
scholars to find ways to represent and thematise the ‘more-than-human world on 
stage’ (2012, p. 1). Their proposal that the ‘material-ecological’ should replace the 
‘metaphorical’ draws metaphor and material as dichotomies, which is limiting when it comes 
to my inquiry into developing an ecological practice, where performance might enact the 
ecological through its very structures and methods of creative practice. In my reseach I found 
that ecological enactment inevitably involves representation, metaphor, the literal and the 
material, where these are impossible to disentangle. Indeed, in response to Arons and May, 
Bottoms helpfully questions whether ‘nature and metaphoricity are in any way separable’, 
asking ‘[i]sn’t the human relationship with nature always already performed and 
performative?’ (2007, p. 19). By focusing only on representing ecology in the theatre I think 
that Arons and May risk reducing ecology to a ‘thing’ or object, and a singular one at that. By 
calling for the materiality of the more-than-human to be brought ‘inside’ onto the theatre 
stage in order to be better represented, they presuppose that ecology is in the first place 
‘outside’ of theatre spaces and performances. Furthermore, by claiming performance should 
focus on representing ecology – by arguing that performance should be about ecology – they 
do not pay attenion to how performance can be and do the ecological. Thus, and somewhat 
ironically, they seem to favour a representational over an actual engagement with ecology.
Arons and May also demonstrate an over-simplified treatment of ecology through  proposing 
that performance should (merely) engage with ‘material-ecological issues’ (2012, p. 2). This 
attributes a rather limiting and instrumentalist identity to performance, reducing ‘ecology’ 
merely to ‘issues’. They problematically assume that ‘ecology’ has to (and can) be brought 
into performance practices by humans in the form of materiality and thematic issue. As such, 
their critical approach reframes ecology as a material reality that is separable from the social 
and cultural, whereby they largely exclude any complex understanding of ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’ as mutually constitutive and co-produced (Szerszynski, Heim and Waterton, 2003, p. 
4). I think that Arons and May risk reinventing the issues that surround the concept of 
‘nature’ through their reductive treatment of ‘ecology’. ‘Nature’ is a concept that has been 
recurrently criticised for reinstating ‘the environment’ as outside of, or the background to, 
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human endeavour (see, for example, Morton, 2009; Bennett, 2010 and Barad, 2007). Whilst 
Arons and May deem metaphorical usages of ‘ecology’ as serving only to ‘sanitize’ the term 
(2012, p. 3), I propose that, in fact, they enact their own sanitisation of ‘ecology’ by reducing 
the ecological to representation, theme and issue, and by reinstating it as separable from 
‘performance’. By arguing that the material-ecological must be brought onto the theatre 
stage they (inadvertently) assume ‘ecology’ is in the first instance outside of, and separated 
from, theatres and their ‘performances’. In this way I find that their approach limits and even 
inhibits the scope for a complex treatment of performance (in) ecology and my proposition 
that performance (in process and theatrical event) is an ecology that continuously and 
inevitably participates within the wider ecology of Earth.
The idea that performance is ecological when it represents ‘ecology’ through works that are 
about ‘the natural environment’ and ‘ecological issues’ is reflected in many performance 
approaches that claim an ecological or environmental focus. Whirlybird Theatre Company 
engage with the ‘natural world’ as a topic and theme: its work aims to allow audiences to ‘re-
imagine our relationship to the natural world’ (Eco Drama, 2015b). Scottish company Feral 
Theatre creates theatre shows that are about environmental issues – its current piece Freaks 
of Nature is, the Company’s publicity states, ‘about extinction’ (http://feraltheatre.co.uk/
past-productions/, no date). Puppet State Theatre Company produced a children’s theatre 
show, The Man Who Planted Trees (2013), which is described as ‘environmental’ in that it 
retells the story of ‘a shephard who plants a forest’ (http://www.puppetstate.com/shows/
the-man-who-planted-trees/, no date). Puppet State used real branches to represent the 
trees planted by the shephard: I felt that this use of ‘natural’ materials to represent ‘the 
environment’ risked objectifying ecology.6 Whilst the show may have told an inspiring 
environmental story, the production’s purely representational approach seemed to me to 
reinstate ‘the environment’ as something ‘out there’ beyond the here and now of the live 
performance. I am not suggesting that ecological performance should avoid being about or 
representing ecology and ecological issues. Rather, by merely focusing on and representing 
‘ecology’ as theme and issue, scholarship and practice neglects the ecological potentials of 
performance forms, practices and methods. My research shows that the ecological-ness of 
performance is not necessarily in its subject matter or thematic content, but in what 
performance does. I set out to explore how performance process and public event might, in 
their very doing, enact our unavoidable entanglements with each (human) other, the more-
than-human and other ecologies(including environmental / ‘natural’ ones). 
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6 I saw this performance at the Scottish Storytelling Centre at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, August 2013.
There is a real risk that the very thinking that artists are often aiming to change – that ‘the 
environment’ or ‘nature’ is separate from ‘humans’ and ‘culture’ – can be inadvertently 
reinstated by the theatrical methods and forms of the work. That is, when theatre practices 
treat ‘ecology’ merely as thematic content, or as something ‘outside’ to be brought into the 
theatre in the form of ‘natural’ objects, they risk drawing the inside (theatre) and outside 
(ecology) as separable domains, as initially fixed dichotomies. The referenced companies and 
artists do not, I am sure, assume this dischotomous relation, and indeed it is important to 
note that these cited theatre works are not critically-informed research practices. These 
types of practices play an important role within the diverse field of ecological performance, 
yet what my analysis of them illuminates is that the ecological potentials of theatre and 
performance are missed when ‘ecology’ is reductively treated only as representation, theme, 
issue or ‘natural’ material. I have thus found there to be more possibilities for developing an 
ecological performance practice in the second approach I have identified in the field.
The second predominant approach is to apply concepts of ecology to performance practice. 
Bonnie Marranca interprets Robert Wilson’s Gilgamesh play The Forest as an ‘ecology’ because 
he ‘chooses all manner of species of texts and images from the world archive, then stages 
their fertility and adaptability in new environments’ (1993 p. 78). She implies that 
performance can be ecological in its form, where the theatrical form can embody the 
ecological principles of, for example, adaptability. My research tests out and extends this 
approach by exploring how  performance can enact the ecological through its very practices 
and forms of doing. Goulish articulates Goat Island performances as ecologies on the grounds 
that they are ‘closed systems’ where ‘each moment in some way points equally to each other 
moment’ (in Bottoms and Goulish, 2007, p. 178). This idea relates to Marranca by further 
implying how performances themselves can act like ecosystems in terms of the form and 
structure of the production itself. Goat Island performer Karen Christopher suggests how, in 
the collaborative working process of Goat Island, ‘we try to ensure that the elements and 
ideas that come in . . . are as interconnected as the elements of a complex eco-system’ (in 
Bottoms and Goulish, 2007, p. 119).  For Christopher, the collaborative process is ecological 
because it is sustained by the diversity of and interconnections between the human 
collaborators and their different ideas; the process of creating performance works like a 
complex environmental ecosystem. Such perspectives, taken together, suggest how 
collaborative performance – in process and product – works like an ecology. I have tested out 
and extended these ideas by exploring how performance practices might enact the ecological. 
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However, by proposing that performance process and product are like ecosystems, there is a 
risk that ‘ecology’ is deployed in the critical literature merely as a useful analogy for the 
human activities of performance. Treating ‘ecology’ as a systems concept to be mapped onto 
performance processes and products may epitomise the metaphorical usage that Arons and 
May claim serves only to ‘sanitize’ the term and eschew ‘its political as well as its material-
ecological implications’ (2012, p. 3). However, this critique ignores the nuances entailed in 
what it means to treat performance as an ecosystem. What this second approach (which is 
largely characterised by the work of Goat Island) may actually do - or what it can lead  to - is 
a more complex treatment of performance ecologies: this approach paves the way for me to 
explore and coax out the ecological potential of collaborative devised performance practices 
(which is what I do in the following section of this chapter). In taking this approach, it is vital 
to consider what conceptualisations of ‘ecology’ are being used in relation to performance. In 
my reading, the risk with the analogy-based applications of ecology to performance (as I 
identified in Marranca, 1993 and Bottoms and Goulish, 2007), is that ‘ecology’ is collapsed 
into simple interconnections: ecology is used predominantly as a concept for describing 
connections between elements in (human) performance systems. Anthropologist Tim Ingold 
challenges the concept of connection, accounting for ecology not as ‘a network of connected 
points, but a meshwork of interwoven lines’ (2011, p. 64). He argues that to propose 
connections between one thing and another is to assume a prior separation between them: 
‘things are their relations’ he writes (2011, p. 70). Ecologies are, in Ingold’s view, inherently 
open because they are ‘a proliferation of loose ends’ and so the continuity and sustainability 
of life depends on ‘a world that is not fully joined up, not fully articulated’ (2013, p. 132). If 
an environmental ecology is fully joined up, with each element pointing equally to every 
other element as Goulish suggests with Goat Island performances, then it cannot sustain 
itself.7 In terms of Ingold’s implication that ecology is an open, ongoing and dynamic 
‘meshwork’, to describe a constant sate of equilibrium and (complete) interconnection is to 
describe a dead ecology and therefore not an ecology. By conceptualising ‘ecology’ 
reductively as a closed network this critical approach risks merely drawing analogies between 
‘performance’ and ‘ecology’ and thereby (and in a different way to the first approach I 
identified) reducing them to separable domains.
 
The two main approaches in scholarship and practice I have outlined risk (in different ways) 
reducing ‘ecology’ to something we can bring into performance from the outside, configuring 
25
7  Interestingly the new company that has replaced Goat Island is called Every House Has a Door: perhaps the 
ʻdoorʼ implies a more open practice than the closure suggested by the symbolism of an ʻislandʼ in ʻGoat Islandʼ?
‘performance’ and ‘ecology’ as separable. With the first approach we humans bring the 
material reality of ‘ecology’ into our ‘performances’ through ecological representations, 
themes and issues. In the second, we analogously apply the concept of ‘ecology’ as a network 
in order to critically understand ‘performance’ as an interconnected system of diverse 
elements. Both of these approaches inadvertently imply that ‘ecology’ is something to be 
used by humans, which could even (re)instate ‘ecology’ as a resource for humans to take 
from. Both approaches seem to assume that we can somehow view ‘ecology’ from a distance 
and at a remove, implying that we have a choice about whether to include ‘ecology’ in 
‘performance’, and whether ‘performance’ participates in ‘ecology’. This assumption is also 
evident in the way that Giannachi and Stewart discuss the ‘interface between ecology and 
arts’ (2005, p. 20): an ‘interface’ implies that ‘art’ is initially separate from ‘ecology’. 
Timothy Morton proposes that all art is ‘ecological insofar as it is made from materials and 
exists in the world’ (2010, p. 11). He implies that ecology unavoidably figures in all art and all 
art unavoidably participates in the wider ecology of Earth. I think that to treat ecology as 
something we can choose to represent materially in our performances is to presuppose 
performance is different from ecology, and to use ecology as an analogy of performance 
supposes that performance is merely like ecology. I argue that there is no choice about being 
in ecology and I take as reality that we are always already acting in and acted upon by 
diverse ecologies: performance is (in) ecology. From this standpoint, my research builds on 
the two approaches I have identified, and I develop the ecological possibilities of 
performance in a different direction by asking: what might an ecological practice do? I think 
that working with binaries between ‘performance’ and ‘ecology’ is, however, unavoidable 
across all artistic practices that engage with ecology, and my research is of course no 
exception. For me, the question is whether and how scholars and practitioners are reflexive 
in their thinking and doing of performance and ecology, and how the paradoxes that will 
inevitably arise are taken into account. Indeed, some thinkers in the field propose that it is 
by theatre working with and exposing the binary thinking - in particular that binary divide 
between culture and nature - that theatre can disrupt and refigure binaries. 
Kershaw proposes that theatre has played a key role in upholding the ‘disastrous opposition’ 
that modernist traditions of European ‘enlightenment’ pitched between ‘culture’ and 
‘nature’ and ‘man’ and ‘environment’ (2007, p. 15). He  discusses how theatre has, for the 
most part, attempted to ‘hold a mirror up to “nature” ’, which has tended to ‘hermetically 
seal it off from the “natural world” ’ (2007, p. 7). He suggests that, if performance exposes 
this complicit role it has played in upholding the nature / culture binary, it could offer 
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revisions to that binary. He draws on Chaudhuri’s proposition that, by ‘making space on its 
stage for ongoing acknowledgements of the rupture it participates in – the rupture between 
nature and culture . . . – the theater can become the site of a much-needed ecological 
consciousness’ (1994, p. 28). By ‘rupture’ Chaudhuri is referring to the part that theatre has 
played in the nineteenth century humanist tradition of constructing ‘nature’ as dichotomous 
to ‘culture’ and ‘society’: she argues that ‘humanism located its shaky foundations on the 
growing gap between the social and natural worlds’ (1994, p. 23). Kershaw suggests that 
postmodern performance, in particular, may be ‘a strong arena for such revisions, because its 
reflexivity may most crucially challenge the dualisms of modernism’ (2005, p. 79). He argues 
that the paradox and irony of ‘postmodern pastiche’ are well-suited qualities for revising the 
culture-nature divide (2007, p. 273). To illustrate this, Kershaw uses the example of an 
activist performance by Earth First in Yellowstone National Park in 1985, where a man dresses 
as a bear in order to draw attention to the ecological damage caused by logging (2007, p. 
268-272). Kershaw discusses the paradox of a human protester ‘taking over’ nature (dressing 
up as a bear) at the same time as he is ‘taking the side of nature’ by using 
‘anthropomorphism to attack the Forest Service for the ecological damage it condones’ (2007, 
p. 270). Kershaw argues that this action, that draws on ‘postmodern performance art in its 
playing with the pastiche sham of dressing up as a bear’, is an example of how ‘performance 
ecologies [can] generate a more hopeful prognosis for nature’ (2007, p. 271; p. 272). He 
suggests that this performance by Earth First is successful in ecological terms because it 
‘transformed the contradictions of its practices into paradoxes’ (2007, p. 272, my italics). He 
implies that paradoxical postmodern performance can enact how we and our practices are 
nature, as opposed to separate from it.
This idea of paradox is explored by researcher Lisa Woynarski. She offers a critical account of 
Fevered Sleep’s The Weather Factory (Wales 2010), a piece that could be considered 
postmodern pastiche. A house in a Welsh town was ‘installed’ with ‘weather’ – the bathroom 
was covered with growing moss and it was raining in the basement – and so the ‘weather’ was 
ironically ‘brought indoors’ and human audiences were ‘implicated in a relationship with 
[it]’ (Woynarski, 2015a). Woynarski argues that immersing audience members in the 
installation served to reveal ‘the way the weather shapes human action and identity and the 
way humans shape the climate’ (2015b, p. 25). The performance installation reflected the 
‘paradox of performance and ecology’ because it simultaneously embodied and disrupted 
‘binary thinking’ between inside and outside, and the piece could open up ‘an affective space 
in which to interrogate our relationship to the more-than-human world’ (Woynarski, 2015a). 
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This resonates with Kerhaw’s suggestion that theatre can be used as a tool of communication 
to dismantle and reshape itself, or to half repeat an error in order to know how to avoid it 
(2007, p. 18). Through her example and analysis, Woynarski demonstrates the potential of 
performance to both embody and revise culture / nature and inside / outside binaries through 
turning its contradictions of practice into productive paradoxes. Kershaw argues that 
performance, in its various manifestations within and beyond the theatrical frame, is a 
‘paradoxical affair’ since it is both real and not real and ephemeral and durable, and 
performance ‘exists always in an ontologically subjunctive mode’ (2007, p. 25). These 
paradoxical aspects of performance make it a potentially powerful way to engage with 
ecology (2007, p. 25). This approach seems at odds with theorist Brian Massumi who, in his 
preface to philosopher and choreographer Erin Manning’s book Always More Than One, 
Individuations Dance (2013), argues that even if we seek to transcend binaries, by working 
with them at all we inevitably evoke habits of thinking that are difficult to ‘shake off’ (in 
Manning, 2013, p. x). He discusses how Manning’s ecological practice and theoretical writing 
take the non-binary notion of ‘reciprocity’ as her ‘launching pad’ (in Manning, 2013, p. ix). 
Whilst Massumi and Manning demonstrate a healthy suspicion of binaries, their approach 
seems rather simplistic and idealistic in its outright dismissal of binaries. It is arguably 
impossible to ever fully avoid using, and thinking with, binaries. Perhaps supposing that we 
can fully jettison binaries is to ultimately enact a fixed binary approach, in that the options 
are presented as either to work or not work with binaries? A more realistic approach emerges 
when the inevitability of binaries is taken into account such that through working and 
experimenting with them we might - even momentarily - transgress their rigidity, limitations 
and dangers. This resonates with how Morton describes what he calls the ‘ecological thought’: 
he suggests ecology can be encountered through even the most anti-ecological ideas and so 
even ‘at the limit of dualism, we [can] encounter ecology’ (2010, p. 95).
Kershaw discusses his own critical approach of writing about performance and ecology. Part of 
developing healthier ‘ecologies of performance’ is, for Kershaw, a question of wrestling with 
the ‘dominant meaning of key words bequeathed by modernism’ such as ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’ as oppositional entities, wherein all discussions of ecology have to engage with the 
‘game’ of linguistic challenge and transformation (2007, p. 17). He implies that by embracing 
binaries as productive paradoxes, rather than treating them as contradictions to be 
transcended or ignored, we can engage with the complexities that are required in engaging 
with ecology. This is because ecology, in its very definition, is arguably a paradox. Kershaw 
explores the etymology of ‘ecology’, explaining how the word ‘derives from the Greek !ἶ"!# 
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(oikos, “household”) and $%&!# (logos, “study”), which implies both “study of the house” and 
“study in house” of nature’ (2007, p. 16). So, when humans name, study or explore ecology 
we can paradoxically only do so from being in it as we are always already part of Earth’s 
wider ecologies no matter what we are doing or where we are. Through his concept of 
‘performance ecologies’ Kershaw usefully shows that performance can never not be in 
ecology, implying that ecological performance must begin from the reality that we are 
exploring something (ecology) that we are always already part of. Along my research 
trajectory, an underlying question emerged: how can performance engage with something - 
ecology - that we are always already living, thinking, doing and performing in? This question 
challenges those general trends I identified in the theoretical approaches which bring or map 
‘ecology’ in / onto ‘performance’. I suggest that ecological performance is neither about 
bringing ‘ecology’ into my work nor bringing my work ‘outside’ into ‘ecology’, but instead is 
about embracing the paradoxes of my work in order to practice the inevitability of 
performance as an ecology that is always already participating in wider ecologies: culture and 
nature, human and nonhuman, and inside and outside as inseparably involved – and 
implicated – in performance. Kershaw draws attention to homologies, rather than analogies, 
between ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ ecologies (2007, p. 22). For Kershaw, performance is not 
merely ‘like’ an ecosystem, but is one: performance ecologies are not analogies of 
environmental (or other) ecologies but are homologous to them. In this sense, there is no 
given or fixed separation between human and nonhuman, culture and nature, and 
performance and ecology. A key aspect in my research approach was the necessity for, on the 
one hand, a continued suspicion of and challenge to binary thinking and doing and, on the 
other hand, an embrace of the inevitability of (re)using and (re)constructing binaries and the 
useful paradoxes that can be evoked through them in practice and critical reflection. Indeed, 
the reflexive accounts of my research projects (Chapters Four and Five) demonstrate how 
separations and binaries are an inevitable part of the performance process and analysis, 
where ideas of culture / nature, inside / outside, performance / ecology and human / 
nonhuman are implicitly used throughout my work. What became key during my research was 
how to resist both fixing these binary categories down and being fixed down by these 
categories, so that whilst binaries may inevitably be (re)used they are unable to override the 
ecological complexity and potentials of the practice-as-research projects. Transforming the 
contradictions of practices and theorisations into productive paradoxes enabled me to explore 
how performance can do the ecological in terms of the devising process and the performance 
event.
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Kershaw argues that ‘theatre and performance in all their manifestations always involve the 
interrelational interdependence of “organisms-in-environments”’ (2007, p. 16). He introduces 
the terms ‘ecologies of theatre’ and ‘ecologies of performance’ by proposing that they 
reference ‘the study – and the knowledge it produces – of theatres and performances when 
they are considered as ecosystems’ (2007, p. 16). I want to build on Kershaw’s approach 
through exploring the questions: what kind of performance practice emerges from an 
ecological thinking and doing; and, what understandings of ecology emerge through the 
thinking and doing of performance? This latter question demonstrates that if performance is 
an ecology then performance may have a lot to tell us about other (actual) ecologies.
I can identify Kershaw’s notions of ‘performance ecology’ and ‘ecologies of performance’ in 
the approach taken by performance practitioner Nic Green.8 Green describes herself as an 
artist who ‘remains committed to developing creative work which can be named as ecological 
in it’s nature, in the sense that her practice focuses on the study of relationships’, and it is 
stated that the ‘political aim of this work is to (re) understand and (re) present the narrative 
of the individual as a part of a mutually dependent ecological paradigm’ (http://
www.nicgreen.org.uk/#!__about, no date). My project both resonates with and extends 
Green’s approach of creating performance that is ‘ecological in it’s nature’ in that I explore 
and develop a critically informed practice that might do the ecological through its creative 
modes and artistic forms of process and product. Interestingly Kershaw does not offer any 
sustained discussion about the creative process of making performance. My research attends 
to these gaps in practice and scholarship. I explore what is at stake when we attend to 
performance as an ecosystem that itself participates within the wider interdependencies of 
diverse ecologies. To do this, I attempted to devise and develop practices that could account 
for, and emerge through, human-nonhuman and performance-ecology inseparability. I now 
turn to those perspectives that offer insights into how human and nonhuman actants are 
implicated in performance processes and products.
Artist and scholar Minty Donald draws from Jane Bennett’s concept of ‘vibrant matter’ (2010) 
to demonstrate how process and performance involve, and emerge through, human and 
nonhuman vibrancy. Donald reflects on her site-specific work Bridging (Glasgow, 2010 and 
2012). The piece involved working with a boat crew to thread rope repeatedly across the 
River Clyde in an act of ‘bridging’ (Donald, 2014, p. 118-121). She discusses how the tide, 
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8 Nic Green is a colleague and friend who I have worked with on a number of occasions as a student and artist 
over the past nine years (including her feminist performance project Trilogy).
river, rope and weather were unpredictable agencies effecting the process and performance: 
‘the messy and unplanned emotions and actions of the boat crew, ourselves [the artists], and 
the spectators’ became ‘potentially disruptive and uncontrollable forces, intermingled with 
those of tide and weather.’ (2014, p. 124). Donald articulates an approach to performance 
that understands process and product as a complex and inclusive ‘interplay between human 
and more-than-human agencies’ (2014, p. 121). She also demonstrates a performance 
practice which enacts, as opposed to merely represents, human and nonhuman vibrant 
matter.9 My research builds on Donald’s notion of the ‘interplay between’ humans and 
nonhumans through developing practices that can enact the inseparability of humans and 
nonhumans. Whilst it is impossible to avoid using the binary terms and concepts of ‘human’ 
and ‘nonhuman’, my research finding, just doing-ness, captures how performance might 
demonstrate human-nonhuman entanglement as opposed to only demonstrating human-
nonhuman connection or interplay (where these notions presume an initial separation 
between humans and nonhumans).10 Through my invention and use of  just doing-ness I 
demonstrate the way  my ecological practice was able to, at times, embrace the complexity 
of how ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’ are constantly constituted through intra-activity: how 
‘we’ and ‘others’ are always already intra-active and intra-acting. ‘Intra-activity’ is a concept 
put forward by Karen Barad, which refers to how all (human and nonhuman) ‘phenomena’ are 
constituted through the entangled dynamics of matter (2007, p. 139). For me, entanglement 
is not a case of humans entangling with nonhumans: that is, entanglement does not refer to 
the knotting together of originally separable humans and nonhumans. Rather, I use the notion 
of ‘entanglement’ to reference the ways in which all ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’ are 
continuously produced through, and participate in, the ongoing and dynamic entanglements 
of matter.
Battista explores German artist Wolfgang Laib's work through the lens of Barad’s concept of 
‘agential realism’, a philosophy that Battista frames as a posthumanist perspective for 
problematising the privileged human position in the world (Battista, 2012, p. 67). Laib is a 
visual artist who collaborates with ‘natural’ materials, such as pollen, wood and beeswax, 
and whose artwork is underpinned by the intra-active process between him and the material 
(Battista, 2012, p. 67-8). Battista proposes that Laib’s method of working with pollen 
embodies a posthumanist vision of the human as entangled in a web of relations and as not 
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9  As already argued, representation can be part of enactment. I do not wish to construct representation and 
enactment as binary oppositions.
10 I discuss just doing-ness in Chapter Five.
the ‘only agentic actor’ (2012, p. 67). Battista describes Laib’s action of collecting pollen 
from a field, where his artistic process becomes part of that ecosystem: according to 
Battista, Laib ‘collaborates in a continuing creative process’ with ‘the plants producing the 
pollen’ (2012, p. 71). Laib removes the pollen from its context of plants and puts it into an 
arts space, which Battista proposes is a ‘strategic choice that sets a local structure for the 
pollen, its new boundaries, allowing its properties to emerge and become differentially 
manifested’ (2012, p. 71). She suggests how the rectangular shapes of pollen that Laib 
creates ‘acquire value and meaning in themselves, for the pollen is not there to communicate 
something more or different from the physical performance of its own materiality’ (2012, p. 
72). Battista argues that the nonhuman (pollen) can, as it were, speak for itself, implying how 
art might resist an anthropocentric narrative of us humans choosing to use or represent 
‘nonhumans’ and ‘ecology’ in our work. Battista’s account suggests how the creative process 
and art piece emerge through human-nonhuman entanglement, which resonates with my 
claim that performance practice - in process and product - is an ecology of diverse human and 
nonhuman collaborators. Furthermore, Battista implies how agency emerges in the enactment 
of intra-activity: rather than attributing agency to the artist or the pollen, this account 
reveals what I chose to describe in my research findings as the agency of practice.11
However, Battista seems to reconfigure a rather reductive human-nonhuman relation when 
she claims that the artist ‘is transformed into an instrument for the material to become and 
express itself’: Laib, she proposes, finds ‘the right conditions for the actor / pollen to stand 
out and flare into visibility on stage’ (2012, p. 72, italics in original). Battista inadvertently 
implies that Laib, the human, disappears from the art, to be replaced by the pollen, the 
nonhuman. This demonstrates a tendency in ecology-based arts practices to render the 
human invisible. Instead of ‘an anthropocentric drama’, with the nonhuman as ‘scenic 
backdrop’ (Bottoms, Franks and Kramer, 2012, p. 1), the nonhuman takes centre stage and 
the human is somewhere in the background. By focusing on the nonhuman over the human, I 
think that Battista reinvents an anthropocentric approach: in her account the human is the 
instrument that allows the nonhuman to ‘stand out’ and be ‘visible’, implying the human still 
has ultimate agency. In my research project Wild Life I sought neither to foreground the 
human nor the nonhuman but to allow the performance to emerge through their 
entanglements. This may be an impossible task since arguably we cannot escape our human 
(centered) perspectives. However, I found that my paradoxical attempt to foreground neither 
human nor nonhuman allowed a nuanced practice to emerge, a practice which was attentive 
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11 I discuss this finding in Chapter Five.
to the performance ecology of distinct yet entangled humans and nonhumans.  Furthermore, I 
developed a practice where humans are not rendered as instruments for nonhuman agency 
but rather humans participate in agency, where agency is always already a matter of dynamic 
and ongoing human-nonhuman entanglement.
Whilst I contend that any performance or theatre practice is an ecology which is inevitably 
part of the wider ecologies of the Earth, this is an unhelpfully generalist claim when it comes 
to exploring and actually developing an ecological performance practice. A tendency to be 
overly broad is evident in other contributions to the performance and ecology field. Sally 
Jane Norman draws on Barad’s concept of ‘agential materialism’ (2007) but, unlike Battista 
who applies Barad to a specific example of practice, Norman simply proposes that all theatre 
is an ‘encounter of human and nonhuman agency’ and an ‘open ended’ apparatus that is 
always in the process of ‘intra-acting with other apparatuses’ (2012, p. 119). In a similarly 
generalising way, John-David Dewsbury draws on Jane Bennett (2010) and makes the rather 
sweeping claim that the ‘practiced immediacy of any performance art’ can open ‘up ways of 
staging . . . the active lure of material affordance’ (2012, p. 81). He implies that any 
performance might bring attention to the vibrancy of matter. Whilst Norman and Dewsbury 
provide useful provocations for the performance and ecology field by suggesting that all 
theatre and performance art involves the human and nonhuman, ultimately they offer little in 
terms of addressing how performance (in process and product) can not only work with, but 
also reveal and account for, its material human-nonhuman ‘intra-activity’ and ‘vibrancy’. I 
wanted to avoid such a generalising approach, seeking to develop a more nuanced account of 
the actualities of a distinctive intergenerational performance ecology and the specific 
practices which were explored and developed. I explored how performance can enact its 
ecological participation, which meant working beyond claiming and showing that performance 
is an ecology that always participates in wider ecologies to actually developing practices that 
– in their doing – can enact and expose this participation. I found that part of this ecological 
enactment involves a practice of attentive listening and responsiveness to, what can be 
called, the ‘feedback’ of the performance ecology.
Kershaw argues that, in order to respond to ecological imperatives, we need to attend to 
what Bateson describes as negative feedback loops (1972). To achieve ‘sustainability all 
[ecological] systems rely on circuits of feedback . . . [and this] is called negative feedback 
because it prevents the system from running out of control through overproduction in any one 
or more of its parts’ (Kershaw, 2007, p. 52). Kershaw implies that, whether a riverbank or 
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performance (2007, p. 147), ecologies communicate when any of their parts become too 
dominant. What matters is whether, and how, negative feedback is heeded and responded to. 
If we ignore it, which he suggests theatre and performance practice tends to do, then the 
ecology is ‘in trouble’ (2007, p. 195; p. 53). He implies that, whilst humans have never 
stopped being part of wider ecology, we do run the risk of not knowing how to register and 
respond to its feedback. Heddon implies an approach for registering and responding to 
ecological feedback through her conceptualisation of performance practice as ‘entangled 
listening’. She describes a ‘dialogical listening which stretches a radical openness towards 
interconnections, “listening with”’. She explores how the one-on-one work of performance 
artist Adrian Howells cultivated ‘a careful attending – a stretching towards’ his human 
participants and the ‘objects’ in his performances. She proposes that his work was ‘an 
invitation to attend’ and to listen ‘beyond the human’ and it therefore potentially displaced 
‘the exceptionalism of the human (as) actor’ (Heddon, forthcoming). Her discussions imply 
‘entangled listening’ as a practice of participating in, and attending to, the human and 
nonhuman participants / collaborators of performance ecologies. This frames my proposal 
that collaboration is a key part of ecological performance practice, where who and what the 
collaborators of performance are is questioned, critiqued and reconceptualised. My research 
thus involved a radical re-conceptualising of ‘collaboration’ and ‘directing’, key terms in the 
field of devised performance. As such, the field of devised performance offers another critical 
vector to my exploration of the ecological in performance.
Collaboration and Directing in Devised Performance
Devising is a process of generating a performance (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 4-5; Govan, 
Nicholson and Normington, 2007, p. 4). For this project I worked with the definition that 
devising is a collaborative process of ‘creating a performance from scratch . . . without a pre-
existing script’ (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 3). Whilst the history of devising is one of 
‘exceeding theatrical boundaries’ (Govan, Nicholson and Normington, 2007, p. 3), it has 
become, since the 1990s, a widely used approach in performance making (Oddey, 1994, p. 8) 
and is often used in traditional theatrical production (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 6). 
Devising is thus not inherently alternative or radical, and locating its relationship to my 
research involves a sharp focus on specific details of, and tensions around, collaboration and 
directing that I explore here through references to the collaborative and directing approaches 
adopted by Forced Entertainment and Goat Island.
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Forced Entertainment is a Sheffield-based theatre company, consisting of six artists including 
the artistic director Tim Etchells. The Company has been making collaboratively devised 
performance work for 30 years with the aim of exploring ‘what theatre and performance can 
mean in contemporary life’, and their work ‘is always a kind of conversation or 
negotiation’ (Forced Entertainment, 2016). Goat Island, which disbanded in 2008, was a 
Chicago-based collaborative performance company made up of six core artists including the 
artistic director Lin Hixson. The company created performances that involved ‘a personal 
vocabulary of movement, both dance-like and pedestrian, that often [made] extreme physical 
demands on the performers’ (http://www.goatislandperformance.org/goatisland.htm#, no 
date).
Collaborative devising practices developed during the 1960s and 1970s and, in many 
instances, were a response to the political concerns of the time, with non-hierarchical 
methods of working being employed by companies wishing to practice ‘participatory 
democracy’ and to challenge societal power structures (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 95-100). 
The structures and processes of creating theatre, as much as the content itself, were seen as 
politically significant (2006, p. 95). Devising, from this frame of reference, is underpinned by 
the notion that politics are about how performance is made, as much as what is made. My 
research extends this approach insomuch as I am concerned with the methods of creating 
performance as much as with what the performance outcome is: specifically, I aimed to 
develop a performance practice that enacts the ecological, as opposed to one that merely 
represents, or is about, ‘ecology’. The early collaborative devising companies focused on 
sharing roles and making decisions through discussion and consensus (Heddon and Milling, 
2006, p. 101). Collaboration was largely seen to operate through agreement and unity. 
Heddon and Milling discuss some of the issues raised by these approaches: dominating and 
hierarchical relations would often materialise within processes because ‘too much was 
expected of the structure itself’ (2006, p. 223). So, whilst there was a concern to ‘give voice 
to the voiceless, and to make new and different points of view heard and seen’ (2006, p. 7), 
the unquestioning faith in consensus often occluded some rather different and even 
conflicting perspectives within a group.
Collaborative devising, therefore, developed towards a more explicit focus on the differences 
and individual skills of collaborators (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 111). This approach was 
furthered to emphasise the diversity of participants rather than their agreements and 
similarities. Alison Oddey discusses how conflict is ‘part of the devising process and creation 
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of the product’ (1997, p. 105), citing how performance company The People Show (1966) 
‘relied on the differences and conflict between individual artists within the group’ (1997, p. 
5-6). Harry Wilson, in discussing directing in devising, contends that it is how ‘conflicts are 
navigated that provides the most interesting moments of collaboration’ (2012, p. 54). Etchells 
argues that collaboration for Forced Entertainment is not about ‘perfect unity but about 
difference, collisions, incompatibilities’ (1999, p. 55-56). Similarly, Christopher proposes that 
collaboration for Goat Island arose through the different ideas and elements that 
collaborators brought in, and thrived ‘precisely because of [this] diversity’ (in Bottoms and 
Goulish, 2007, p. 119-20). These perspectives imply that differences might not merely be 
contained by, and celebrated in, a collaborative process, but that differences lead and 
determine the process. I developed this notion by exploring how the ongoing and differential 
dynamics between collaborators can shape and make the process and performance. 
Specifically, I found that attending to collaborators as differential and dynamic 
entanglements (rather than fixed and a priori separable ‘selves’) may be the most radical 
way for diverse ‘voices’ to be heard. Radically, the ‘voices’ I attended to in my project were 
both human and nonhuman (and, more accurately, they were ‘voices’ that emerge in-
between).
There is a preoccupation with interruption and unpredictability in the theory and practice of 
devising performance. Practitioners often cite the ‘mistake and accident’ as part of their 
practices for generating performance (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 12). This concern with 
unpredictability relates back to the ‘happenings’ of the 1960s, which are a key antecedent of 
collaborative devising. Artists understood that the unplanned and random in the ‘happening’ 
had the capacity to close the gap between ‘art and everyday life’ (Govan, Nicholson and 
Normington, 2007, p. 24-5). Deliberate ‘chance procedures’ were employed to generate the 
material and structuring of the event, whereby ‘new and unexpected meanings [could] 
arise’ (Heddon and Milling, 2006, p. 65). The ‘happening’ demonstrated a favouring of the 
unplanned, unknown and unpredictable. Laura Cull describes how, in relation to John Cage’s 
influence on ‘happenings’, the use of chance was a ‘means to expose the ego of the author to 
the intervention of worldly forces into the art-making process, such that the author is no 
longer the sole arbiter of events’ (2013, p. 49). My research relates to and extends these 
aspects of the ‘happening’, whereby I sought to develop practices that displace the artist / 
director as central and in (full) control of the art work. I explored practices and modes that 
could account for how the artistic activities of performance are always already acting in (and 
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acted upon) by the (often unpredictable and unknown) ‘worldly forces’ of distinct but related 
environmental and social ecologies. 
Related to the qualities of the ‘happening’, Etchells discusses collaborative devising as a 
practice of trusting ‘discoveries and accidents’ and distrusting ‘intentions’, celebrating 
‘misunderstandings and misrecognitions’ above ‘clear communication’ (1999, p. 55). Etchells 
provides a useful touchstone for understanding performance – in process and product – as an 
emergent and unpredictable ecology. However, he problematically configures a fixed binary 
by pitting the openness of mistake and accident against the supposed closure of the intended 
and predicted. This fixed binary thinking is also evident in Oddey’s suggestion that devising 
replaces the ‘known’ of a play-text with the ‘freedom’ and ‘unknown’ of collaborative 
exploration (1994, p. 4-6). Whilst distinguishing between the intended and unintended, 
known and unknown, and predicted and unpredicted is a key aspect of devising performance, 
these articulations risk occluding the complexities and interdependencies of these 
(supposedly dichotomous) concepts. By reductively posing devising as a matter only of 
accident, the unknown and complete freedom these perspectives seem to idealise, and 
neglect the nuances of, the collaborative process: indeed, Alex Mermikides and Jackie Smart 
suggest there is often a friction between ‘idealised’ methods and the ‘messy reality of 
process’ (2010, p. 13). The ‘happenings’, however, are useful in reaching for a less reductive 
notion of working with the unknown and with unpredictability. ‘Happenings’ were actually 
tightly planned events with, at the very least, implicit instructions for participants to follow, 
yet they managed to relate ‘a spontaneous and improvisatory aesthetic’ (Govan, Nicholson 
and Normington, 2007, p. 24-5). Heddon and Milling discuss how even ‘in the most apparently 
chaotic performance or Happening, there is structural order . . . It is the specific nature of 
the task, game, rules or structure within which improvisation occurs that conditions the 
possible outcomes, and contributes to the style of the resultant performance’ (2006, p. 9). 
This implies a more nuanced relationship between the known and unknown, between control 
and uncontrollability, which is an aspect of devising that I specifically sought to explore in 
Wild Life. I found that it is by participating in the dynamics between what is predicted and 
what is profoundly unpredictable that collaborative devising can challenge fixed hierarchical 
and binary structures between all – human and nonhuman – collaborators. I articulate this key 
finding through my new phrase: wilding performance containers.12
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The director is often conceptualised as part, rather than leader, of the collaborative group. 
Elizabeth LeCompte, director of the Wooster Group (USA), insists that she only arrives at 
ideas for the work through the activities of her actors: the work only arises ‘on the stage’ and 
not ‘inside my head’ she explains (1993, p. 234). Whilst this explanation implies that the 
director works within, rather than dominating over, the collaborative process, the very idea 
of a director who makes final decisions and takes responsibility for the performance 
complicates ‘the notion of non-hierarchical work or democratic participation’ (Heddon and 
Milling, 2006, p. 5). Wilson explores the tensions and contradictions of directing a 
collaboration, suggesting that the term ‘director’ may be an unhelpful one and offering 
alternatives such as ‘enabler’ and ‘validator’ (2012. p. 118). He discusses how the ‘director’ is 
not a fixed concept that is predetermined from the outset, implying the role as responsive 
and improvisatory, rather than fully knowable and predicted. Using this open definition, a 
director may well be able to facilitate a process, and compose a performance, which includes 
and validates the diversity of (human and nonhuman) collaborators. David Rosenberg, a 
member of the performance company Shunt (UK) who sometimes takes on the role of director 
in its devising processes, suggests that the ‘vision that I’m trying to implement is never my 
own, that vision came from collective creation’ (Rosenberg in Mermikides, 2010, p. 160). 
Hixson echoes this in her proposition that, with Goat Island, she creates the performance ‘not 
with my singular self but with my multi-headed and many-headed and many-armed Goat 
Island self’ (in Bottoms and Goulish, 2007, p. 122). By being a participant in the collaboration, 
the director is seen to make decisions on behalf of the collective, where the performance 
arises out of the collective process, so the performance can never be (only) the director’s 
vision. The director’s skills are often seen to be in sequencing and structuring the material 
that group members have created: the director sifts ‘out what is inappropriate from the 
abundance of material . . . bringing what remains into a coherent form’ (Mermikides and 
Smart, 2010, p. 155). This implies a hierarchical relationship, even though it may only come 
in later in the process. The question arises, then, how can collaboration, when a director 
must take the lead at moments, continue to work with and involve all (human and nonhuman) 
participants in a process?
Wilson proposes that the ‘hierarchy of the director is diminished as a result of their role as 
co-learner with the performers’ (2012, p. 121), implying that the collective process of 
navigating through the unknown and unpredictable enables a non-hierarchical director-
performer relation. So, working with the unknown of ‘mistake and accident’ could be 
interpreted as a means to ensure that neither the director, nor any one human vision, fully 
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dominates a work. Etchells proposes that his task as a director is to bring together ‘diverse 
creativities’ (1999, p. 55). Reflecting on Etchell’s mode of working, Mermikides suggests 
performers must make a lot of choices in the tasks Etchells sets them, which ‘quite clearly 
absolves Etchells from authorship over the material, opening the process up to the operations 
of chance’ (2010, p. 111). In Mermikides’ account, the self-determination of each (human) 
collaborator is seen to arise in their navigation through a task. This implies that the 
constraints set by Etchells are creatively interpreted by his collaborators, which gives rise to 
performance material that cannot be fully predicted or authored by him. This has proved to 
be a useful reference point for my practice of working with diverse child and adult, and 
professional and nonprofessional, collaborators and in facilitating their active participation in 
co-determining the performance material. However, there are limits to the utility of Etchells’ 
approach for my project. In his (description of his) practice the creativity and 
unpredictability of performances are attributed merely to human collaborators and, further, 
his understanding of unpredictability poses some critical issues. Even if the human 
collaborators creatively interpret Etchells’ tasks, and complete the unfinished ideas he brings 
to the devising process, these performers may only contribute inasmuch as the directives they 
are set allow them. In this approach, collaborators share in creating the work but only 
through the choices of conventions and constraints set by a director. Heddon and Milling 
discuss how devised work, often proclaimed as intuitively and collaboratively made, may 
hinge on what is already being looked for. They discuss how one may ‘intuitively’ feel 
something is ‘right’ because ‘it fits a model of the already known’, whereby supposedly 
‘original’ ideas are only seen because they are already anticipated (2006, p. 198-9). So, whilst 
setting tasks and embracing ‘mistake and accident’ could be interpreted as a way of being 
open to the unpredicted contributions of the director’s collaborators, what is being seen 
might only be what fits with an already formed idea, an idea that is iterated in part through 
the very directives set by the director for the performers. For my research I wanted to 
explore processes that actively facilitated the unpredictable contributions of my collaborators 
and, crucially, push directing beyond tropes of viewing humans as the only collaborators in 
performance.
Certain aspects of Hixson’s approach to directing resonate with my intentions as a director. 
Hixson emphasises that her role as director involves offering ‘creative constraints’, which are 
often in the form of ‘directives’. Her human collaborators respond to her directives and then, 
in response to their responses, she offers further directives in a process that is driven by a 
series of directives and responses (in Bottoms and Goulish, 2007, p. 124). The directives 
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Hixson provides – such as ‘[c]reate a shivering homage’ – are clearly instructions but they are 
also articulated in ‘a poetic form that leaves them open to multiple forms of response’ (Cull, 
2013, p. 43). Cull discusses how Hixson has no fixed concept of what a ‘shivering homage’ 
looks like, and so to respond to her directive is not to execute her idea but to undertake a 
creative response to it (2013, p. 43). Working with the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, Cull 
describes this kind of approach as ‘immanent authorship’, which involves ‘modes of 
authorship that are based on the imposition of rules and constraints, that serve to preserve 
rather than homogenize difference within a process of collaborative authorship’ (2013, p. 24). 
Immanent modes of creativity allow, according to Cull, coordination of the performance to 
come from the ‘bottom-up’ (2013, p. 25). Certainly, in my research, I wanted to find 
practices that would allow the diverse child and adult, and human and nonhuman, 
collaborators to dynamically steer the process, whereby the performance could emerge from 
the processes and activities of the group: from the ‘bottom up’. Christopher seems to echo 
Cull’s idea of immanence when she proposes that, in a Goat Island process, the performance 
material itself ‘begins to suggest certain directions’ and thus the performance begins to 
‘make itself’ (in Bottoms and Goulish 2007, p. 120). Etchells also gestures towards ‘immanent 
authorship’ when he argues that there is an ‘ethical need . . . [to] fall into . . . their 
work . . . to let it take them somewhere unknown, to surrender to that, or to respect that, to 
go with the work’ (1999, p. 62). The implication is that the performance process itself exerts 
a pull towards certain directions, whereby director and human performers respond to what is 
immanent in the process. Human collaborators are seen to follow and participate in the work, 
as opposed to the work merely following (from) them, which implies that there are more-
than-human ‘voices’ or trajectories involved in determining the process and performance. 
This notion of following the process is, however, problematic as it corresponds to the trait 
that Heddon and Milling were challenging: that one may ‘intuitively’ feel something is ‘right’ 
merely because it fits with what is ‘already sought’ (2006, p. 198-9). Taking this point into 
account, I have been able to show collaboration and directing to be a matter of participating 
in, and responding to, the performance ecology. My research calls into question what I think is 
an unspoken assumption about collaborative performance practices: namely, that human 
beings are the only, or at least the most important, performance collaborators. Responding to 
Heddon and Milling’s entreaty to practitioners to ‘make works for and of their times and 
places’ (2006, p. 231), I found that a focus on both human-human and human-nonhuman 
collaboration was a radical extension to the extant conceptualisations of ‘collaboration’ and 
‘directing’ in the devising performance field. There are perspectives in the field of movement 
40
and ecology that offer an account of how the human and nonhuman inform, and take part in, 
performance practices.
Movement and Ecology
Sandra Reeve, a key dancer-researcher, conceptualises ‘ecological movement practice’ (2008, 
p. 31) through the notion of the ‘ecological body’, which she defines as a ‘body-in-movement-
in-a-changing-environment’ (2011, p. 48). Reeve brings into relief the flow between the 
ongoing flux of the body and the continuous movement of its environment (2008, p. 70-71). 
Dancer Paula Kramer explores outdoor contemporary dance through the lens of ‘vibrant 
matter’ (Bennett, 2010), proposing that ‘dancing among the nonhuman offers an effective 
space to taste and practice . . . [agency as] confederations between the human and 
nonhuman’ (2012, p. 85). Arden Thomas, exploring dancer Anna Halprin’s Still Dance (which 
takes place in different locations such as a beach and a wood) suggests that Halprin ‘acts and 
is acted upon’, revealing not only ‘human agency’ but also the agency of ‘nonhumans’ (2012, 
p. 117; p. 123). So, across this range of critics and dance-researchers, ecological movement is 
seen as a way of participating with the movements of the nonhuman, and of enacting human-
nonhuman agency. Movement is not a means to look upon ‘ecology’, but is conceptualised as 
a human and nonhuman activity, and rather than using ‘nature’ as a fixed background, or 
‘picturesque backdrop for performance’ (Kramer, 2012, p. 83), movement is practiced as a 
way of ‘being among’ (Reeve, 2011, p. 50) and of taking an ‘active part’ (Kramer, 2012, p. 91) 
in environmental ecologies. This suggests to me how performances might emerge through 
human and nonhuman movements and collaborations. This literature also suggests that human 
movers do not so much do movement but rather join in with the ‘moving world’ (Reeve, 2011, 
p. 50) or in a different metaphor participate with the ‘liveliness of things’ (Kramer, 2012, p. 
87). Movement does not work to represent an environmental ‘ecology’ but is seen as a way to 
take part in the diverse more-than-human agencies of these ecologies. The critical literature 
thus offers a nuanced approach to movement as a human-nonhuman occurrence of agency. My 
research built on these perspectives and practices by experimenting with specific movement 
practices that led me to push this idea of participation further: I propose movement is neither 
owned nor enacted by singular human or nonhuman agents or bodies but rather acts in and 
across all of us. We can, as it were, only participate in the agency and movements of 
ecologies.
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Kramer helpfully critiques the concept of ‘nature’, disputing outdoor dance as a practice of 
getting back to ‘nature’ (2012, p. 83). She criticises what she calls ‘alternative/eco/hippie 
practices of “communing” with nature’ and she wishes to challenge the assumption that 
outdoor dancers who work in the ‘natural environment’ are seeking ‘redemption’ or 
‘enlightenment’ or are ‘out there’ to become part of a ‘purer world’ (2012, p. 83). Kramer 
would like to attend to dance in ‘the natural environment’ in order to counter the above 
assumptions, developing a practice ‘that glorifies neither human nor nature and allows for 
both to inform each other’ (2012, p. 83). Halprin’s work seems to operate in a similar vein, in 
that her work explores how ‘nature’ and ‘human’ might inform each other. Thomas describes 
how Halprin’s body ‘enters into relationship with the natural world’, whereby she and those 
witnessing her are given ‘pathways toward personal engagement . . . with the 
environment’ (2012, p. 122-123). However, these theorisations about movement practice 
prove problematic. Whilst the practices may be effective in terms of questioning the 
supposed separation between ‘humans’ and ‘nature’, the critical discourses about them seem 
to reinstate a narrative of disconnection to connection (and indoors to outdoors), where 
movement practice is upheld as a means of bringing (back) together the ‘human’ artist with 
the ‘natural’ environment. Kramer discusses how movement arises ‘from being in contact 
with specific textures, colours, smells or temperatures . . . [in] the natural 
environment’ (2012, p. 84) and Thomas describes Halprin’s work as a ‘conversation’ or ‘duet’ 
between the artist and ‘nature’ (Thomas, 2012, p. 122; p. 114). Movement practice seems to 
be asserted as a medium of bringing ‘us’ (humans) into contact with ‘nature’ (nonhumans) 
which, rather than presenting humans and ‘nature’ as entangled, presupposes humans and 
‘nature’ are initially separated domains. This limitation of the critical literature is also 
evident in the largely unquestioned bias towards discussing practices that take place in 
outdoor and natural environments.
Reeve proposes that ‘moving in natural environments’ is ‘more conducive’ to ecological 
perception and ‘embodied awareness’ (2011, p. 50; 2008, p. 93). Kramer claims that the best 
context for experiencing human-nonhuman agency is ‘extreme’ natural terrain or weather – 
these are the ‘conditions’ under which ‘nonhumans . . . [can] enter the dance’ (2012, p. 86). 
Thomas focuses on how a singular human (Halprin) ‘communes’ with ‘nature’ in the outdoors 
(2012, p. 117). ‘Natural’ outdoor environments are presented as the, or at least the most 
preferable, way to experience ourselves as part of Earth’s ecologies. Whilst making 
distinctions between studio-based and outdoor movement practices is an important pursuit in 
this field, by predominantly focusing on outdoor movement practices the scholarship risks 
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configuring ‘ecology’ as something that can only be experienced in certain types of locations: 
‘ecology’ is accessible only to those who can ‘go out’ and move in the (implied) extremes of 
‘the outdoor natural environment’. Furthermore, in these practices it is largely only one 
human (normally the able-bodied professional adult artist) who is immersed in the ‘outdoor’ 
environmental ecology. This risks configuring ecological dance work as a matter of a singular 
(privileged) human in amongst many nonhumans. By emphasising and focusing on the singular 
adult able-bodied professional artist human going outdoors into ‘nature’, ecology is arguably 
reduced to an expert outdoors experience. Whilst the artists and scholars working in this field 
do not, I am sure, intend to configure ecological movement in these limiting ways, there is a 
risk in this field of fixing down what being and doing ecology looks like. Experiencing ecology 
through outdoor movement in ‘nature’ could become an orthodoxy: this is where, and how, to 
be ecological, and this is who can experience it. I think that ecological performance practices 
need to resist (re)configuring ecology as merely ‘the natural environment’ and must work 
hard to challenge the image of ecology as something ‘out there’ accessible only to a few. 
Nearly three decades ago Guattari proposed that ‘[e]cology must stop being associated with 
the image of a small nature-loving minority or with qualified specialists’ (1989, p. 52). In 
contributing to the exciting field of ecological movement, it has been imperative for me to 
remain aware of how any ecological performance work always risks enacting what Wallace 
Heim warns against: she suggests that an ethos of mutual constitution can easily ‘be 
translated into a conformity in how one is supposed to “do” nature-human relations’ (2012, p. 
212). Morton offers a helpful insight here in his suggestion that we must get away from 
‘ecological sentimentality’ (2007, p. 200) and understand that ‘the ecological thought . . . is 
easy to latch onto from anywhere’ (2010, p. 18). Morton suggests that we are already in 
ecology, and so do not need to go anywhere to find (a separate or other) ‘it’. His perspective 
implies that thinking and doing ecology is something accessible from wherever, and to 
whoever, we are. 
My approach to movement practice builds on the work in the movement and ecology field: 
rather than focusing on the singular adult professional artist moving in ‘the environment’, my 
practice involves multiple human collaborators of diverse ages and performance experience. I 
do not think that practices should not take place outdoors or that artists should not make solo 
work, but rather I wish to resist this trend (in the critical literature) of presenting ‘the 
ecological’ only in relation to certain types of places and bodies. As I have already suggested, 
working with and exposing the paradoxes and complexities of binaries (such as indoor / 
outdoor, human / nonhuman and culture / nature) is a necessary tactic for any ecological 
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project. I think that if, in our practices and scholarship, we do not expose and experiment 
with these paradoxes and complexities, we risk (re)entrenching habits of binary thinking. 
Whilst fully transcending binaries is unfeasible, it is necessary to remain reflexive to them so 
that we may attend to, what Massumi articulates as, ‘the intricate complexities of [an] 
event’s acting out’ (Massumi in Manning, 2013, p. x; Manning, 2013, p. 212-213). In this sense, 
the complexities of human-nonhuman entanglement warrant further exploration in the 
movement and ecology field, and it is to this gap that my research attends. In making Wild 
Life I wanted to see what practices emerged when human-nonhuman entanglement was taken 
as a given from the outset: I wanted to explore the unavoidability of how we and our 
performances are continuously participating in actual ecologies. I approached movement as a 
practice of how we are all unavoidably constituted by and in the movements of ecologies or, 
as Manning puts it, we are ongoing processes of ‘more-than’ our (singular human) 
‘selves’ (2013, p. 216).
 
Exploring ‘dance’ and ‘ecology’ Manning discusses how ‘there is no outside of movement’ and 
that ‘movement already moves and . . . we are moved by it’ (2013,  p. 122; p. 35). She 
explores the ‘overarticulation’ of dancing, defining it as ‘the felt experience of the form 
outdoing itself’ (2013, p. 38), implying that dance transgresses definable positions. For 
example, she argues that a ‘spiral as such cannot be danced. It is more duration than 
form’ (2013, p. 30). Moving bodies, by constantly moving through (and past) any fixable form, 
emerge as a ‘bodying’ or a ‘participatory node in the milieu of movement’ (2013, p. 78; p. 
122). She suggests that technique is a way into ‘technicity’, where technicity is a way of 
being danced by the movement of ecologies or, to use her word, ‘milieu’ (2013, p. 40). In 
Wild Life I set out to explore movement methods that would allow human performers to be 
danced rather than to do dance, to be moved rather than to do movement. However, Manning 
exclusively focuses on the professional dancers of the Forsythe Company and she presents 
‘technique’ and, concurrently, the experience of ‘technicity’, as only accessible to highly 
trained ‘dancers’ (2013, p. 139; p. 141). Like others in the field, she risks demarcating the 
experience of ecological movement - of being ‘moved’ by the movements of ecologies - as 
something only accessible to the professional dancer. My research builds on Manning’s work, 
in that I have sought to develop a practice that does not instate the ecological as something 
some people are more capable of thinking and doing than others. Through the 
intergenerational and professional-nonprofessional collaborations of my practice, I explored 
how performance might be able to be an inclusive practice which enacts how we are all, in 
performance and in life, participants in the movements of diverse (performance, social and 
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environmental) ecologies. In order to further frame this aspect of my research the key terms 
of nonprofessional and professional, and of child and adult, need to be unpacked.
Performance and Nonprofessional Performers
In this section, and in addition to discussing those articles that focus on nonprofessional 
performers in professional contemporary performance, I draw on two interviews I conducted 
for this project: Richard Gregory is the artistic director of Quarantine, a Manchester-based 
theatre company that works with ‘people who haven't been trained to perform’ (Gregory, 
2010, p. 235) and who are often from diverse social backgrounds (Quarantine, 2015); and, 
Joke Laureyns, the artistic director, and Kwint Manshoven, the performer-collaborator, of 
Kabinet K, a Belgium based dance company which ‘make[s] dance performances with children 
and professional dancers’, and sometimes ‘older people’ (Manshoven, 2014).
Artists who work with nonprofessional performers tend to frame this choice as politically and 
socially driven. Gregory proposes that involving people not trained in performance is ‘about 
seeing people and hearing voices on stage that are rarely present’ (2010, p. 235). Laureyns 
frames the intergenerational approach taken by Kabinet K as a response to the lack of 
‘intergenerational physical relations’ in wider society (2014). Choreographer Rosemary Lee, 
who works with large casts of nonprofessional dancers who span a range of ‘age, social and 
ethnic backgrounds’ (Welton, 2010, p. 48), wants her work to ‘open up a possibility for human 
contact that is usually foreclosed to the social arena’ where it is rare to see physical 
connections between adults and children (Lee, 2009 in Welton, 2010, p. 50). Whilst there is a 
clear politics of participation in these examples, these performance makers do not make 
participation their main focus: participation is not the direct theme or subject of their works. 
Gregory emphasises how Quarantine’s performances are ‘driven entirely by a desire to 
explore a set of ideas’, whereby participation is a ‘tributary of the process’ (2014). His focus 
instead is on the lives and identities of the participants: Gregory aims for a state onstage of 
‘individuals, each with their own story, rather than interpreters of somebody else’s 
ideas’ (2010, p. 235). Taking a different perspective on participants, Manshoven proposes that 
Kabinet K works with children not because he wishes to make performances about children: 
he is not ‘interested in the identity of a youngster’ nor with ‘what the child wants in life [nor 
with] how the child feels’ (2014). Instead, Kabinet K’s work is driven by ‘another necessity’, 
whereby participation is ‘towards form’, and not content (Laureyns, 2014). 
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My approach emerges from what I see as a space of practice between Quarantine and Kabinet 
K. Whilst working with(in) an intergenerational performance ecology was a political choice in 
that I was responding to the scarcity of professional performance involving child and 
nonprofessionals as both collaborators and performers, I chose not to directly focus on their 
participation as subject matter. For me the participation of diverse human collaborators in 
Wild Life was a given from the outset, existing as the form of my artistic practice, with this 
form converging with content but not tied down by it (the readings audience members made 
of the final performance cannot, of course, be separated from the intergenerational form of 
the piece). Extending this further, I explored how performance can enact the given-ness of 
entangled human and nonhuman participation. Rather than instate a narrative of non-
participation (disconnection) to participation (connection) by treating performance as a 
medium to bring people, or people and ecology, together, my research found ways of taking 
ecology (and our participations in it and with each other) as a given: I sought to coax out the 
innate ecological potentials of performance practices. My approach involved focusing on the 
inquiry of the piece – which, for Wild Life, was ‘wildness’ – as opposed to focusing on making 
human (or nonhuman) participation happen through performance, or focusing on (human and 
nonhuman) participation as (merely) the thematic content of the work. My research 
demonstrates how performance practice can enact our unavoidable participations in wider 
social and environmental ecologies, whereby part of this approach concerns how we are 
inevitably interwoven with other humans. Crucially, I developed a collaborative practice 
where ‘humans’ are taken to always already be entangled with the more-than-human: being a 
human is a matter of human-nonhuman entanglement. I found working with a diverse range of 
professional and nonprofessional adult and child performers to be a key aspect of developing 
this ecologically collaborative practice.
One approach in the small but emerging field of child and nonprofessional performers, is to 
focus on the particular aesthetic and style of the non trained performer, where the emphasise 
is on how they perform differently to trained performers. Gregory discussed with me how 
nonprofessionals give performances that are ‘quotidian’ and ‘ordinary’, which have none of 
the pretense that he associates with the trained actor or performer (2014). The 
nonprofessional performers can present the ‘richness of an everyday life’ (2014), he told me. 
Geraldine Harris, in reference to Quarantine’s piece Susan and Darren (2008), identifies a 
‘naturalness [to] Susan’s and Darren’s interaction with each other and with the 
audience’ (2008, p. 5-6). This, she proposes, results in a performance that has none of the 
‘irony, parody, pastiche or other “postmodern” modes of self-reflexivity . . . [that] create a 
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knowing distance from the spectacle and its subjects – Susan and Darren’ (2008, p. 13). She 
suggests that, by having ‘ordinary people’ – in this case a middle-aged woman (Susan) and her 
son (Darren) on stage – there is an ‘equality in Quarantine’s work between art and non-art but 
more importantly between artist and non-artist’ (2008, p. 9). This resonates with my practice 
and is a useful insight for my research, as it implies how nonprofessionals in performance 
might trouble the binaries between performers and spectators, and artists and non-artists. 
The presence of the nonprofessional in performance could, therefore, challenge the way 
performance often upholds ‘the ecological’ as an expert experience exclusive to the 
professional artist. Furthermore, the ‘quotidian’ style that Gregory deems to be typical of the 
nonprofessional performer could relate how we are, in an everyday sense, always in ecology.
However, through my practice-as-research experiments I found that to assume the 
nonprofessional always or even ever performs in an ‘everyday’ and ‘natural’ style (Gregory, 
2014; Harris, 2008, p. 13) can be a limiting approach. Emphasising a particular kind of 
quotidian action can undercut and undervalue the work of the nonprofessional, defining them 
in terms of what they lack: they can naturally (and only) perform as their everyday ‘selves’ 
because they are not professional. Their value as performers emerges via their incapacities. 
In my work, I found that this approach risks romanticising nonprofessionals, who are read as 
some kind of an idealised ‘other’ in comparison with the trained performer. In this 
formulation, we do not read their work or their skills, but rather merely admire their 
‘natural’ and ‘ordinary’ performances. (Revealingly, this is akin to the way the child film 
actor is, according to Karen Lury, often seen as ‘successful’ in terms of ‘their essential 
characteristics and not their learned abilities’ (2010, p. 156-7).) Furthermore, over-
emphasising their quotidian style of performing denies nonprofessionals their capacity to be 
extraordinary or not ‘everyday’. Their style of performance is fixed and presumed from the 
outset: they will perform ordinariness. This approach unhelpfully prefigures what performers 
are not capable of in the same moment as it proposes that which they are (ordinary), which 
not only risks presuming what their nonprofessional performances will be like, but also what 
their performances will mean and represent. Through my research process I developed an 
imperative to work without prescribing what style or type of performances the (adult or 
child, professional or nonprofessional) performers might give.
In her work on Quarantine’s performance Old People, Children and Animals (2008), Lourdes 
Orozco describes a four-year-old girl, Maia, who, she proposes, is ‘free’ and ‘let be’ to play 
during the performance, entertaining ‘the audience by entertaining herself’ (2010, p. 82). 
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Orozco argues that, by Maia simply being ‘herself’, she signifies ‘unpredictability’ and ‘is a 
metaphor for what cannot be controlled, the looming danger of error, mistake and 
misfire’ (2010, p. 84). This is a useful analysis of the child performer for my projects since in 
both Age-Old and Wild Life I sought to work with, and respond to, the unpredictability of 
child collaborators, and find ways to enable their unpredictabilities to play out live on stage 
(this formed part of my paradoxical approach: how to allow for unpredictability in a 
structured and rehearsed performance?). However, there are also limitations with this 
approach. By discussing Maia as a metaphor of unpredictability, Orozco (from the outset of 
her discussions) seems to exclude any real unpredictability in what Maia might mean and 
represent in the live performance. There is a risk in her analysis of assuming that we (adults) 
can know what type of performance the child performer will give – that she is ‘herself’ and 
‘free’ – and what this (nonprofessional, child) performance will inevitably represent - namely, 
‘unpredictability’. In a similar vein, Gregory suggests that he was ‘naturally’ drawn to 
children for this piece because he wanted to explore who we are ‘responsible for’ (in Orozco, 
2010, p. 82). This comment suggests to me that the significance and value of Maia’s 
performance for Gregory was prefigured (by him) from the outset: that her presence would 
bring up questions about ‘responsibility’. This denies Maia any unknowability, and effaces the 
potential that Maia might have to not mean ‘responsibility’, or even to mean a lot more than 
‘responsibility’. Even if Maia did represent ‘responsibility’ to the audience and was in a 
common sense way unpredictable in what she did during the performance, Orozco’s critical 
discussion and Gregory’s motivation to work with a child both seem to deny Maia any part in 
contributing to these representations: that Maia’s presence will represent ‘unpredictability’ 
and ‘responsibility’ is presumed from the outset simply because she is a young child. With this 
approach there is a risk that the nonprofessional child performer is even rendered very much 
like the Victorian child actor described by Anne Varty – that he or she is simply a prop to be 
read only in terms of aesthetic effect (2008, p. 38). 
The emphasis on nonprofessionals being ‘natural’ and ‘themselves’ also seems problematic 
because it glosses over the fact that the conventions that frame the performer are likely to 
be chosen and defined by the director, and not be the choice of performers themselves. 
Wilson discusses Junction 25, a Glasgow-based performance company of young people 
between 11 and 18 years old that is facilitated by artists Jess Thorpe and Tashi Gore of Glas(s) 
Performance. The young people are deliberately ‘empowered’ to make performances about 
issues or around themes relevant to them, where the focus is on them ‘being the authors and 
owners of the collaboratively devised work’ (Wilson, 2011, p. 110). However, Wilson suggests 
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that the ‘voices’ and ‘ideas’ of the young people may only be present inasmuch as they fit 
with, and can be communicated through, the theatrical, social and economic conventions and 
frames provided by Thorpe and Gore. He proposes that the sense that these young people 
‘are empowered is relational to the extent to which their empowerment is shaped by [the] 
directors of the group’, suggesting that the ‘theatrical language’ that is used for their voices 
to be heard belongs more to Thorpe and Gore (and their training in contemporary 
performance) than the young people themselves (2011, p. 114; p. 115). I do not, however, 
think that the approach taken by Thorpe and Gore is problematic since their work does not 
deny (or hide) that they (the professional artists) input into Junction 25 performances through 
providing conventions and structuring performance material. What I think is problematic is to 
suppose that nonprofessional performers are heard and seen as ‘themselves’ simply because 
they perform ‘their’ ideas and with their ‘own’ voices. This notion is to neglect the nuances 
of how conventions frame and ‘perform’ the work as much as, if not more than, the 
performers themselves. To conceptualise nonprofessional performers as merely quotidian, 
‘natural’ and ‘themselves’ seems to leave little space for unknown, unpredictable and even 
skilled performances to emerge. My practice of working with nonprofessionals is informed and 
inspired by Quarantine and Glas(s) Performance, yet my research took me in a different 
direction: I explored and challenged the very notion that there is a fixed singular human that 
can perform their ‘natural’ and ‘ordinary’ self. I aimed to treat diverse human collaborators 
as undetermined and unique performers who can produce unexpected and accomplished 
performances and, crucially, who are unavoidably entangled with(in) the more-than-human.
An alternative to the approach that I have ascribed to Quarantine and Glas(s) Performance 
can be found in practices where nonprofessionals give performances equal to the capabilities 
of trained performers. That Night Follows Day, a collaboration between Etchells and Victoria 
Theatre (Belgium), is a useful example.13 The performance involved 16 youngsters reciting a 
list of statements and questions from ‘children’ addressed to ‘adults’ that was written by 
Etchells. The fact that this was a text pre-written by a professional adult practitioner and 
then spoken, and not created, by the child performers, was clear: the performance frame and 
conventions provided by the adult artist was explicit. But this, I found, allowed attention to 
focus less on the identities or everydayness of these youngsters and more on their skills as 
performers. The production was tightly rehearsed and structured, involving the performers 
speaking as a chorus with precise vocal intonations and pauses, with moments of individual as 
well as choric and other mixtures of voices. There was nothing ‘ordinary’ about their style of 
49
13 I saw this performance at the Tramway, Glasgow, April 2008.
performing. As an audience member I was impressed by what I responded to as their 
expertise: I felt they were challenged by, but in no way unable to do, this performance. This 
approach ruptured my preconceptions about what children, and nonprofessionals, are capable 
of: the performers had been treated as and therefore read as skilled and consummate 
performers in control of their material. I did not interpret them as being patronised and told 
to be ‘themselves’, but saw that they had been assigned tasks just as any (professional, 
adult) performer might. By not presuming their inabilities, the youngsters were respected and 
given creative power. However, this approach largely predetermined what their (repeated) 
performances will be. Whilst the first approach I identified presumes a quotidian performance 
style, this second approach presumes a trained or coached one. With this approach, there is a 
risk of defining and judging the nonprofessional child performer merely in terms of how 
impressively expert their performance is. The performer is, therefore, still defined through 
and fixed by the binaries of child / adult, professional / nonprofessional, artist / non-artist 
and capable / incapable. So whilst initially attractive, this was ultimately an unhelpful 
approach for my practice, which aims to at once work with and reconfigure these binaries. I 
therefore aimed for a significant diversity in the skills, experiences and ages of the 
performance ecology.
But, helpfully, there is a third approach I can identify in the field that, I found, demonstrates 
a more complex conceptualisation of the nonprofessional and proved for me a more useful 
articulation of how professional and nonprofessional, and adult and child, performers can 
meaningfully participate in and contribute to the performance ecology. This approach is 
partly evident in the work of Kabinet K. Manshoven proposes that he and Laureyns collaborate 
with nonprofessionals because they wish to work with ‘bodies that are not articulated too 
much in their way of dancing’ (2014). Laureyns proposes that their practice is about 
performers’ ‘absence of knowledge’ (2014). Taking these articulations on their own, Kabinet K 
seems to be another example of defining and valuing child and nonprofessional performers by 
their lack of performance training and knowledge. However, the approach is, in their 
description and practice as well as in my reading, more nuanced than this. When working with 
nonprofessionals, Kabinet K gives them some dance technique training, providing bodies with 
‘a knowledge [and] language’ (Manshoven, 2014). This gives performers a way into working 
with physical tasks. Performers are equipped to ‘struggle’ creatively with the ‘dance 
knowledge’, and it is this ‘struggle’ that the creative team propose ‘makes our 
work’ (Laureyns, 2014). Laureyns discusses how unique movement emerges when performers 
simultaneously ‘attempt’ and ‘resist’ the conventions and techniques that she, the 
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choreographer, provides for them (2014). With Kabinet K’s approach, it is between acquired 
dance knowledge and being not-fully-trained that these nonprofessionals are deemed to be 
unique and skillful performers. The nonprofessional is conceptualised neither by their lack of 
training, nor by being the same as professionals, but through being between the known and 
unknown, the learnt and not-yet-learnt, the mastery of technique and lack of technique, and 
ability and inability. In this liminal place, performers contribute neither through innate 
everyday-style performances nor by being performance experts, but by their unique and 
capable negotiations through performance conventions. My practice relates to and extends 
this approach. I developed methods that apply to both professionals and nonprofessionals, 
and adults and children - methods that allow collaborators to variously contribute to the 
process and performance. I found these methods were a question of how to, firstly, take the 
betweens into account and, secondly, respond to the unique and capable negotiations of how 
my collaborators did performance tasks. Andrew Quick usefully explores the idea of 
‘between’ and ‘doing’ in his discussion of child performers and the ‘secret gesture’ (2006).
Quick discusses Übung (2001), a performance that involved a group of six youngsters between 
eight and 15 years imitating the actions of adult actors in a film projected behind them 
during the performance, made by Josse De Pauw and Victoria Theatre. The youngsters 
enacted through complex actions, costume changes and lip-synching in a ‘faithful’ imitation 
of the film (2006, p. 155). Quick reflects on what he identifies as the indefinable movements 
of these performers using Walter Benjamin’s notion of the ‘secret gesture’, defining it as the 
‘spontaneous’ and ‘improvisatory gestures’ enacted by children that are impossible to 
attribute with any meaning because they operate outside of adult systems of signification 
(2006, p. 160). These ‘gestures’ are ‘secret’ because they are movements that cannot be 
named or predetermined: they are ‘beyond comprehension’ (2006, p. 150). Quick proposes 
that these movements unfolded in the performance, not in a ‘free’ anything-goes context, 
but through the ‘rule-bound space’ (2006, p. 153). Quick recalls a moment in the 
performance when a boy walked across the stage. Quick can find no pattern in the 
movements of this performer, he cannot work out what is being ‘done’ before him (2006, p. 
155). Unable to pin down the boy, he concludes ‘that the performer is working and walking 
through numerous possibilities, making particular sets of performance choices before 
me’ (2006, p. 155). The boy, tasked with strict rules of imitation, is negotiating and playing 
with what is ‘permissible and inadmissible’ where ‘rules are not banished or permanently 
excluded but rather are suspended and pushed aside’ as in the case of the ‘rule of what is 
being “done” is worked through in the improvisational moment’ (2006, p. 153). The children 
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in Übung perform between the known of the rules and the unknown of their doing of the 
rules, producing momentarily rupturing and unpredictable performances. Quick implies how 
child performers can meaningfully determine what a performance is through their unique, 
live and spontaneous negotiations through rules and structures.
Whilst offering useful insights about how child performers can transgress rule-bound space or 
performance containers, I find that Quick is reductive in his identification of a fixed 
difference between adult and child performers, deeming the latter the ideal spontaneous 
performer. He conceives the ‘secret gesture’ as something only children can enact, 
confirming Benjamin’s romantic notion that nothing ‘can compete with the authenticity that 
is the child’s improvisatory activity’ (2006, p. 152). Quick presents the ‘gift’ of the ‘secret 
gesture’ as something for adults: its significance lies, for him, in how it ruptures adult 
taxonomies of ‘meaning’ (2006, p. 150). I wanted to expand upon Quick’s approach and so 
sought to create performances where adult and child, and professional and nonprofessional 
(and human and nonhuman performers) might all enact transgressive and ‘secret’ 
performances. Part of my approach was also was to show Age-Old and Wild Life to 
intergenerational audiences, rather than limit and fix the performances to a specific type of 
audience.
Laureyns and Manshoven of Kabinet K define their work in terms of the performers’ 
dedication to doing. I See You (2012) was a piece that involved Laureyns performing with a 
young girl and older man, which was structured entirely by physical tasks ascribed to the 
performers.14 Laureyns gives the examples: ‘you have to be busy with weight or counter 
weight, or with choosing directions’ (2014). The performance emerged through the 
performers being completely, physically engrossed in doing the task: it was their real effort of 
doing that constituted the qualities and layers of the piece. Laureyns proposes that, if 
performers try and communicate meaning or emotion, or if they ‘“play” they are dedicated’ 
to a task, then ‘the work would collapse’ (2014). This focus on doing is about ‘not being an 
actor’ (Laureyns, 2014) but being ‘yourself’ and ‘normal’ (Manshoven, 2014) whilst physically 
in action. This notion of being ‘normal’ is different to the quotidian and ordinary 
performances that the first approach attributes to nonprofessionals. Rather, it references the 
actuality of, and dedication to, doing: it is about a ‘physical presence’ that is ‘not related to 
everyday life’ and can, in fact, appear ‘very foreign’ (Laureyns, 2014). They see the 
performances enacted by children to be at once ‘normal’ and ‘foreign’, ‘capable’ and 
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14 I saw I See You at the Tramway, Glasgow, October 2014.
‘incapable’ and ‘trained’ and ‘non-trained’, and in this sense their nuanced approach disrupts 
binary thinking.
Kabinet K seems to relate an approach to performance where the liveness of doing – beyond 
just being – is understood to lead the performance. I was also eager to understand children 
and adults, and nonprofessionals and professionals, to shape the process and performance 
through their unique and particular ways of doing: I focused on their diverse and distinctive 
negotiations through the performance training and containers I gave to them. However, my 
research took this a step further by focusing on how human and nonhuman collaborators 
might enact and transgress the boundaries and containers of performance. I aimed to develop 
methods of working that enabled diverse human and nonhuman collaborators to deliver 
unique and ongoing entanglements through doing. Ecology is, after all, a pragmatic physical 
reality, and may therefore be best experienced and exposed through the pragmatics of doing. 
In order to  demonstrate more fully what I mean by this complex term ‘ecology’, I now 
discuss the conceptualisations and practices of ‘ecology’ that my research used, explored and 
developed.
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Chapter Two – Ecology
Introduction
In the previous chapter I drew insights from performance scholars such as Kershaw and 
Heddon, and movement scholars including Reeve and Manning, to contextualise my research 
inquiry into how performance practice can be ecological. In this chapter I further 
contextualise my exploration of performance (in) ecology. I develop my thesis that 
performance – in process and product – is a distinctive ecology of diverse and entangled 
humans and nonhumans, and that the performance ecology continuously and inevitably 
interacts with(in) wider ecological processes and systems. I do this by drawing on my key 
interlocutors working in the field of ecology and more-than-human theorising: Gilles Deleuze, 
Félix Guattari, Jane Bennett and Karen Barad. These writers provide the most useful 
theoretical framework for my research. 
I begin with Deleuze and Guattari as their conceptualisation of ‘betweens’ and their non-
binary speculations on arborescence and the rhizome offer a useful theoretical touchstone for 
one of my key research findings: wilding performance containers. However, their analogy-
based approach to ‘ecology’ (through the metaphors of arboresence and rhizome) is 
ultimately limiting for my inquiry into how the actual material practices of performance-
making can be and do the ecological. I thus turn to the new materialist and posthumanist 
perspectives offered by Bennett and Barad. Both these writers aim to be more directly 
descriptive of the actual modes through which humans and nonhumans participate in 
different material processes, where agency is distributed across and between human and 
nonhuman actants. Their different yet related theories on matter are particularly useful for 
my project since my practice-as-research explored two performance ecologies (Age-Old and 
Wild Life) in terms of the actual human and nonhuman material actants involved. Bennett 
and Barad are thus the most relevant in terms of setting up, reflecting on and analysing my 
ecological performance practice. Crucially, I also show how my research might impact and 
add further complexity to Bennett’s and Barad’s thinking.
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Conceptualising Betweens: Rhizomes and Arborescence in the Philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari
Deleuze and Guattari propose their rhizome philosophy as a challenge to the arborescent 
structure of reality presumed in most Western thinking. An arborescent standpoint configures 
the world through hierarchies and origins, and constructs ‘systems with centers of 
significance and subjectification’ (1988, p. 16): there is an origin (seed) and a centrality 
(trunk) from which all things branch out (roots and branches). All human and nonhuman 
‘things’ and identities are defined by their relation to a centre point. Arborescence relates a 
‘transcendent plan(e) of organization’ upon which all ‘things’ are organised and signified, and 
are accorded ‘fixed or ideal essences’ (1988, p. 311; p. 248). This plane governs what 
‘things’ are and what / who relates to what / who by stratifying ‘forms and subjects’ and 
configuring hierarchical ‘relations between strata’ (1988, p. 314). Human and nonhuman 
identities and differences are fixed by this plane of organisation: arborescence organises, and 
is organised through, the logic of binary.
In contrast to understanding the world through the tree, Deleuze and Guattari propose the 
rhizome. There is neither a fixed centre nor ‘positions’ in the rhizome, but rather there ‘are 
only lines’ (1988, p. 7). Instead of containing ‘fixed and mobile elements’, the rhizome 
consists of ‘all manner of “becomings”’ with the rhizome existing in ceaseless movement or 
‘continuous variation’ (1988, p. 22; p. 553). It may be useful to think through theatre 
performance processes and events as a rhizome or as part of a rhizome, in that this usefully 
implies performance as a practice of ongoing dynamic movement, and as a practice that 
participates in the movements of wider ecology / rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari discuss how 
there is ‘no preformed logical order to becomings and multiplicities’, but argue that there is 
‘criteria’ that emerges and applies ‘in the course of events’ (1988, p. 293). This informs my 
notion of participating in, rather than dominating, the trajectory of the performance process, 
whereby it is through attending to the distinct yet entangled human and nonhuman 
participants that the trajectory (or criteria) of the process and performance emerges. I 
developed an ecological practice where there is not a preformed organisation (or order) to 
what the work will be, but an immanent order constituted through the (a)live collaborations 
and events of the process. Whilst arborescent thinking purports a transcendent reality and 
assigns essential identities, the rhizome is ‘interbeing’ and ‘alliance’ (1988, p. 26). Rather 
than a plane of organisation, when it comes to the rhizome there is a plane of 
‘composition’ (1988, p. 301).  They use ‘composition’ to demonstrate how this plane is (and 
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can only be) constructed, it neither preexists nor transcends the ongoing movements of the 
‘becomings’ that (continuously) make it up. The rhizome cannot, therefore, be pinned down, 
it can only be made and we can only participate in, and ‘experiment’ with, its making (1988, 
p. 293). This relates a concept of ‘ecology’ as something that is continuously in-the-making, 
whereby what humans and nonhumans are is in perpetual flux and always materialising. With 
their rhizome philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari propose that matter is ‘nonstratified’, that 
materiality does not constitute divided solid entities but materiality is moving ‘energy’ (1988, 
p. 178). In this sense, movement and choreography practices may be well placed to explore 
and enact the dynamics of ceaselessly moving matter. However, the most useful aspect of 
Deleuze and Guattari is their nuanced articulation of how the rhizome does not replace the 
tree, nor the tree replace the rhizome: there is no binary choice between the two, no 
absolute move from one to the other. Rather, there are ‘knots of arborescence in rhizomes, 
and rhizomatic offshoots in [tree] roots’ (1988, p. 21).
Deleuze and Guattari propose that ‘in all things’ there are lines of ‘segmentarity, strata and 
territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and 
destratification’ (1988, p. 2). They define ‘stratification’ as the process of structuring ‘linear 
causalities between elements’ and of organising ‘hierarchies of order between 
groupings’ (1988, p. 390). The freedom and openness of rhizomatic ‘lines of flight’ are not 
simple matters of supplanting and abandoning stratification. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari 
encourage an approach that works both with and beyond stratification, whereby lines of 
flight rupture the strata and ‘follow the rhizome by rupture’ (1988, p. 10-11). They do not 
take issue with segmentarity itself; the human is, they argue, ‘a segmentary animal’ (1988, p. 
244). Rather, they imply that the dangers of arborescence emerge when we treat the 
segmentation of strata as a rigid and fixed reality. They discuss a notion of ‘supple 
segmentarity’, whereby ‘segmentarity is not grasped as something separate from a 
segmentation-in-progress operating by outgrowths, detachments, and mergings’ (1988, p. 
245). They indicate that stratification is a rupture-able, rather than fixed and final binary 
structure. However, Deleuze and Guattari propose that transgressing arborescence is not a 
case of ‘wildly destratifying it’: they argue that blowing ‘apart the strata’ risks bringing the 
strata ‘down on us heavier than ever’. Rather, they discuss a process of lodging ourselves ‘on 
a stratum’ and experimenting with the ‘opportunities it offers’, and by this process of 
‘meticulous relation with the strata . . . one succeeds in freeing lines of flight’ (1988, p. 187). 
This usefully relates and critically frames my finding of wilding performance containers: 
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working closely with performance containers / ‘strata’ can be a strategy for transgressing and 
reconfiguring containment / stratification.
Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari argue that, just as trees ‘may burgeon into a rhizome’, so 
too rhizomes can be (re)stratified into arborescence (1988, p. 18; p. 9). They imply that lines 
of flight do not destratify in any absolute or final way. They propose that it is at the ‘cutting 
edge’ of ‘deterritorialization’ that a ‘reterritorialization’ can also ‘be performed’ (1988, p. 
258). Lines of flight rupture the strata but are then restratified. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
lines of flight and stratification are processes that are enfolded into each other. I sought to 
test out their non-binary understandings of stratification / lines of flight and arborescence / 
the rhizome, which led me to discover a practice of working with betweens. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that being between ‘does not designate a localizable relation going from one 
thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that 
sweeps one and the other away’ (1988, p. 27). Being between is not to ‘progress or regress’ 
to one or the other, but rather, being between has ‘a consistency all its own’ (1988, p. 277; p. 
279). I developed an ecological practice that focuses on collaboration between diverse 
humans and between humans and nonhuman materials, where the process and performance 
can be understood to emerge through the betweens of the performance ecology.
Whilst Deleuze and Guattari offer a useful critical vector for my research inquiry into the 
ecological, their approach is ultimately limiting for my project. Their arguments rely heavily 
and primarily on metaphors of ‘ecology’ through the analogies of the ‘rhizome’ and 
‘arborescence’, whereas exploring the ecological potentials of performance practice requires 
a sharp focus on the actual material processes of ecologies. Therefore, in order to further 
articulate the complexity of performance (in) ecology, I turn now to Bennett and her notion 
of ‘vibrant matter’ and Barad and her radical articulations of what it means to be entangled 
in material ecological processes.
Conceptualising Human-Nonhuman Collaboration: Jane Bennett and Vibrant Matter
In her influential book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, vital materialist Jane 
Bennett proposes that matter is vibrant and ‘alive’ (2010, p. 8). Matter is not passive but 
‘lively and self-organizing’ (2010, p. 10). She avoids the notion that there is a ‘soul’ or ‘life’ 
which enters into, or animates, materials that would otherwise be inert by proposing that 
matter itself, by its very materiality, is alive with ‘agentic capacity’ (2010, p. 10; p. 87-89; p. 
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9). So, nonhumans are, like humans, ‘actants’ (2010, p. ix). By placing humans and 
nonhumans on the same ontological plane, Bennett emphasises how all (cultural, natural, 
organic and inorganic) bodies are ‘affective’ (2010, p. xii) and have the capacity to perform. 
All ‘things’ demand attention in their own right, and ‘things’ exert a power beyond human 
attributions, constructions and meanings. For Bennett, nonhuman matter exerts its own pulls 
and lays its own trajectories within, through and beyond the human (2010, p. viii): this is 
matter’s ‘thing power’ (2010, p. xvi). Her articulation of nonhuman actants usefully frames 
one of my research aims: to develop performance methods of working with the agency of 
nonhuman materials. With Age-Old and Wild Life I sought to develop a practice of 
collaborating with materials not as props in aid of human performers, but instead as 
performers in their own right with their own trajectories and tendencies. However, to only 
focus on the vibrant matter of nonhumans would be to miss the complexity of Bennett’s 
theory. A key aspect of her argument is that nonhumans and humans are vibrant matter.
Bennett proposes that matter is not the background to human practices but rather we humans 
‘are vital materiality and we are surrounded by it’ (2010, p. 14). She thus locates vibrancy 
across human and nonhuman bodies: agency is distributed across humans and nonhumans. So, 
the ‘human self’ does not exist as such but is ‘intrinsically polluted’ with ‘material powers’ 
which circulate ‘around and within human bodies’ (2010, p. 116; p. ix): ‘the environment is 
[literally] inside human bodies and minds’ (2010, p. 116) she writes. The implication here is 
that humans, and human practices such as theatrical performance, neither cause nor invite 
nonhuman vibrancy but rather we are always already caught up in it. Material vitality is both 
inside and outside of ourselves: material vitality ‘is me, it predates me, it exceeds me, it 
postdates me’ (2010, p. 120). This provides a useful frame for my proposal that we and our 
performance practices are always already in (the vibrant matter of) diverse ecologies. Under 
Bennett’s notion of ‘confederations’, humans can only do things because we are each 
confederations of vibrant matters and we are always in confederations with ‘various and 
variegated materialities’ (2010, p. 96). So, it is only possible for me to create collaboratively, 
direct a performance and write this thesis because I am infused by and I am in confederation 
with vibrant materials. Bennett discusses how it would be impossible for humans to exercise 
‘wills or intentions’ without the endeavors of ‘many other strivings’ (2010, p. 98; p. 32). This 
poses a challenge to the very idea of ‘me’ writing this thesis and the notion that ‘I’ can 
communicate and speak from ‘my’ perspective and intentions. Indeed, Bennett’s ideas about 
‘vibrant matter’ challenge the concept of human intentionality. If we are always already part 
of, and in confederation with, what is more-than-our(human)selves then how can we 
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attribute full control and intention to our actions? There is indeed an irony in ‘me’ writing 
about ‘my research’ when ‘my research’ is, in part, about disputing the centrality of ‘the 
human’ and the exceptionalism attributed to ‘human’ intentions. This paradox can work as a 
productive way of exploring what it means for humans to be part of the vibrant matter of 
ecologies. Furthermore, Bennett suggests that ‘intention’ is like a pebble thrown into the 
water or an electrical current sent through wire: it ‘vibrates and merges with other currents, 
to affect and be affected’ (2010, p. 32). By this she means that the idea of distributed agency 
does not deny human intentionality but renders it less definitive of outcomes (2010, p. 32). 
With this frame of reference, it is important to note that humans can perhaps only create 
theatrical performance and write about performance practices from our specific and unique 
human positions with(in) complex material systems and processes. Indeed, when discussing 
her performance experiments with water and its agency Donald proposes that ‘our 
experiences are always, inevitably, felt, filtered and shared from a subjective human 
perspective’ (2015, p. 38). These are the complexities and paradoxes that we must 
necessarily work with in developing an ecological performance practice.
Bennett proposes that humans are always already ‘confederations of tools, microbes, 
minerals, sounds, and other “foreign” materialities’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 36). Similarly Morton 
insists that nothing ‘exists all by itself, and so nothing is fully “itself”’ (2010, p. 15). If 
humans are never only ‘human’ - if we are always already more-than-human - then to focus 
on human performers and human practices is not necessarily an anthropocentric approach so 
long as we are alert to and acknowledge the multiplicity of the human or, more precisely, the 
nonhuman within, around and across the human. With this caveat, I propose that focusing on 
humans – in the case of my research, on humans of different ages, backgrounds and skills – is 
one strategic and vital way of attending to the inevitable entanglements of humans with(in) 
the nonhuman. I sought to explore not just how performance can enact vibrant matter but 
also what kinds of creative practices emerge from acknowledging and treating humans and 
nonhumans as vibrant and lively matter.
For my project, there is a key nuance to Bennett’s arguments. She does not concede a passive 
acceptance of the vibrancy of matter as inherently positive and life-giving: she includes a 
brief discussion about the destructive capabilities of material processes, implying how 
ecological processes can involve damage and harm. She discusses how it is necessary to 
acknowledge matter’s harmful capacities (2010, p. 54). If we do not, humans are merely (and 
hubristically) rendered as protectors and managers ‘of an ecosystem that surrounds us’ (2010, 
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p. 111). This focus on the negative aspects of material-ecological processes is something that 
has generally been avoided in the performance and ecology field (for example, Arons and May 
render human ‘embeddedness and enmeshment in ecology’ in exclusively positive terms 
(2012, p. 3) ). This limited approach is also evident in recent ‘more-than-human’ theorising 
(for example, Ingold renders his ‘lines of life’ that make up the environmental system of the 
‘meshwork’ as an entirely positive process of being alive (Ingold, 2011) ). Bennett suggests 
that if we acknowledge the negative potentials of vibrant matter, then the task we have ‘is to 
engage more strategically with a trenchant materiality that is us as it vies with us in 
assemblages’ (2010, p. 111). This frames my concern that, if we are to take seriously our 
participation in all manner of distinct yet interrelating ecologies, then it is surely necessary 
to learn how to listen not only to the life-affirming vibrancy of matter but also to the vibrant 
negative feedbacks of performance ecologies? I think it is necessary to embrace the 
difficulties of what it means to be unavoidably in the wider ecology of Earth. Indeed, Bateson 
proposes: ‘We are not outside of the ecology for which we plan - we are always and inevitable 
a part of it’ and it is here that ‘lies the charm and the terror of ecology’ (1972, p. 510). This 
notion of the ‘terror’ of ecology is also something that Morton explores in his ‘dark ecology’, 
which is predicated on the ‘ambiguity and darkness’ of our ‘intimacy with other beings 
(Morton, 2010, p. 100). For the ‘health’ of ‘ecologies’, Bennett argues that we must devise 
new ways of enabling us to ‘consult nonhumans more closely . . . to listen and respond more 
carefully to their outbreaks, objections . . . and propositions’ (2010, p. 108). I take Bennett’s 
argument further, aiming to develop performance methods that allow us to listen to 
nonhumans and humans more closely, and to listen and respond to the negative feedback 
from within a specific practiced ecology: an intergenerational performance ecology of diverse 
humans and nonhuman materials. What might a performance ecology uniquely tell / teach us 
about the negative, destructive and ‘dark’ aspects of material ecological processes?
Bennett’s concept of ‘vibrant matter’ has usefully provided me with a critical frame for some 
specific research propositions that I explored. Barad is, however, able to offer an even more 
nuanced account of human-nonhuman material processes. Her anti-essentialist materialism 
provides a critical account of entanglement (and what it might ethically mean to be 
entangled) that has proved useful in explicating some of my key research findings.
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Conteptualising Entanglements and Boundaries: Karen Barad and Agential Realism
Karen Barad proposes ‘agential realism’ as a way of empirically understanding ‘matter’s 
dynamism’ (2007, p. 177). She suggests that we, and our practices, are always already 
constituted by entangled human and nonhuman involvements (2007, p. 171-172). However, 
she does not merely discuss human-nonhuman entanglement. She explores the actual 
material processes by which phenomena are rendered as ‘this’ and ‘that’, ‘human’ and 
‘nonhuman’, ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’, ‘organic’ and ‘inorganic’, ‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’, 
‘material’ and ‘discursive’ (2007, p. 183; p. 178; p. 427; p. 381). She shows how diverse 
phenomena are constituted and explores how specific ‘things’ come to matter and not 
matter. In order to contextualise her ‘agential realism’, and its implications for my ecological 
practice, it is necessary to review the criticisms she makes of essentialism, 
representationalism and social constructivism.
Essentialist thinking supposes that ‘things’ in the world have an independent and given 
reality, that there are fixed properties and boundaries to all the world’s phenomena.15 
Humans are understood to be able to stand objectively ‘outside’ of and at a distance from the 
‘things’ they wish to observe and understand. The ontology presumed through essentialism is 
that there is absolute ‘exteriority between observer and observed’ (Barad, 2003, p. 815). On 
the other hand, representationalism proposes that humans cannot access the ‘real’ world and 
that all we can do is endlessly (and subjectively) represent it. With representationalist 
thinking the world exists (to us) only inasmuch as we interpret and construct it. So, for 
example, ‘nature’ is understood as a construction that is constituted through human cultural 
practices of representing. Under representationalism, faith is not put in matter but in 
representations (of matter). Barad argues that, with representationalism, ‘we don’t trust our 
eyes to give us reliable access to the material world’, yet we believe ‘that we have a kind of 
direct access to the content of our representations that we lack toward that which is 
represented’ (2007, p. 380-381). Representationalism, therefore, relies on a fixed binary 
separation between materiality and representations and it reconfigures distinctions between 
the discursive and the material, and the cultural and the empirical. Social constructivism, on 
the other hand, understands the discursive and material as entwined processes. Barad turns 
to theorist Judith Butler in order to think ‘the matter of materiality and signification together 
in their indissolubility’ (2007, p. 145). With social constructivism, human practices are 
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15  The ʻarborescentʼ  view of the world explored by Deleuze and Guattari corresponds to the essentialism Barad 
discusses.
understood in terms of their material performativity. That is, social and cultural practices 
have real-material consequences on bodies. Cultural practice does not merely represent the 
world, but marks and materially contributes to what the world is. Barad draws on Butler’s 
notion that it is the repetition of cultural performances that produces ‘a specific 
materialization of bodies’ (Barad, 2007, p. 63). In exposing the material performativity of 
identities, significations and power relations, social constructivists open up the possibilities 
for contestation and change. However, Barad criticises Butler, discussing how she presumes 
that materialisations, and marks on bodies, are the end product of human cultural practices. 
Matter is ultimately seen to derive from ‘the agency of language or culture’ and the material 
bodies that social constructivists discuss are usually only human ones (2007, p. 64; p. 145). 
Performativity and agency is attributed and limited to the human domain. Social 
constructionists, therefore, fail ‘to recognise matter’s dynamism’ and do not take the 
dynamics of matter ‘seriously’ (2007, p. 64; p. 152).
In the place of essentialist, representationalist and social constructivist perspectives, Barad 
offers ‘agential realism’. This is not the ‘realism’ of an essentialised world of inherent 
physical properties and boundaries. Nor is it ‘about representations of an independent 
reality’, and it ‘goes beyond performativity theories that focus exclusively on the human / 
social realm’ (Barad, 2007, p. 37; p. 225). Agential realism is, then, ‘about the real 
consequences, interventions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-acting within 
and as part of the world’ (2007, p. 37). But what does Barad mean by ‘agential realism’, and 
what implications does this have for my conceptualisations of an ecological performance 
practice?
Barad proposes that the world consists of ‘phenomena’ (2007, p. 139) and that these 
phenomena are constituted through the entangled dynamics of matter. There are no 
preexisting material ‘entities’ or ‘relata’ which then ‘interact’ or ‘relate’ with each other 
(2007, p. 139-140). There are only ‘intra-actions’ and the ‘world is intra-activity’ (Barad, 
2003, p. 810; p. 817). Barad’s concept of intra-activity resonates with the propositions I have 
already detailed, about how the performance ecology is a matter of distinct yet entangled 
diverse humans and nonhumans, and that process and performance is a matter of interacting 
or ‘intra-acting’ with(in) wider ecologies. Process and performance can be understood as 
instances of ecological participation or intra-activity. Barad proposes that intra-actions 
involve ‘entangled agencies’ but these ‘entangled agencies’ are only constituted through 
their intra-actions (2007, p. 33). Distinct ‘relata’ or ‘agencies’ do not precede but rather 
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emerge in their intra-actions. This is because every intra-action effects an ‘agential cut’. In 
contrast to the Cartesian cut, which takes distinctions for granted, the agential cut ‘enacts a 
resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological . . . indeterminacy’ (2007, p. 
140). In this resolution the intra-acting agencies are established and separability between 
agencies is ‘agentially enacted’ (2007, p. 175). Agential cuts do not uncover preexisting 
agencies, but rather co-constitute what the intra-acting agencies are. So what intra-acts with 
what is established in their intra-activity. The agential cut (temporarily) determines 
boundaries between one ‘thing’ and an ‘other’ with the cut enacting ‘exteriority-within-
phenomena’ or ‘agential separability’ (2007, p. 175; p. 140).
I propose that performance, and performance practices, can be understood through Barad’s 
concept of ‘apparatuses’, where apparatuses are not pre set-up structures that can be used 
to look at the world but rather apparatuses are ‘material-discursive practices’ that are always 
already intra-acting with(in) the world. Apparatuses are practices through which distinctions 
between ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’, ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, and so on, are ‘constituted’ (2007, 
p. 141). An apparatus does ‘not simply detect differences that are already in place; rather 
they contribute to the production and reconfiguring of difference’ (2007, p. 232). In this 
sense, the apparatus of theatrical performance can be understood to contribute to and 
reconfigure wider ecologies: performance marks and is marked by diverse ecologies. 
Apparatuses enact agential cuts: that is they help to implicate boundaries between one thing 
and an other, say between eight humans, or between humans, rocks, water, buckets and 
matches.16 With Barad’s agential realism, differences and relations between ‘phenomena’ are 
made, and differences and relations are intra-actively and materially performed. Differences 
and relations are not pre-givens, and they are not enacted once and for all. With every intra-
action they are different. Differences are thus only ever ‘differences-in-the-(re)
making’ (Barad, 2014, p. 175), and with each intra-action ‘the manifold of entangled 
relations is reconfigured’ (Barad, 2007, p. 393-4). The ‘phenomenon’ constituted by these 
boundaries and differences are utterly entangled. In this sense, boundaries and differences 
between humans and between humans and nonhumans are intra-actively produced such that 
with each of our intra-actions we take part in reconfiguring what these differences are. So, 
boundaries and differences can be understood not as fixed but as continually made and 
remade through material processes; processes that we do not have full control over but we 
are agentially part of. What is key about Barad’s argument for my research is that she is able 
to account for separation and difference between phenomena at the same time as she is able 
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16 These references correspond to Wild Life, which I explore in Chapter Five.
to show that these phenomena are materially and continuously entangled and entangling. 
This is particularly significant for my analysis of Wild Life, in which I discuss the differences 
and distinctions as well as the entanglements of the diverse humans and nonhuman materials 
in the performance ecology. Barad is able to provide a critical framework for discussing 
separation and entanglement, differences and interconnection, and boundaries and the 
unbounded.
Barad proposes that ‘phenomena – whether lizards, electrons, or humans – exist only as a 
result of, and as part of, the world’s ongoing intra-activity, its dynamic and contingent 
differentiation into specific relationalities’ (2007, p. 353). She proposes that ‘we participate 
in bringing forth the world in its specificity, including ourselves’ (2007, p. 353). Under Barad’s 
‘agential realism’, being in the world is inevitably about being entangled within diverse 
ecological processes, which is always already a matter of intra-action, and so what matters is 
how we enact our live, ongoing and unavoidable intra-activity. This relates to my argument 
that since all performance practice participates in ecology then how we practice performance 
matters to ecology. Barad proposes that specific ‘possibilities for (intra-)acting exist at every 
moment’ (2007, p. 235). Vitally for my research, she implies that intra-acting agencies can 
transgress the boundaries they have helped to enact; according to Barad, intra-activity is a 
process of reconfiguring cuts, differences and boundaries. This relates to two of my findings 
from Wild Life: firstly, that ecological performance is a question of what methods allow us to 
enact through our intra-activities responsively and with responsibility; and, secondly that the 
diverse humans and nonhumans of the performance ecology all have the capacity and 
potential to transgress and reconfigure the boundaries of the performance containers I (as the 
director) provide. I characterise these findings through my phrases: the agency of practice; 
and, wilding performance containers.17 . 
The perspectives I have explored in this chapter have enabled me to critically frame my 
research inquiry and to discuss the key concepts and ideas that I engaged with, tested and 
developed in my practical projects. However, there are two aspects of Bennett’s and Barad’s 
work that my research into performance ecology might build on and offer important 
challenges to.
There is a tendency in Barad’s theorisations to lose sight of humans and intra-human 
relations. Her intention is not to jettison ‘the human’ but to present a more complex and 
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17 These are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
accurate empirical account of how ‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’ materially emerge. However, in 
putting forward her key argument that discursive practices ‘are not human-based 
activities’ (2007, p. 183-184), she often seems to push the human so far out of her theoretical 
discussions that the human appears to, well, disappear. This disappearance is evident in the 
examples she chooses, such as the brittlestar animal which is used to illustrate her ideas 
about ‘differences that matter’ (2007, p. 369): she tends to avoid focusing on specific human 
beings and prefers instead to focus on specific nonhumans. In exploring and developing an 
ecological performance practice I worked with a specific group of diverse humans, and I chose 
to focus on the performance ecology as an ecology of humans and nonhumans. This meant 
that my work involved a sharp focus on relations and collaborations between humans, as well 
as between humans and nonhumans. At times, I even specifically and only focused on the 
humans in the performance ecology as a strategy for working with the complexity of humans 
as human-nonhuman entanglements. In this way, my research offers an alternative to Barad’s 
predominant focus on the nonhuman. At the same time, Barad’s work offers a vital framework 
for my research into performance ecology; her perspective allows me to remain cognizant of 
the more-than-human and reminds me that the human is not all (of the performance 
ecology).
My research also adds to a different but related aspect of new materialist thinking, which can 
be identified in the work of both Bennett and Barad. When there is a focus on the human in 
their work, it is predominantly one single (adult) human who is discussed. Bennett discusses 
her experience of encountering the vibrant matter of a dead rat, cap, glove and pollen on her 
walk, where she is a part of this configuration of ‘things’ (2010, p.4-5) and Barad draws on 
the experiments of physicist Niels Bohr in order to frame her argument that we are part of 
the phenomena we wish to study (2007, p. 26). In both cases, ‘the human’ is represented 
through a single person. In my research, I explored and developed these ideas about material 
vibrancy (Bennett) and material intra-activity (Barad) by focusing on a collective of different 
humans: two children, one teenager and six adults (including me). I tested out Bennett’s and 
Barad’s ideas in terms of both intra-human and human-nonhuman relations, and I propose 
that ‘the ecological’ is necessarily as much about challenging our approach to doing human 
interrelations as it is about challenging our approach to doing human-nonhuman 
interrelations.
In these ways, my research aims not only to illustrate and test out the theories on matter 
offered by Bennett and Barad, but also to build on their work. So, whilst a large part of my 
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thesis is about what Bennett’s and Barad’s work brings to ecological performance practice, I 
am also concerned with what performance ecology can bring to the conceptualisations and 
meanings of ecology presented by their theories. This is, in part, why a practice-as-research 
(PaR) methodology is a significantly relevant one to use for my research. I think that the key 
potential of a PaR approach is that it can draw out insights from specific instances of 
performance practice, where these insights can shed light both within and beyond theatre 
and performance. In the following chapter I discuss in more detail my approach, locating it 
within the wider theoretical landscape of PaR.
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Chapter Three – Methodology
In exploring how a performance practice can be ecological, my project is driven by an inquiry 
that demanded a PaR approach. Since my research is concerned with doing - with the 
practices and modes of doing theatrical performance - the research needed to be led by the 
actualities of specific performance processes and events. A PaR approach was also key in 
terms of the research partnership with Catherine Wheels Theatre Company. In this chapter I 
discuss the complexities and issues of PaR and how I have approached using this methodology 
in my research.
In the UK PaR genealogies can be traced to at least the 1960s, emerging as part of the 
‘performative turn’ or ‘practice turn’ that has taken place across a range of arts and 
humanities disciplines (Kershaw, 2011, p. 63). However, PaR in theatre and performance has 
only gained substantial recognition in British universities since the 1990s (Nelson, 2013, p. 4; 
Kershaw, 2009, p. 1-2). Despite being acknowledged by the sector’s research agencies and 
processes – PaR is funded via the AHRC and evaluated as part of HEFCE’s Research Assessment 
Exercises (RAE) and Research Excellence Framework (REF) – a key writer on PaR, Robin 
Nelson, has proposed that it does not currently enjoy a wholly respected position within the 
academy. He suggests that it remains for some a rather elusive and / or incomprehensible 
mode of research (Nelson, 2013, p. 4). Anxiety towards PaR is predominantly due to the 
ambiguity this methodology poses in terms of where ‘research’ and ‘knowledge’ can be 
located, and what constitutes their dissemination. By proposing artistic practice as research 
methodology, PaR troubles the traditional Western binary between ‘practice’ and ‘theory’, 
between ‘making’ and ‘studying’ something (Nelson, 2013, p. 19; p. 16). A key aspect to how I 
use and conceptualise ‘performance’ in this thesis is that doing performance can be a mode 
of theorising about performance; that making performance can be a mode of studying it. 
Furthermore, a key aspect to how I use and conceptualise ‘ecology’ is that, since we are 
always already in ecology, the ecological troubles binaries between thinking and doing, where 
practicing and theorising ‘ecology’ are not easily separable processes. My practical approach 
to thinking and doing performance (in) ecology resonates with Guattari’s political proposition 
that any critical ‘reconstruction’ of the ‘human’ requires the ‘continuous development of . . . 
practices as much as . . . theoretical scaffolding’ (1989, p. 40). Furthermore, by proposing 
that research inquiry and findings can be embedded within artistic practice itself, PaR 
implicitly disrupts institutional structures of presenting and evidencing research. In particular, 
and certainly an aspect of my own research, the instabilities and impermanence of theatrical 
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performance pose direct challenges to the long-standing notion of fixed knowledge 
taxonomies. Since performance is a live as well as ephemeral activity, it also challenges the 
notion of ‘reproducibility’, which is something that has been upheld by ‘the academy for the 
past 550 years via mechanically reproducible writing’ (Piccini and Rye, 2009, p. 42). 
Therefore, PaR variously challenges traditional conventions of research inquiry and 
presentation. For me it is, in part, these very difficulties and complexities that make PaR a 
rigorous and robust research approach and, in particular, the necessary approach for my 
research inquiry into an ecological practice.
As previously discussed, I inherited a research topic: ‘Sustaining the Imagination: Theatre and 
learning for sustainability’. I was attracted to this CDA because of my ongoing commitment, 
as a professional performance-maker, to exploring ecology through performance. I thus 
brought my own critically informed and creative practice to this project, which formulated 
into two research imperatives: exploring how performance can enact ecology through its very 
practices, methods and structures; and, exploring how intergenerational collaboration could 
be a particularly dynamic performance ecology through which to develop an ecological 
practice. I revised the overarching question to be: How can a performance practice be 
ecological? Brad Haseman points out that this negotiation is typical of a PaR approach – 
creative practice itself initiates the research inquiry (2007, p. 147) – albeit brought into 
sharper focus through the CDA format of my research. This aspect of PaR is further 
demonstrated by Kershaw, who suggests that artist-researchers tend to ‘encounter hunches’ 
from within their professional artistic practices and that it is these that form the starting 
points for their research (2011, p. 65). I certainly arrived at my research question as a result 
of the hunches I encountered in my practice leading up to my PhD research and I chose to 
begin my practice-as-research by testing out these hunches through an initial performance 
project, Age-Old, as well as through my initial literature reviews of two areas of performance 
studies: performance and ecology; and children and performance. Through the laboratory 
practice of Age-Old I identified more clearly and coherently the specific research questions I 
wished to explore: the project served to affirm my research inquiry and its feasibility and 
significances as part of a timely and meaningful scholarly conversation. This process of honing 
and specifying the research through the actual process of doing the research is, as Nelson 
points out, similar to all methodologies and disciplines (2013, p. 30) but nonetheless does 
create an ‘output’ in a format – a performance – rather dissimilar to other methodologies. 
Age-Old was an important scoping-out phase of my research and formed a development piece 
through which emerged some of the methods and aesthetics that I took forward into the 
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much more ambitious process and production of Wild Life, where Wild Life forms the major 
body and output of my research.
Whilst my PaR methodology was clear from the outset, the specifics of my performance 
methods were not predefined. This relates to two distinctive qualities of PaR: firstly, since 
the approach is particular to each artist-researcher the methods are inherently diverse 
(Kershaw, 2009, p. 4); and, secondly, since the methods unfold through the process of the 
research, they are always emergent and cannot be fully defined prior to the research process 
(Barrett, 2007, p. 6). Extending this latter trope of PaR, I found that a key aspect of an 
ecological practice is that its performance methodologies are neither fixed nor definitive but 
can be transgressed and reconfigured by the interventions that are enacted by human and 
nonhuman participants.18 I thus consider PaR to be a robust methodology for my inquiry into 
ecological practice precisely because its methods can shift, develop and emerge in response 
to the particularities of the performance ecology. My performance (research) practice can 
even be understood to be predicated on its lack of fixed methodology. Simon Jones’ insights 
resonate with this aspect of my approach. Jones argues that, what is needed with PaR, is not 
the courage of practitioner-researchers to predict and convict their practices, but rather ‘the 
courage of their lack of convictions’ (2009, p. 22, italics in original). He proposes that PaR 
must resist ‘coming to know a practice apparently once and for all time’ (2009, p. 22). I think 
it is, in part, by embracing the unknown and emergent nature of creative practice that PaR 
can be generative of new thinking and doing, and can produce new knowledge and insight 
about, in my case, performance and ecology. This approach of embracing the unknown and 
emergent necessarily involves an openness to the muddles and messiness of creative practice. 
Bateson, through his ‘metalogues’, emphasises the importance of muddle and messiness: he 
suggests that ‘if we . . . spoke logically all the time, we would never get anywhere . . .[and] 
in order to think new thoughts or to say new things, we have to break up all our ready-made 
ideas and shuffle the pieces’ (1972, p. 25). For me, exploring and developing an ecological 
performance practice can be understood as a process of shuffling the pieces (of what is 
already known about ‘performance’ and ‘ecology’). Jones’ notion that PaR is not about fixing 
or predicting creative practices is also particularly apposite in terms of the emphasis my 
research places on exploring agency in performance ecology. Part of my PaR approach was a 
question of how to allow my methods to emerge responsively and reflectively in relation to 
the unknown, unexpected and unpredictable aspects of the performance ecology.
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18 I discuss my notion of humans and nonhumans transgressing performance methods in Chapter Five.
Nelson describes a PaR approach as one in which the ‘products’ of artistic practice are 
presented as a key instance of the research findings and dissemination (2013, p. 8-9). This is 
reflected in my approach, where my research ‘products’ – the public performances of Age-Old 
and Wild Life – present the components of my research journey and outcomes, where Wild 
Life forms the major body of my research. Whilst I include a full-length film, along with 
specific film excerpts from process and performance, of both Age-Old and Wild Life as part of 
this written thesis, it is of course the case that these films do not replace the processes and 
performances themselves. Rather, they function as part of this written thesis as a reminder 
for readers who have seen both or either of the pieces, and as a mode of sharing the 
processes and performances, in some form at least, with readers. Furthermore, in chapters 
Four and Five I have chosen to direct the reader towards watching the full-length films of 
each performance prior to reading my full analysis of each project and its findings, and to 
view each film excerpt before the specific analyses it corresponds to. By doing this, I hope to 
avoid preordaining the documentation of the performance work with particular 
interpretations of action. I wish to allow the reader more scope (and agency) in terms of 
interpreting and understanding the creative work and my claims for that work. This is related 
to a significant issue with PaR: that its findings tend to be prefigured by the researcher prior 
to engagements with the actual performance projects. This prefiguration means that the 
practice risks merely being a project of self-confirming prophesy. By viewing the work prior to 
my writing about that work, my aim is to demonstrate how the practice itself is research; 
research which exists within and beyond the theoretical ideas I explored through it and the 
theoretical ideas that my critical reflections on that practice led me to.
My methods of documenting my two projects included filming and taking pictures of 
rehearsals and the final performances, and keeping a journal to reflect on each session and 
the research process. For Age-Old, film-maker Geraldine Heaney filmed the performance (at 
Hillhead Primary School) from the position of an audience member using one hand held 
camera. For Wild Life, film-makers Jack Nurse and Morven Williams each used a hand held 
camera and a third camera was set up at the top entrance of the auditorium (at Platform) in 
order to capture the performance space from above. In this thesis I include images and 
footage from the rehearsal process and final performances, and I use and summarise sections 
from my journal. With PaR, these kinds of documentation – films, images and reflective notes 
– are sometimes used in the place of the artworks in order to fully evidence the research 
inquiry and findings (Nelson, 2013, p. 5; Piccini and Rye, 2009, p. 36). This is, however, not 
the case for me. Since it is the actual doing of performance (in process and product) that my 
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research seeks to explore and elucidate, it does not make sense to treat the documentation 
as though it can fully stand in for my performance projects. Therefore, my presented 
documentation plays a small but supportive role as part of this written component of my 
thesis.19 What is distinctive about research that is PaR, is that the research emerges from 
artistic practice, is carried out using that practice as the principle methodology and is (in 
part) evidenced through the products of that practice. I think artistic practice can explore 
questions that other methodologies cannot and, as Nelson puts it, what is at stake with PaR is 
the capacity of an artistic practice to ‘undertake an inquiry which yields insights of its 
own’ (2013, p. 81). PaR is predicated on the unique type of research inquiry an artistic 
practice can instigate and enact, and the distinct kinds of knowledge which that practice can 
produce. It remains the case, however, that the predominant ways others will engage with my 
research will be through this written thesis and the documentation of the performance 
projects. This presents a paradox: my research seeks to elucidate how actual performance 
practices can do the ecological at the same time as it relies primarily on this written 
component of the thesis for its scholarly dissemination. Remaining alert to this paradox is an 
important aspect of my reflexive approach. The different methodologies I adopted for gaining 
feedback from my collaborators and audiences may go some way in addressing the paradox of 
writing about the doing of performance (in) ecology.
My approach to gaining feedback from my collaborators developed and shifted over the 
course of my research trajectory. For Age-Old I recorded reflective discussions that I had with 
my young collaborator: 7-year-old Carragh McLavin. These reflective discussions took place 
during the creative process and after the public performances. However, when gaining 
feedback from Carragh I felt that when I recorded our conversations, Carragh tended to offer 
me (what she thought were) the ‘right’ answers to my questions.20 Asking Carragh pre-formed 
questions seemed to prefigure specific kinds of answers: answers which were helpful to my 
understandings of the work but said little about how the process and performance may have 
been doing performance (in) ecology.21 When reflecting on Carragh’s feedback during Age-
Old, I felt that she had in fact presented me with the most interesting and useful insights into 
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19 I recognise that documentation and performance is a field of practice and critical discussion in its own right, and 
is often discussed in relation to PaR (see, for example, Piccini and Rye, 2009). Whilst it is beyond the scope of my 
thesis to explore the debates in detail, the documentation and performance field offers a useful reference for my 
brief discussion here about the role of my documentation in this thesis.
20 Journal, 30 November 2013
21 I asked her questions such as ‘what did you like about being animals in the performance?’ and ‘what did you 
enjoy most about the process and performance?’ Journal, 20 February 2013
my research process when we were not formally reflecting on the work but simply chatting 
either during or outside of rehearsals.22 For Wild Life I therefore decided to adopt a different 
approach to gaining feedback from my collaborators: I simply made notes of the insights 
offered by my collaborators, where these insights occurred both during and outside of 
rehearsals and often at unexpected moments (i.e. not necessarily when we were having 
reflective discussions about the work and their experiences). This methodology enabled me to 
capture a sense of what my collaborators might be experiencing and what the different 
performance practices might be doing. I also gained feedback during the creative process of 
making Wild Life through sharing works-in-progress with my non-academic supervisor, Paul 
Fitzpatrick and dramaturge, Laura Bradshaw. 
My approach to gaining audience feedback also shifted over the course of my research. For 
Age-Old, I predominantly gained feedback formally in post-show discussions and workshops. 
As part of a work-in-progress sharing of Age-Old at Tramway (a theatre venue in Glasgow), 
there was a feedback session with the audience, which provided me with responses about my 
work from professionals in the field of children’s theatre. I conducted workshops with the 
Primary 3 pupils from Hillhead Primary School who saw the final performance of Age-Old, 
gaining theirs and their teachers’ insights into, and readings of, the work. I also conducted 
feedback workshops with two youth groups at Platform (spanning 8 to 16 year-olds) who saw 
the final performance of Age-Old. Whilst these methods for audience feedback proved 
somewhat useful in terms of hearing about the varied readings of Age-Old, I felt that the 
feedback was limiting in terms of gaining any in-depth insights into what the performance 
was doing: the feedback was largely about what the young people thought the performance 
meant in thematic and content terms. This may have been, in part, due to the kinds of 
questions I asked (for example, ‘what do you remember most about the performance’ and 
‘what / who did you see in the performance?).23 I also think that the limitations of the 
feedback I received was due to the very construct and context of feedback sessions and 
workshops. Whilst this set-up can be useful for developing performance work and developing 
people’s engagement in that work, for my research I wanted to gain a sense from audience 
members of what the performance might have been doing in its very enactments. Whilst it 
may be impossible to ever fully gain these types of insights from audience members, I felt 
that the informal conversations I had with audience members immediately after the Age-Old 
productions were the most useful in terms of gaining a sense of what their phenomenological 
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22 I draw on Carragh’s insights throughout my analysis of Age-Old in Chapter Four
23 Journal, 30 November 2013
experiences of the performance were. Therefore, my predominant methodology with Wild 
Life was to have informal conversations with a variety of audience members. These included 
artist colleagues, scholars, friends and spectators who I spoke to informally immediately after 
the performances. I purposefully did not prepare specific questions to ask audience members 
since I wanted to see what emerged about the work when spectators were not prompted by 
my research agendas. I wanted to be open to their experiences even if their experiences went 
against my intentions for the work. By not aiming for any specific type of feedback, this more 
informal and casual approach had significant import for my research, as it allowed me to gain 
a deeper and more accurate sense of what the work might have been doing for these 
audience members. In my analyses I also draw on two published reviews of Age-Old and Wild 
Life by the same critic Mary Brennan (the first review containing a paragraph on Age-Old as 
part of a mixed programme and the second solely devoted to Wild Life). These reviews offer 
another mode of audience feedback from the perspective of a theatre and dance critic. This 
type of multi-modal feedback from both my collaborators and audience members is key to 
PaR as both process and production. I draw on these different feedback modes as key 
research evidence throughout my analyses of Age-Old and Wild Life.
By emphasising the capacity of a practitioner-researcher’s specific practice to generate 
knowledge, PaR could be (mis)interpreted as a way of providing new insights merely for the 
artistic discipline(s) it adopts. Contemporary performance artist-scholar Paul Clark has 
discussed how ‘live performance might theorise itself’ and describes how the distinctions 
between ‘the theory of performance’ and ‘performance of theory’ became increasingly 
blurred during his PaR doctoral research (Clark, 2004). From this perspective, the relevance 
of PaR does not necessarily go beyond the specific artistic discipline. This presented me – 
working in a CDA format and seeking to influence professional practice, my scholarly 
discipline and ecology theorisations more broadly – with a rather limiting and inward-looking 
approach. Whilst I concur with Clark that a substantial part of PaR is its capacity to develop 
the artistic practices it uses as its methods, I have found that the radical potential of PaR is 
precisely its ability to transgress ‘domains’ of knowledge. Kershaw also argues that the ‘reach 
and coherence’ of successful PaR is always already beyond the particular arts practice (2009, 
p. 3). My approach takes performance seriously as a practice that can generate, extend and 
contest theory and knowledge both within and beyond the discipline of performance: 
specifically, one part of my research is about what new insights performance ecology might 
offer to theorisations about ‘ecology’ in non-performance fields.
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So, performance practice can be understood as itself a theorising and thinking activity, 
producing ‘knowledge or philosophy in action’ (Barrett, 2007, p. 1). My PaR approach was not 
merely a case of bringing ‘theory’ into dialogue with ‘practice’ or of simply drawing analogies 
between my practice and the theoretical ideas I encountered. Instead it was predominantly a 
matter of theory (about performance and ecology) emerging from the enactments of the 
performance ecology in process and product. My ongoing critical reading and writing of course 
informed and influenced my ongoing practice, however, it was important that my reading and 
writing neither fully dominated not determined what practices emerged.  At the same time, 
my performance projects and my ongoing reflections on those projects led me to new critical 
reading and writing, whereby these in turn influenced my future practice. Nelson describes 
this approach through his notion of ‘praxis’, which is a term used to denote the possibilities 
of ‘thought within both “theory” and “practice” in an iterative process of “doing-reflecting-
reading-articulating-doing”’ (2013, p. 32). It is important, however, to emphasise that in my 
approach this iterative process is not one of equivalence: the job is not for the performance 
practice to merely demonstrate the theory or the the theory to simply demonstrate the 
performance practice. Indeed, when I tried to directly translate ecological-theoretical ideas 
from my critical reading and writing into my performance practice, both the ideas and 
performance practice were weakened. The following example demonstrates this.
During the process of making Wild Life, I facilitated the group of eight performers in a 
movement exercise. I instructed them to move together in a clump and on my 
instruction to run out and back together again. I added the instruction that one or two 
people could run away from the group and then re-join them when their running led 
them back.24
Watch Clip 1 Practice-as-Research, Issues of Translating Theory into Practice
I was attempting to directly translate the ecological notion of the ‘rhizome’ (put forward by 
Deleuze and Guattari) into a performance exercise. I had envisaged the movements of the 
group as a constant variation of ‘speeds and slownesses’ and I had imagined the single person 
running away from the group as a ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 296-297; p. 
187). I was expecting and demanding that my performance practice demonstrate a 
philosophical idea about ecology, and I was thus ascribing an instrumentalist notion of (and 
unrealistic purpose for) my work. The performance exercise became merely a vessel through 
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which to represent ‘ecology’, and, as a result, the philosophical idea and the practice both 
seemed diluted to me. On reflection, this runs counter to my approach of allowing ecological 
insights to immanently emerge from the doing of performance. I was not giving my 
performance research practice its due as itself generative of theoretical ideas. I was treating 
my practice as a means through which to represent ‘ecology’, rather than working with 
performance as itself an ecology that can uniquely enact, and shed (new) light on, what an 
ecological practice might be. As my research process continued, and as I developed an 
approach whereby my critical reading and writing (which covered perspectives within and 
beyond performance studies) could indirectly inform my practical work, my practice began to 
yield theoretical ideas about ecology and performance which I could not have predicted from 
my desk-based work. Simultaneously, my critical reflections and further reading grew from, 
but inevitably exceeded, my performance practice. This praxis is what underpins my PaR 
methodology, which I want to articulate as a thinking-doing approach.
Kim Vincs helpfully argues that artistic practice is a ‘process of thinking’ and critical analysis 
is itself a practice that is ‘alive, growing’ (2007, p. 100; p. 108). My thinking-doing approach 
is one in which my performance practice and critical-reflective writing are distinct yet 
enfolded into each other. I think that both are generative, creative and performative 
practices, and together they constitute my research trajectory and findings. As I already 
suggested they are not equivalent practices, but rather they differentially disseminate, and 
dynamically carry on, my research. My research outcomes are, therefore, not locate-able in 
any one ‘thing’: they cannot be located or fixed in either Age-Old or Wild Life or in this 
written thesis. Rather, my research is differentially carried on by the distinct yet entangled 
practices of doing performance and critically reflecting on performance. Perhaps the radical 
potential of PaR is its capacity to enact and demonstrate how theory and practice, and 
thinking and doing, are not (and never were) fixed and separable domains of knowledge? 
Furthermore, I propose that me, my performance collaborators, the audience members and 
the (more difficult to name) nonhuman participants of Age-Old and Wild Life, are all 
instances of the dynamic, and often unpredictable ways, in which my research continues to 
be manifested and differentially carried on. And, your practice of reading this work is another 
differential extension of my research. In this project, then, ‘research’ and ‘knowledge’ are 
not, in any fixed sense, embedded anywhere or embodied by anyone. Rather, I understand 
research and knowledge to be (only ever) enacted, and to be (only ever) research-in-process 
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and knowledge-in-the-making.25 The creating, directing and performing of Age-Old and Wild 
Life, the writing of this written part of my thesis, and your process of viewing and reading it, 
are all variegated practices of participating in the ongoing weaves of a dynamic research 
ecology.
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25  Barad echoes my notion of knowledge as only ever knowledge-in-the-making. She proposes that ʻpractices of 
knowing are specific material engagements that participate in (re)configuring the worldʼ  (2007, p. 91, italics in 
original).
Section Two
Research Findings
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Age-Old
Wild Life
Chapter Four – Exploring Ecological Performance through Intergenerational 
Practice: Age-Old
As previously stated, Age-Old was my first PaR project and was an important scoping out 
phase of my research. In Age-Old I wanted to test out whether intergenerational 
collaboration can be a dynamic and generative performance ecology through which to 
develop an ecological practice. The project formed a development piece through which 
emerged some of the methods and aesthetics that I took forward into the much more 
ambitious process and production of Wild Life. For Age-Old, I decided to focus on a specific 
intergenerational collaboration between me and a single child, as at this early stage of my 
research I wanted to focus on a small-scale project in which I could be immersed as 
collaborator, facilitator and performer. I was concerned with what particular insights my 
practice would reveal about the connections between intergenerational collaboration and 
ecological practice.
Watch Age-Old Full Length
Project Structure
For Age-Old I collaborated with a seven-year-old girl, Carragh McLavin, working with her to 
co-create a new devised performance. When looking for a collaborator, I had no fixed criteria 
for who they should be, aside from wishing to find someone who was interested in 
experimenting with performance and excited at the prospect of collaborating with an adult 
artist. Carragh was suggested to me as a potential collaborator by my colleagues at Short 
Courses at the Royal Conservatoire of Scotland.26 Carragh attended the weekend drama class 
for children between the ages of six and eight so I was able to observe the class – and Carragh 
as a participant in it – before getting in touch with her parents to ask their permission to 
meet up and discuss the project. I was invited by her parents to meet with Carragh at her 
home and tell her about the project. From this meeting Carragh decided she wanted to be 
involved and a rehearsal schedule was agreed with her and her parents.
Age-Old was made and performed between November 2012 and November 2013. The project 
involved two stages of development: the first stage culminated in a work-in-progress 
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performance; the second stage culminated in a final performance. The work in both its stages 
was shown to a wide range of audiences in diverse contexts. For the first stage, I worked with 
Carragh for 11 weeks. For the first six weeks we met up once a week for a 90-minute session, 
and for the remaining four weeks we met twice a week for two hours. This stage of the 
project was produced by Nick Anderson and Rosana Cade, from Buzzcut, a Glasgow-based 
company ‘dedicated to creating exciting, supportive environments for artists and audiences 
to experiment with cutting edge live performance’ (Buzzcut, 2015). Buzzcut was unable to 
provide a budget, but did provide rehearsal space and technical support. A work-in-progress 
was shown at Summerhall in Edinburgh at Manipulate, a visual theatre festival directed by 
Puppet Animation Scotland, in January 2013. The audience for this showing was made up of 
theatre goers and arts professionals. It was also shown at Tramway in Glasgow at an Ideas 
Exchange run by Imaginate, a Scotland-based organisation that promotes performance for 
children and young people. For that showing the audience was predominantly arts 
professionals with an interest in new work for and / or by children.
The second stage of developing Age-Old took place between September and November 2013. 
This phase was supported by producer Matt Addicott from Platform, who had seen Age-Old at 
Ideas Exchange. Platform is an arts centre located in Easterhouse in the East End of Glasgow, 
an underprivileged area with a high poverty rate. This phase ran over six weeks with Carragh 
and me working together for two hours twice a week. Carragh was, by this time, eight years 
old. Platform provided rehearsal space and technical support, but again we did not have a 
budget for the performance. The final performance was shown in the studio space at Platform 
to youth groups from Platform (young people between eight and 16 years old), local 
community members and a theatre going audience from across Glasgow. Age-Old was then 
shown at Hillhead Primary School – Carragh’s own school – in the West End of Glasgow to an 
audience of Carragh’s classmates, parents and teachers.
Starting Points
When first meeting Carragh, I introduced the project to her by saying that recently I 
had been thinking about the age of landscapes and animals and how they are often so 
much older than me but are a part of who I am. I said that I wanted to work with 
someone younger than me in order to explore these ideas in new ways and that I was 
interested in her perspective and ideas about human age and things in ‘nature’ that 
are older than us. I proposed that creating Age-Old would be an opportunity for us to 
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get to know each other and what our different perspectives are: ‘We will do this’, I 
said, ‘through playing, making movement and using drama activities. From what we do 
in the process we will create a performance for a public audience.’27
In Age-Old I wanted to explore what intergenerational collaboration might uniquely tell us 
about how performance can be ecological. I entered into the rehearsal process with some 
specific questions informed by my past practice and my initial explorations into theories of 
children’s theatre, children in performance and performance and ecology:
• How can intergenerational performance – in process and product – enact the nonhuman in 
the human?
• What does a child’s approach to performance teach us about doing ecology in performance?
• What types of performance conventions allow adults and children to collaborate?
I started by making specific choices about the process and performance. Firstly, I decided 
upon the themes of the work: age, and human-animal and human-landscape relations. 
Secondly, I decided that we would work inside in theatre studios, outside in the local park 
(Kelvingrove) and further afield in rural locations near to Glasgow. I wanted to see whether 
the ways we worked together shifted depending on where we worked. I wished to test out – 
responding to the initial brief attached to the CDA – whether a place-based approach was 
going to remain a key aspect in developing an ecological performance practice. Thirdly, I 
chose a material for us to explore: white plastic bags. I made this choice because I wanted to 
see how we could work with a ‘normal’ material in new ways, and how we differently 
interacted, played and experimented with a material that is ‘everyday’ and easily 
recognisable. This also served to determine the visual aesthetic of the performance. Fourthly, 
I decided upon specific devising activities for Carragh and me to try, which included: writing 
questionnaires for each other and responding to these; writing lists about each other and 
about ‘things’ that are older than us in ‘nature’; choreographing movement sequences in 
response to words we wrote about particular landscapes; improvising and interacting with the 
bags; and, playing at different physical ways of ‘becoming’ animals. I chose these activities, 
and made decisions about the theme and material of the project, with the knowledge that 
any or all of these choices could be shifted, or even jettisoned completely, by me and / or 
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Carragh once we began working together. Whilst I wanted the process to be open to Carragh’s 
interests and responsive to our evolving relationship and whatever unpredictably emerged 
through our collaboration, my initial decisions gave helpful boundaries to our explorations. 
This approach enabled me to respond to Carragh and to the creative process itself, whilst 
avoiding being too open by following a process where ‘anything goes’. Since I was working 
with a non-trained young collaborator, this aspect of my approach was particularly important: 
Carragh entered into a process that had parameters, which allowed her to feel safe and – 
gradually over the process – to experiment with and push the structures and ideas I brought 
in. I also had a hunch that  a flexible process that has creative and generative boundaries, 
which can be broken and re-made along the way, may be a key part of intergenerational 
collaboration and, indeed, an ecological performance practice. 
The Performance
Age-Old explored the relationship between Carragh and me, and between each of us and 
animals and landscapes. It was described by theatre and dance critic Mary Brennan as a show 
about ‘the natural world both real and as filtered through the prism of a child’s 
imagination’ (Brennan, 2013).28 The audience sat in a horse-shoe configuration on chairs and 
on the floor on cushions. The piece was a collage of different performance modes. These 
included movements that echoed animal behaviours, which also involved me lifting, carrying 
and swinging Carragh. Two movement sequences were layered with recorded texts created by 
Carragh and me in turn: Carragh describing herself as a tree, which included ‘I grow . . . 
Things grow on me . . . I can fall down, I need carbon dioxide, sunlight and water to grow’; 
and, me describing Carragh by listing what I saw when I looked at her, such as ‘I see a wolf, I 
see doing something for the first time . . . I see not being afraid to love things’. Specific 
movements, such as doing a ‘mountain’ shape, were repeated and developed in different 
sections of the performance.
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Other elements included Carragh and me giving spoken introductions about each other, telling 
individual audience members what kinds of wolves they would be, playing at being animals 
with the plastic bags and making a circular path out of the bags. There was a projector 
onstage, which showed film footage and images at specific moments. At the start of the show, 
as the audience entered, the projection showed Carragh and me outdoors playing in a park. 
Later in the performance, questions for a mountain that Carragh had written were projected. 
At another moment, there was a film of us being animals in a park, which was layered with us 
doing live ‘animal’ movements and sounds. Near the end of the performance, a film of us 
‘flying’ with the white plastic bags outdoors was shown, whilst Carragh sat on my shoulders 
watching it.
Enacting and Representing the Nonhuman in the Human
Watch Clip 1 Enactment and Representation, Animal Improvisation 
Kershaw, in his discussion of how performance ecologies might constitute humans as ‘a wholly 
integral part of the Earth’s environment, acting in it rather than on it’, suggests that it is key 
for performance to focus on the nonhuman in the human (2007, p. 318; p. 238, italics in 
original). He argues that ‘human participation in ecologies . . . must be of kinds that are 
continually renewed through humans courting, as it were, the nonhuman “other” in 
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themselves and each other’ (2007, p. 238). With Age-Old I wanted to explore the particular 
case of adult-child collaboration and how this collaboration might enable enactments of the 
nonhuman in the human. I was concerned with developing performance strategies for Carragh 
and me to explore and experience the nonhuman ‘other’ in our (human) selves and each 
(human) other. I was interested in how Carragh, as a young child, would imagine and enact 
the nonhuman and how our approaches to doing the nonhuman might be similar and different 
and how they could coexist. One way I did this was through improvisations that involved us 
‘being animals’.29 An example of these improvisations is shown in the clip previously viewed. 
Whilst Carragh and I predominantly appear to be representing nonhuman animals, my 
experience of doing this (and other similar improvisations) was that by being absorbed in the 
performance labour of ‘being animals’, there was no (easy) separation between the 
symbolism and physicality, metaphor and literality, and representation and enactment of the 
nonhuman in the human. I found that my focus on representing an animal (or following the 
way Carragh was representing one) led me to, at times, forget what animal I was attempting 
‘to be’ and my attention was instead fully pulled to the physical experience of enacting the 
improvised movements themselves.30 There are moments in the clip when we appear to be 
fully immersed in the doing of our improvised activities, such as: when we make a continuous 
‘ooo’ sound near the end of the film (which came from Carragh suggesting that we become 
owls); when we ‘howl’ loudly (a result of Carragh suggesting we become loud wild animals); 
and, when we jump forwards with our arms in the air, shaking our heads and baring our teeth 
(which emerged from Carragh’s suggestion that we become angry wild animals). My 
experience of these improvisations was that, in the doing of the performance tasks, Carragh 
and I were simultaneously representing and enacting the nonhuman in the human. Perhaps 
‘courting’ the nonhuman in the human is necessarily a matter of the simultaneity of the 
symbolic and literal, and metaphorical and physical? This idea challenges the approach taken 
by Arons and May: as discussed in Chapter One, they draw ecological metaphors and 
materiality, and symbolism and the literal, as fixed dichotomies. Perhaps theatrical 
performance cannot avoid ecological metaphors, symbolism and representations and, 
therefore, perhaps any engagement with ecology through performance inevitably involves 
metaphorising and representing the nonhuman? My experiences of the improvisations 
suggested to me that part of an ecological performance practice is to embrace and engage 
with the nonhuman through representation and enactment, where representation may well 
be an unavoidable aspect of enactment.
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Furthermore, from participating in, watching and reflecting on the activity of  ‘being 
animals’ with Carragh shown in the clip, there seem to be  specific qualities of doing that 
emerged through our real physical efforts of improvising. In the moments of immersion in 
what we were doing (such as the examples already given), the ways in which we were 
collaborating and performing seem to shift slightly: rather than merely carrying out the tasks 
of a performance improvisation, we arguably become more attentive, open and responsive to 
each other. For example, when we are ‘howling’ together the individual sounds we are 
making develop and change in relation to the approach (to ‘howling’) taken by each other: by 
attending to each other’s ways of ‘howling’ we are able to be open to the shifts in our 
collective ‘howling’, which in turn prompts different kinds of ‘howling’ in response to each 
other. Furthermore, I think these qualities of doing also arose in relation to the ecology of the 
place we were in: the grass, trees, concrete path, people, dogs and more of Kelvingrove Park. 
For example, a man cycling past on a bicycle became part of our activity and another 
element for us to respond to, and the gusts of wind caused us to adjust our foot positions and 
ways of moving when we were ‘bearing’ our teeth and shaking our heads. By being immersed 
in the doing of ‘being animals’, it seems we were more able to respond to the constant shifts 
in what the other did and what was happening around us. Or, to put this another way, the 
physical demands of our improvisations, along with the very real physical demands of the 
spaces we were in, seemed to lead to an open, attentive and responsive quality of listening 
between Carragh and me. So, whilst we were theatrically working with representations and 
metaphors of nonhumans, there arguably were moments when we were in fact enacting 
specific qualities of doing. I want to propose that it is in the qualities of doing produced by 
certain kinds of performance activities, as opposed to the subject matter or themes being 
explored, that the potentials arise for ‘humans courting, as it were, the nonhuman “other” in 
themselves and each other’ (Kershaw, 2007, p. 238). This aspect of Age-Old led me to 
consider that, firstly, an ecological performance practice may be a matter of the qualities of 
doing (such as openness, attentiveness and responsiveness) that theatrical performance 
practices can instigate, where these qualities might be understood as ecological, and that, 
secondly, representing and symbolising the nonhuman may be a significant strategy into 
enacting ecological qualities.
This point about how there may be implicit aspects of theatrical performance practices that 
instigate ecological qualities of doing can be developed further through discussing my reading 
of a children’s dance piece, Îlo, by Belgium company ChaliWaté.31 Îlo was performed by two 
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adult dancers. It involved mime and dance, and was framed as a play without words about a 
man and a ‘thirsty plant’ (http://www.chaliwate.com/en/spectacles#Ilo, no date). The piece 
was described as an environmentally focused work about the issue of water shortage: it was a 
story about a man and a plant going on a journey to find water (Imaginate, 2016a http://
www.chaliwate.com/en/spectacles#Ilo, no date). It has been discussed as an environmental 
performance that addresses the ‘soaring issue’ of global water shortages, exploring ‘the topic  
from both the perspective of a human and a thirsty plant’ (TV Bomb, 2016). Îlo explored an 
environmental issue through the use of metaphor and representation: mime was used to 
represent a ‘thirsty flower’ and the ‘flower’ (represented by the female performer) was in a 
large plant pot and served as a metaphor for ‘nature’. Whilst the ecological topic was explicit 
and the human dancers were clearly representing nonhumans and demonstrating ‘nature’ 
through theatrical metaphors, for me the physical qualities of how the performers danced 
together were what made this performance, in my understanding, an ecological piece of 
work. Certain parts of the choreography demanded that the two dancers continuously take 
and give each other their weight in, what I saw as, an ongoing process of collaborative 
negotiations. These negotiations seemed to produce a responsive quality of reciprocity 
between the dancers, where the performers were (in these moments) enacting responsiveness 
and reciprocity. My thoughts eventually and subtly arrived at the need for reciprocity 
between humans and nonhumans in a wider ecological sense. Of course the topic of ‘water’ 
and the representations of ‘nonhumans’ played a part in my reading of the work, but it was 
the physical qualities and dynamics of their movements that had any lasting affect on me. 
Reciprocity is often presented as a key principle of environmental ecologies, especially 
through the ecosystem maxim of ‘everything hangs together’ (Naess, 1987, p. 37). Seeing this 
performance prompted me to consider whether dance practice implicitly entails the potential 
for enacting how ‘everything hangs together’, where movement work can do the qualities of 
healthy environmental ecologies (where these qualities include responsiveness and 
reciprocity). With Age-Old I explored movement creation in a number of ways in order to see 
what types of methods might allow ecological qualities to emerge in the doing of movement 
work (in both process and product).
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Immanent Authorship
Watch Clip 2 Immanent Authorship, Mountain Movements
In a rehearsal during the first stage of developing Age-Old, we made a list of words to 
describe mountains, which included ‘muddy’, ‘high’, ‘spiky’ and ‘rocky’. At the end of the 
session, Carragh had commented to me that she ‘liked these words very much’.32 In response 
to her comment, for the following rehearsal I transferred these words onto slips of paper, 
folding them up and putting them in a hat. I introduced my idea to Carragh: for us to create a 
movement sequence from the ‘mountain words’ we had come up with the previous week and 
we would create our movement sequence by taking turns to close our eyes, pick a slip of 
paper, create a movement from the word written on it and then teach our movement to each 
other. We would add each movement on to the last in order to create a movement sequence.
We began this activity, and I soon realised that the game of picking out an unknown word 
from the hat brought an excitement and energy to the way we worked together: there was a 
playful sense of ‘which one will I / you pick and what will it say and what movement will 
you / I do?’ Whilst I had brought a preplanned exercise into the rehearsal, Carragh and I were 
equally required to respond physically in-the-moment to what was written on the piece of 
paper. I could not plan how I would respond to the activity, as my responses were a result of 
the movement Carragh had just created, and how it felt being in the room with her at the 
time. It seemed that Carragh and I could have a more collaborative process as a result of us 
both being in a position of unknowing: neither of us knew what word we were going to pick, 
nor what movement the other would make. As previously discussed in relation to devising 
performance, Wilson proposes that the ‘hierarchy of the director is diminished as a result of 
their role as co-learner with the performers’ (2012, p. 121). The collective process of 
navigating through the unknown (of what movements we would create) seemed to 
temporarily enable a non-hierarchical adult-child and professional-nonprofessional 
collaboration between Carragh and me, in that we were equally implicated in devising this 
movement material. 
With Age-Old, I developed an understanding that my role as the trained expert and director 
was to carefully plan structures that created a safe space for Carragh and me to work 
together with(in) the unknown: that is, intergenerational collaboration emerged when 
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activities demanded that we create from a shared position of unknowing. So, whilst I was ‘in 
the know’ about how to create appropriate structures for devising performance material, I 
was not ‘in the know’ about what we would create: what was created relied on how we 
responded to each other and how Carragh interpreted an activity and in what direction we 
then took that activity together. My preplanned activities would not only be taken in 
unexpected directions, but new activities would often emerge from them. Creating the 
‘mountain movements’33 led us to explore and develop – later in the rehearsal process – the 
same movements through an improvisation, which led us to create new movements. By this 
approach, the performance material can be understood to emerge immanently from the 
collaborative process. Laura Cull’s description of ‘immanent collaboration’ is useful here: she 
discusses how performance can emerge from the differences between collaborators and from 
the process itself – from the ‘bottom-up’ (2013, p. 24-25). A ‘bottom-up’ approach was a key 
part of our intergenerational collaboration, where the structures of the performance 
activities (such as the creation of the ‘mountain movements’) would demand that Carragh 
and I contribute differently even as we were jointly working with(in) uncertainty and the 
unknown. The types of movements that Carragh and I created were at once unique to each of 
us and informed by what each other did: we were arguably discovering new performance 
material together in the moment of making it. Furthermore, my initial idea of creating 
movements from the ‘mountain words’ (written by Carragh and me the previous week) can be 
understood as an example of how my creative ideas often emerged from within the process 
itself, from a previous activity and / or from something Carragh had said or done. This 
troubles any clear sense of who the ideas belong to, where the ideas can be understood to be 
immanent to our collaborative process.
When performance ideas and performance material developed in response to something 
Carragh and I had said or done within or outside of rehearsals, I think that the performance 
process was being led by both Carragh and me, or rather it was being led by our collaboration 
and relations. Ingold’s description of environments is useful here. He describes human and 
nonhuman beings as ‘lines’ that interweave and ‘knot’ together (2011, p. 226; p. 151; p. 
175), where these ‘lines’ do not connect one ‘thing’ to an ‘other’, but rather beings unfold 
through their ongoing relations with each other: things are their relations’ (2011, p. 70). His 
theories about ecological environments reflect and extend from the scientific understanding 
of ecosystems as a matter not of isolated individuals but of relations between organisms and 
between organisms and their environments. As Bateson describes, the unit of survival is not so 
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much the Darwinian notion of the ‘survival of the fittest’ species but rather the ‘unit of 
survival is organism plus environment’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 489). In light of this ecological 
principle, the practices I developed in Age-Old can be understood as ecological when they 
allowed our relations to lead the process (as opposed to either of us individually leading). By 
this approach, the final performance of Age-Old arguably involved the relations between our 
adult and child perspectives as opposed to a performance that was entirely filtered through 
my adult gaze. This ecological principle of the relational can be extended to the relations 
between different performance elements. For example, the ‘mountain movement’ 
choreography became part of the final performance, and was layered with a recorded text 
that Carragh and I had put together from a poem she had written about trees. This choice to 
layer the movement sequence with a different element from the process (a spoken text) is 
another aspect of immanent authorship. I structured the performance by experimenting with 
putting different elements (created by Carragh and I) together. This allowed the immanent 
connections between performance elements to emerge, where unforeseen connections 
between, for example, the ‘mountain movements’ and Carragh’s tree text could arise. 
Perhaps this type of immanent authorship, where the focus in on relations as opposed to 
individual humans or individual performance material, is part of what sustains a performance 
ecology? Perhaps immanent authorship can be understood as an ecological practice insomuch 
as it enables no one human perspective or no one performance element to dominate? Perhaps 
ecological performance practice is about allowing connections between collaborators and 
between performance elements to emerge from the ‘bottom up’ of the performance ecology 
(rather than connections being imposed by the human director)?
Whilst I emphasise our process of collectively working with(in) the unknown and the potential 
for the relations between Carragh and me to lead the work, this approach was not about 
complete equilibrium or equivalence between us. In the ‘mountain movements’ clip, it 
appears that at times I led the movements, at times Carragh led and at other times it is 
impossible to tell who was leading. We were able to collaborate without being fixed by the 
dualisms associated with adult / child and professional / nonprofessional relationships, such 
as knower / learner, leader / follower and teller / told. I do not think, however, that we 
completely transcended these binaries, but rather, there was a constant and dynamic shift in 
our relations. I think that these ongoing shifts meant that no performer, and in this case no 
movement, could dominate the performance ecology. Our collaboration, in this instance, was 
not a case of us contributing in equal and the same ways, but a matter of the emergent and 
changing dynamics between us. What I think is important about this immanent authorship 
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approach is that Carragh and I were equal insomuch as the relations and betweens led the 
work. As discussed in Chapter One, equilibrium is not a desirable quality for an environmental 
ecology because total equilibrium would mean a system becomes stagnant and dies. Rather, it 
is the changing dynamics between elements that defines and sustains a healthy ecosystem. 
Furthermore, ecologists propose that the diversity and health of ecosystems can be sustained 
by the positive effects of ‘ecotones’, which are dynamic places where, as Kershaw puts it, 
‘two or more ecologies meet and mingle, such as, say, riverbanks, seashores and deep-sea 
volcanic vents’ (Kershaw, 2007, p. 19). Ecology, as a scientific discipline, demonstrates that in 
the between of two or more ecologies, new life-forms can emerge. So it may well be that for 
performance (in process and product) to enact the ecological, we need to develop strategies 
that allow for the unique and changing dynamics between collaborators to constantly change 
and evolve, where the betweens of the collaboration lead the work. These ideas emerged 
directly out of the intergenerational context I was working in, which suggests that 
intergenerational collaboration can offer a productive context for developing an ecological 
practice. Practitioner and researcher Jess Allen articulates this connection between the 
intergenerational and ecological in her description of a conference performance-paper I gave 
about Age-Old.34 In her conference review, Allen discusses the ways in which my presentation 
used ‘diversity and dynamism as signifiers of healthy ecosystems . . . [asking] how adult / 
child experiences might coexist within genuinely collaborative performance-making [and] how 
might they [Carragh and I] contribute not in the same ways, but differently and in dynamic 
relationship?’ (2014, p. 229). Allen’s observations signal my claim that intergenerational 
collaboration can implicitly enact the diversity and dynamism that is so necessary for the 
health of any ecosystem. 
At the audience feedback session at the Ideas Exchange event, my non-academic supervisor 
Paul Fitzpatrick commented that, for him, the most compelling aspect of the performance 
was how clear it was that Carragh and I had made the performance material together. He 
suggested how, even though the piece was rehearsed and structured, the performance itself 
openly and explicitly involved the live process of Carragh and me dynamically navigating 
through the work. Fitzpatrick felt that he was watching the dynamics between us emerging 
live in the space: the intergenerational relationship happened transparently in real-time on 
the stage.35 Brennan, in her review of Age-Old, describes the show as ‘a tender, merry yet 
89
34  Performance and the environment: new perspectives on ecological performance making, a symposium, Royal 
Central School of Speech and Drama, 1 November 2013.
35 Journal, 13 February 2013.
affecting dialogue about the distances – in noticing, understanding, believing – that grow in, 
and with us across years’ (Brennan, 2013, my italics). Brennan identifies the intergenerational 
dialogue that emerged live onstage, which implies that she was focused on the relations 
between us, as opposed to one individual performer. Fitzpatrick’s comments and Brennan’s 
review suggest that the dynamics of our intergenerational collaboration were not (only) 
represented in the performance but were enacted in the live doing of the performance. I 
propose that the public performances were each a unique carrying on of our collaboration, in 
which the dynamics of our relationship emerged differently each time we performed the 
work. Barad proposes that to ‘specify or study the dynamics of a system is to say something 
about the nature of and possibilities for change’ (2007, p. 179). By focusing on and specifying 
the dynamics between Carragh and I, I think that the performance embodied (in its very 
doing) possibilities for change: there was a sense that our relations could play out in different 
ways depending on, for example, the moods Carragh and I were in, the spectators who were 
watching the work, the particularities of the space we were performing in and (many) other 
factors. In this way, the performance may have been successful as an open ecology, in that 
the production inevitably shifted depending on our interactions and the interactions between 
the performance ecology and other ecologies, such as the ecology of the place we performed 
in. This leads to another aspect of the research project: through Age-Old I wanted to explore 
how the process of making the work could be informed by the ecologies of the different 
places in which we worked, and therefore whether a place-based practice was going to be a 
productive approach for developing an ecological performance practice.
Place-Based Practice
Watch Clip 3 Betweens Leading, Flying with Bags
Six weeks into the process of the first stage of development, I was walking Carragh home 
after a rehearsal when she began leaping in the air and, since she was holding my hand, she 
tried to bring me with her. I joined in and after a few minutes, asked her what she was trying 
to do. She replied that she was trying to fly in the air.36 Reflecting on this moment 
afterwards, I thought Carragh was communicating to me that she wished to explore ‘flying’ in 
our creative process. This demonstrates the approach I developed of listening to Carragh’s 
creative interests and ideas even when she did not present them to me as verbal suggestions 
but rather implied them through things she did. Carragh’s tendency, as a young child, to do 
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things as opposed to talk about them prompted me to listen to her in more open and 
responsive ways than I might have done if collaborating (only) with an adult professional 
artist. As already discussed, Heddon presents her notion of ‘entangled listening’ as a 
‘dialogical listening which stretches a radical openness towards interconnections, “listening 
with”’, and she proposes a practice of listening ‘beyond the human’ (Heddon, forthcoming). 
With Age-Old, by listening and attending to Carragh I also wanted to explore how we might 
listen and attend to the dynamics of an environment and how those dynamics might inform 
the listening dynamic between us.
Reflecting on Carragh’s ‘flying’, I had the idea of making a film of Carragh and me attempting 
to ‘fly’ using the plastic bags outdoors. Carragh was keen on my idea and so I asked artist 
Becki Gerrard, who knew Carragh and her parents, to film Carragh and me in a location close 
to our rehearsal space at the University of Glasgow: Kelvingrove Park. Later in the process we 
filmed ourselves at Mugdock Country Park (ten miles outside of Glasgow). When we began 
experimenting with ‘flying’ in Kelvingrove Park it was, at first, forced and difficult. I found 
myself suggesting we do things, such as leap on the spot and run up a bank, whilst Carragh 
became quiet and unwilling to try things out. At this point, I was attempting to overlay my 
adult projections about what we would do and how we would do it: I had expected us to 
chase each other, run up the hill and ‘fly’ back down and try flying on the spot in different 
locations around the park. I had my own ideas about what interacting with(in) the ecology of 
this place should look like. I was bringing in activities that were not necessarily immanent to 
our collaborative process (I was working from the top down). After about 15 minutes I stopped 
suggesting ideas, and Carragh and I simply began to explore where we were: the tree beside 
us; the area of grass beside a tennis court; a muddy slope; a bench; a litter bin; a concrete 
path; and a tree stump. When we began attending to what was immediately there in the 
park, our actions began to emerge in spontaneous and immanent ways.
I saw Carragh run behind a bin, so I followed and crouched beneath the opposite side 
and then we both began circling the bin whilst holding our gaze with each other. This 
was not something either of us had vocally suggested, but rather was a playful activity 
that we came up with together in the moment of doing it. Carragh responded by 
jumping towards the tree that was beside the bin, and I again followed her, running to 
the other side of the tree. I noticed Carragh had her hands on the bark, and I began 
feeling the bark with my own hands, which Carragh then copied. Then, we were both 
creeping our hands up the tree. Later on, we found a bench, which we both climbed 
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onto. When we were standing there I felt the breeze blowing the bags on my arms, 
which gave me a feeling of lightness, which prompted me to turn on the spot in order 
to allow the breeze to blow all the bags. I began to pivot on the spot, which Carragh 
copied, and then she began bending her knees, which I copied, and we both jumped 
off the bench, as if we were lifting off into flight. At this moment I remembered our 
task of ‘flying’ – we had arrived at the task through a route neither of us could have 
planned, a route that was responsive and immanent to each other and where we 
were.37
Perhaps our activities were led not only by the dynamics of our intergenerational 
collaboration but also by the environmental dynamics of where we were? When we focused 
our attention on where we were and what we shared this space with (trees, benches, bins, 
paths, grass, animals and other humans), we seemed to get more of a sense of what each 
other was doing, where each other was going and what the possibilities were for our 
activities. By collaborating with our environment we were seemingly able to collaborate more 
fully with each other. As we continued to explore our environment, our approach to ‘flying’ 
became more playful and ambitious: we clambered up a steep bank; I ran as fast I could with 
my arms stretched out; and Carragh climbed into a tree. In these instances it seemed as 
though we were not only playing in, but also playing with, our surroundings. My experience 
was that by playing with(in) the textures of our surroundings we could more fluidly share the 
roles of leader / follower. Perhaps by interacting with, and attending to, the movements of 
our environment our relationship could also in movement? This approach is similar to the way 
Reeve conceptualises her ‘ecological movement practice’ (2008, p. 31), which she describes 
as a ‘body-in-movement-in-a-changing-environment’ (2011, p. 48). However, whilst Reeve and 
other writers in the movement and ecology field predominantly discuss a singular adult artist 
moving in a ‘natural’ environment,  Age-Old explored the movements of two (very different) 
human bodies and between those bodies and ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ environments.38 The 
relatively simple concept of exploring ‘flying’ arguably became a complex case of dynamics 
and movements working across Carragh, me and the environments. Perhaps this activity can 
be considered an instance of the inseparability of human-human and human-nonhuman 
dynamics and movements? That is, it was neither Carragh nor I, but the dynamics between us 
and between us and our environment that seemed to be leading our activities. I use 
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38 Kelvingrove park is a busy park situated in the West End in Glasgow, and Mugdock County Park is a rural 
location.
‘between’ after Deleuze’s and Guattari’s notion that the term ‘does not designate a 
localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular 
direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away’ (1988, p. 27). 
Perhaps the dynamics and betweens could lead our activities because I (the adult professional 
artist) did not ‘own’ these outdoor spaces in the same way that I ‘owned’ the indoor studio 
spaces? When we worked indoors it often seemed that Carragh was rendered ‘the child’ 
coming into an ‘adult’-ruled space, whereas outdoors it seemed that Carragh and I had a 
more equal ownership of the spaces (spaces which did not have such explicit boundaries as 
the studios). We were both newcomers, exploring and discovering these unknown (to us) 
outdoor spaces together. However, the qualities and dynamics of collaboration that we 
enacted outdoors were not limited to outdoor environments. Working inside in the studio 
spaces could also instigate an adult-child collaboration whereby the work emerged from our 
dynamics and betweens (as I demonstrated with the example of the ‘mountain movements’).
Whilst I found that focusing on the interactions between the performance ecology and 
‘urban’ and ‘rural’ ecologies to be a rich inquiry, I realised that an ecological practice is not 
necessarily a matter of where the process and performance take place but is more 
importantly a question of how we approach process and performance. Whilst this place-based 
approach I had started to explore during the creative process of making Age-Old offered me 
insights into how I could approach collaboration as a practice of more-than (only) humans, I 
quickly realised that this notion of collaboration was not unique to place-based practices, and 
that indoor studio practices also had the potential to develop human-nonhuman 
collaborations. Furthermore, through working outdoors in these different environments during 
the process I realised that if I was to tie the performance down to one specific site I would be 
limiting the reach and openness of the work: it could only happen in one particular place and 
for those people who could access that place. A site-specific approach even struck me as 
potentially anti-ecological, in that to tie a performance down to one site risks fixing that 
performance ecology to one place. In contrast to this, the performance we made was flexible 
and adaptable insofar as Age-Old was performed in a diversity of indoor spaces: the ‘Red 
Lecture Theatre’ at Summerhall is an intimate room with two in-built white boards which we 
adapted the performance to by using the boards for projecting the film footage and writing 
on; ‘Tramway 4’ in Tramway is a conventional black-box studio with an end-on audience set 
up, which meant we shifted the physical position of specific parts of the performance; the 
large studio space at Platform is white with a wooden floor and no in-built seating, and so we 
used chairs and mats for the audience to sit on; and, finally, the large hall at Hillhead Primary 
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School is used for assemblies and sports, and so we used wooden benches for the audience to 
sit on and a large number of white sheets of paper to create the projector screen and a 
‘board’ to write on. The various manifestations of Age-Old were, in part, determined by the 
different spaces the show took place in. Whilst Age-Old was tied to indoor performance 
spaces, it was not tied to any one type of indoor performance space. Although limited by the 
requirements of the performance (such as using a projector and needing enough space for 
Carragh and I to create a large circle of white plastic bags), this flexibility and adaptability is 
perhaps part the openness of the performance ecology?
My explorations into a place-based approach deterred me from using and developing that 
approach in the context of ecological performance. Furthermore, by working in indoor and 
outdoor locations during Age-Old, I became increasingly interested in how performance can 
challenge the notion that ‘ecology’ is something ‘outdoors’ beyond conventional theatre and 
performance spaces. Rather than focus on working with(in) the environmental and social 
ecologies of specific outdoor environments, which is a practice put forward by site-specific 
artists and scholars (Wilkie, 2002, p. 158; Pearson, 2010, p. 35), Age-Old led me to focus on 
how the creative methods and forms of the process and performance can be ecological 
wherever performance might take place.
 
Exposing Theatre’s Role in Constructing ‘Nature’
In this project I wanted to test out Chaudhuri’s and Kershaw’s claims that theatre can 
challenge and revise binary divisions by exposing its own role in constructing ‘nature’ as some 
‘thing’ outside of and other to theatre and ‘culture’. As discussed in Chapter One, Chaudhuri 
proposes that by ‘making space on its stage for ongoing acknowledgements of the rupture it 
participates in – the rupture between nature and culture . . . – the theater can become the 
site of a much-needed ecological consciousness’ (1994, p. 28). Kershaw draws on Chaudhuri’s 
claim when he suggests that, if performance exposes the complicit role it has played in 
upholding the (modernist) nature / culture binary, it could reconfigure that binary. He 
proposes that postmodern performance is ‘a strong arena for such revisions’ (2005, p. 79) 
because the paradox and irony of ‘postmodern pastiche’ are well suited qualities for revising 
the culture-nature and human-nonhuman divides (2007, p. 273). Age-Old can be considered 
postmodern in that, as Heddon and Milling discuss, postmodern performance is often 
understood through a certain ‘aesthetic code’ including the ‘paradoxical’, ‘fragmented’ and 
‘decentred’. (2006, p. 203). They propose that one ‘event’ of postmodern performance may 
94
be to awaken audiences to their implication in meaning-making by performances being 
‘nonclosure oriented’ and suggest that the key point of postmodern performance is to use 
performance to ‘unmask performance’ (2006, p. 205; p. 208). Age-Old was made up of 
fragments of movement, play, film footage, images, interaction with plastic bags and spoken 
and written text, and there was arguably no ‘central’ or dominant element or theme. I 
wanted to test and explore whether postmodern performance is capable of unmasking the 
performance of ‘nature’ through transforming the contradictions of its practices into 
paradoxes that might - even momentarily - reconfigure culture / nature binaries.
In the final performance there was a moment when I placed a plastic bag in front of the 
projector (which was at ground level on stage). The bag cast a shadow on the wall in the 
shape of a mountain due to where and how I placed the bag in relation to the projector. Later 
in the performance, I crouched down on my hands and knees and Carragh climbed onto my 
back, so that she was on her hands and knees on top of me. I crawled in a circle, moving in 
front of the projector, which resulted in our bodies casting a shadow. It looked as if we were 
traveling into a mountainous landscape. This sequence of actions produced an image that 
explicitly represented a ‘natural landscape’, whereby I was not masking the creation of this 
‘nature’ image but transparently performing its construction. I hoped that our actions would 
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be an example for the audience of the performative process of making ‘nature’ that theatre 
arguably contributes to. Perhaps audience members were challenged to consider the 
performance’s and their role in constructing what ‘nature’ is? I wanted to enable the 
audience to experience the paradox that the performance was about human interconnection 
with(in) ‘nature’ and at the same was contributing to the construction of ‘nature’ as other to 
‘culture’. Perhaps this paradox of the performance challenged the assumption that ‘nature’ is 
separate from culture and rendered theatre as always already in nature?
Kershaw argues that by using the ‘spectacle’ of performance we can transform the 
‘contradictions of [our] practices into paradoxes’ (2007, p. 272), where these paradoxes 
prompt revisions of binary thinking. Certainly as a performer I experienced what Kershaw 
describes. However, I think my experience was largely because of my research intentions. In 
fact, this part of the performance troubled me because I found that neither Carragh nor the 
audience necessarily experienced the paradoxes. For Carragh, the significance of this 
performance material was that she enjoyed being on my back because it made her feel ‘like a 
baby wolf being carried by a mother wolf’.39 One audience member, Val Hopfinger, 
commented to me after seeing Age-Old that ‘the moment when you and Carragh were 
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walking on your hands and knees into the mountain was a beautiful image, you looked so 
peaceful and I thought you became an elephant in the mountains’.40 This comment implies 
that my reflexive construction of the ‘nature’ image was not experienced by Val Hopfinger. 
Rather, the ‘mountain image’ was merely observed and appreciated as ‘beautiful’. 
This issue is reflected in the comments made by the P3 school pupils (seven to eight year 
olds) who saw Age-Old at Hillhead Primary School. In a workshop I conducted with the pupils 
a week after they saw the performance, I asked for their feedback about it. Many of the 
children commented on the ‘mountain’ made from the plastic bag and projector. One boy 
thought that Carragh and I were ‘in the Rocky Mountains’ and ten other pupils specifically 
enjoyed the moment when Carragh and I were ‘far away’ and ‘in the mountains’.41 
Considering these comments, I cannot find any evidence that audience members (either adult 
or child) became aware of the performative construction of ‘nature’. In fact, this moment in 
Age-Old may have actually risked contributing to, what Ingold describes as, the 
‘bombardment’ of images of ‘the environment’ evident in our media. He proposes that 
‘nature’ images from around the world presented in the media serves merely ‘to make us 
inclined to forget that the environment is, in the first place, a world we live in, and not a 
world we look at’ (2011, p. 95). Whilst this part of Age-Old may have merely rendered ‘the 
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environment’ as other to the here and now of the performance, I think other elements of the 
performance avoided this issue. I want to propose that the binaries of culture / nature and 
human / nonhuman were more successfully explored and reconfigured through the approach 
we discovered and developed of collaborating with the material: white plastic bags.
Collaborating with Materials
Watch Clip 4 Nonhuman in Human, Bags and Carragh and Clip 5 Unpredictability, Bags, 
Carragh and Sarah
Prompted by Bennett’s concept of all matter as ‘vibrant’ and ‘alive’ (2010, p. 8), one idea I 
wanted to test out in Age-Old was how working with a material that is manufactured (i.e. not 
considered ‘natural’) can be part of an ecological practice. I brought 50 white recycled 
plastic bags into the rehearsal process. These bags were always present in the rehearsals even 
when we were not necessarily going to work with them. I was interested in experimenting 
with different ways of exploring the materiality of the bags. I wanted to see whether Carragh 
and I could discover a creative relationship with them that did not deny, but neither was 
limited to, their meanings as ‘plastic bags’ with the connotations of ‘waste’, ‘consumption’ 
and ‘environmental damage’. Specifically, I wanted to see how Carragh’s approach to playing 
and experimenting with the bags might offer something different to my adult (performance-
trained) approach.
I planned an exercise that involved Carragh listing all the things she knew about trees. 
She decided to pick her favourite thing from the list she had made, choosing the fact 
that squirrels live in trees. She was explaining to me that squirrels collect nuts when 
she spontaneously picked up a plastic bag and crumpled it up, hiding it between her 
hands. Her actions suggested to me that she wanted to play at being a squirrel. I asked 
her if she would like to show me more about squirrels by playing with all the plastic 
bags while I watched. She was keen to do this, and immediately went into an 
improvisation (without words) in which she experimented, played and interacted with 
the bags, moving in response both to the bags and her task of becoming a squirrel. 
Carragh carried bags in her mouth, made a ‘nest’ with the bags and curled up in it, 
rested on her back and shook her legs and arms in the air whilst throwing bags up and 
catching them in her mouth.42
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I felt like I was witnessing the simultaneous processes of Carragh discovering the bags and 
Carragh attempting to become a squirrel. It was the live-ness of her explorations that held my 
attention.
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My notes from the rehearsal show that I was unwilling to look away from the movements of 
Carragh and bags: my writing was sprawling and not in keeping with the lines on the page, 
which is what happens when I am not looking at the paper. My notes demonstrate that I was 
preoccupied with Carragh’s physical movements with the bags: I wrote ‘gathering bags’ and 
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‘gathering up in mouth’. I was drawn to the interactions between Carragh and the bags as 
opposed to viewing the bags merely as props that represented something in aid of Carragh’s 
performance. Carragh was bound up in the physical explorations of working with the bags and 
I think this, in turn, brought my attention to the materiality of her and the bags. She was not 
using the bags as objects with fixed meanings: rather, she was working with the tendencies 
and textures of this material. By only having the bags to play with, her movements seemed to 
become ever-more creative and responsive towards that material. There were constant 
changes in her gestures and the speeds at which she moved, all of which occurred as a result 
of her collaboration with the bags: Carragh’s unique movements were inseparable from the 
unique ways these bags moved and behaved. I think that it was these qualities of how Carragh 
was collaborating with the bags that challenged any fixed sense of human / nonhuman 
separability: it was impossible, at moments, to say who / what (Carragh or the bags) was 
leading the improvisation. I was drawn to the performativity of Carragh and the material 
itself. She often let the bags lead her movements. In these instances, Carragh, the human, 
was not necessarily at the centre of this performance, but rather, the between of Carragh and 
bags seemed to be at the fore.
Watching her, I felt that I was witnessing her embodied empathy for nonhuman ‘others’ – both 
the bags she was collaborating with and the squirrel she was imagining. Her playing was 
simultaneously a metaphor for squirrels (for her) and a physical matter of a human 
interacting and moving with plastic bags. This is another example of the entanglement of the 
metaphorical and material, and the represented and enacted, whereby this entanglement 
was arguably a key part of how she was ‘courting’ the nonhuman ‘other’ in her ‘human’ self, 
where this ‘other’ was perhaps the ‘squirrel’ and / or the bags? To return to the rehearsal, 
after watching Carragh improvise with the bags for some time I joined her. I was seemingly 
able to adopt a similar but distinct way of working. I was able to perform with the bags, 
treating them not as theatrical metaphors but as ‘vivid entities’ with their own trajectories 
and tendencies (Bennett, 2010, p. 5). Goulish offers a useful reference point here. He 
proposes how, in a Goat Island process, materiality becomes ‘another inquiry, another 
investigation’ as materials ‘are always in a state of imbalance, instability’ (in Bottoms and 
Goulish, 2007, p. 41-42). He suggests that materials are ‘elements of a process which demand 
to connect with us conceptually, spatially and physically’, which involves working with 
materials rather than assembling objects as ‘props’ to be used for predetermined ends (in 
Bottoms and Goulish, 2007, p. 42-43). Goulish implies a performance approach that can 
account for how materials have tendencies and trajectories beyond those which humans 
101
construct and demand of them: the materials themselves make their own physical, spatial 
and conceptual demands. Interestingly, Bennett proposes that vibrant materiality takes shape 
vividly in childhood and that, for adults, attending to the world as vibrant matter involves a 
kind of return to a childhood sense of wonder at a world populated by ‘animate things’ (2010, 
p. vii). I certainly found that Carragh, as a child, was particularly predisposed to treating the 
bags as her collaborators. I found that I – the adult professional artist – had a lot to learn from 
Carragh – the nonprofessional child – specifically in terms of learning to collaborate with 
‘nonhuman’ materials as vibrant matter. This suggests how intergenerational collaboration 
may be a particularly important performance ecology through which to develop an ecological 
practice.
I reflected on this rehearsal session with my non-academic supervisor Gill Robertson, who 
offered a valuable response in relation to the idea of how children work with materials. She 
commented that, from listening to me describing the activity of Carragh becoming a squirrel 
and interacting with the bags, it sounded as though I was discovering and allowing for the 
unpredictability and, as she put it, the ‘messiness’ of the ways in which a child performs, and 
in particular performs with materials.43 I interpreted Robertson’s ‘messiness’ both in the 
literal sense of making a mess onstage (this was part of what Carragh was doing with the 
bags) and in a metaphorical sense of messing up (my) adult expectations about what the 
material means and how it can be used. This conversation with Robertson prompted me to 
develop structures in the process and performance that would allow for Carragh’s 
unpredictability as a child performer to ‘meet’ with the unpredictability of the bags, whereby 
I might also be prompted to perform unpredictably with Carragh and the bags. In rehearsals 
and the final performance, I found that since we had to respond to the bags – their 
tendencies and movements – live onstage, we also had to respond to each other’s 
unpredictabilities and spontaneous gestures. In this sense, my approach extended Quick’s 
notion of the spontaneity and unpredictability of the child’s ‘secret gesture’ (2006, p. 150), in 
that Age-Old arguably involved Carragh and me (child and adult) enacting spontaneity and 
unpredictability. During my workshops with pupils at Hillhead Primary school a teacher 
commented to me that he had found the ways we used the bags to be unexpected and 
‘different’. He was fascinated by the unpredictable ways Carragh and I uniquely interacted 
with them.44 
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Furthermore, this teacher also read the bags symbolically as representing ‘waste’ and 
‘pollution’. He saw the moment when I attempted to blow a bag off my shoulder as a 
representation of an animal not able to get rid of human ‘rubbish’: he said that it was a 
metaphor for how animals do not have a choice about human ‘waste’ being disposed of and 
adversely effecting them. At the same time, he was drawn to the physical ways Carragh and I 
used the bags, such as laying them out in a circle and Carragh throwing them in the air. He 
described how the bags were sometimes representing themselves (bags), other times acting 
as metaphors for something else, and at other times were simply physical things that he could 
see, hear and feel (the audience were able to pick up and play with the bags at the end of 
the show).45 His comments suggest to me that the ways Carragh and I interacted with the 
bags were both representational and literal: an ‘ecological issue’ emerged but did not take 
away from him reading the bags as materiality with tendencies of its own (beyond the human 
meanings attributed to it). In light of this teacher’s comments, it seems that our 
collaborations with the bags meant that no one way of viewing that material could be fixed 
and that the performance was open to multiple interpretations of that material. Indeed, I had 
not specifically intended for this particular ‘ecological issue’ to be read into the work, but at 
the same time I had not not intended this type of reading. I had chosen bags specifically 
because of their ‘environmental’ connotations and had aimed to reference and move beyond 
these meanings. The teacher’s comments imply that this happened for him.
I want to suggest that Age-Old was, in part, an open and accessible  performance ecology due 
to there being a child on stage, whereby child spectators were able to relate to the work 
more directly. Most of the comments made by the school pupils about Age-Old focused on the 
perspective of Carragh:
‘Carragh walking in a circle of bags you had made.’
‘Carragh waving two plastic bags when you said “Where are you?”’ 
‘Carragh was on your back.’
‘Carragh was swung round by you holding one of her wrists and one of her ankles.’
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‘Carragh was in a forest in a secret den.’46
Focusing on Carragh could have been, in part, due to the pupils already knowing her (Carragh 
attended Hillhead Primary school). However, I think that by collaborating with a child in 
process and performance, children watching the work can access it more easily and 
confidently. In my interview with Kabinet K, Manshoven commented that the children in their 
audiences often talk about the child performers but say very little, or nothing at all, about 
Manshoven (who performs in the Kabinet K shows with the child performers) (Manshoven and 
Laureyns, 2014). The comments made by the Hillhead pupils, along with this reflection from 
Kabinet K, suggest that children are able to identify with and access a piece of performance 
much more easily when there is a child or children performing in it. This finding presented me 
with a key concern: that ecological performance may need to involve a diversity of human 
collaborators in order to avoid presenting the ecological as something only certain people can 
do or experience. Seeing people that look like us on stage (for example, a child seeing 
another child) may be a key way in which performance can enact the openness and 
immediacy of wider Earthly ecology as something we are all always already within and an 
integral part of. I decided to further explore this idea, and the other key ideas I have 
discussed about Age-Old, through a new project, Wild Life, for which I collaborated with a 
larger and more diverse group of children and adults.
Age-Old into Wild Life
There were six key ideas from Age-Old that I took forward into Wild Life. Firstly, I wanted to 
explore further the relations between enacting and representing ‘ecology’ in performance: I 
wanted to explore how the entanglements of the metaphorical and physical, and the symbolic 
and literal, are part of an ecological practice. Secondly, I wished to further my findings on 
immanent authorship and adult-child collaboration by working with a larger intergenerational 
group and gaining a different perspective, by taking on the role of director and exploring an 
ecological approach to directing. This decision to work with a larger and more diverse group 
was also prompted by Kershaw’s useful reference to how ecology, as a scientific discipline, 
understands the ‘diversity of life in ecosystems . . . [as] an indication of health’ (2007, p. 53). 
I wanted to further explore how the diversity in an intergenerational performance ecology 
can be a productive way for performance to explore and enact the ecological. Thirdly, I chose 
to focus in particular on developing a collaborative practice with nonhuman materials in 
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order to further my findings about working with materials as ‘vibrant matter’. Fourthly, in 
light of the limitations I had identified in place-based approaches, I decided to focus on 
developing performance practice within a theatre venue (Platform) in order to challenge the 
notion that ‘ecology’ is some ‘thing’ outside of theatre practices and spaces. Whilst the social 
and environmental ecologies in and around Platform would, of course, inform and interact 
with the performance ecology, I decided not to directly focus on these interactions. Given the 
rich questions and ideas that had emerged from Age-Old about studio-based modes and 
practices of performance, I resolved to limit my research to the specifics of a studio-based 
performance ecology, all the while remaining aware that this ecology would inevitably 
interact with other distinctive ecologies surrounding the venue we were working in. 
Furthermore, given the time frame and available resources for the project, it seemed 
appropriate to place this limitation on Wild Life: to explore the local environmental and 
social ecologies surrounding Platform would have required a more extended research project 
or another project entirely. Fifthly, I wanted to develop my performance strategies for 
working with binaries in order to disrupt them. Whilst I knew it would be inevitable that Wild 
Life would draw on the binary couplings of performance / ecology, inside / outside, culture / 
nature, human / nonhuman, adult / child and professional / nonprofessional, I wanted to 
further explore ecological performance – in process and product – as a practice of enacting 
ecological qualities, whereby these qualities might reconfigure and even transgress binary 
thinking and doing. In Age-Old I had discovered responsiveness, listening, openness, diversity 
and dynamism as ecological qualities that intergenerational performance practice could 
enact. With Wild Life I wanted to further explore these, as well as remain open to what new 
qualities - and in particular, what unexpected qualities - might emerge through the particular 
practices of this intergenerational performance ecology.
Lastly, there was a new idea, ‘wildness’, that had emerged directly from my reflections with 
Carragh about our collaboration, and which was key to the way I approached Wild Life. Three 
weeks after the final Age-Old performance I held a session with Carragh to reflect on the 
project. I asked her what stood out the most for her from the creative process and the 
performances. She said that the times she remembered the best (and which were most 
enjoyable for her) from the process were when we were both ‘being wild together’ and that 
the final performances stood out to her because they felt ‘wild’.47 Carragh’s comments were 
a key moment in my research trajectory. Her comments prompted me to consider ‘wildness’ 
as a potentially key aspect of an ecological performance practice, especially if related to the 
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re-wilding idea that ‘wildness’ is characteristic of healthy environmental ecologies (Monbiot, 
p. 8; Sandom, Svenning and Ejrnæs, 2012, p. 11). I therefore wondered whether the 
ecological could be productively practiced through creatively exploring ‘wildness’? I had a 
hunch that exploring ‘wildness’ as concept, idea, actuality and enactment may instigate the 
ecological qualities already referenced in relation to Age-Old as well as revealing new ones. I 
therefore chose to embark on a creative inquiry into ‘wildness’ with my collaborators and to 
call this main research project, Wild Life.
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Chapter Five – Wilding Performance: Wild Life
I set out to explore how ‘wildness’ emerges in process and performance and what an 
intergenerational inquiry into ‘wildness’ can tell us about how performance can be an 
ecological practice. In keeping with my commitment to a thinking-doing methodology, at this 
point I chose not to explore ‘wild’ from within ecological or environmental theory per se.48 I 
wanted to see what insights my practice would uniquely reveal about ‘wildness’ and its links 
to ecological practice. I was motivated to work with children and adults, professionals and 
nonprofessionals, and nonhuman materials in order to involve multiple interpretations and 
manifestations of ‘wildness’, where ‘wildness’ is – like ‘nature’ – a contestable and complex 
concept.
Watch Wild Life Full Length
Project Structure
For Wild Life I collaborated with and directed a group of eight professional and 
nonprofessional performers between the ages of nine and 60 years, working with and 
directing them in a new devised performance. The process and performance involved working 
with materials – stones, rocks, matches, buckets and water. The project took place at 
Platform. My collaborators were a mixture of people from the area of Easterhouse, and so 
local to the performance venue, and from the city of Glasgow more widely. They were (in 
order of image overleaf, left to right): 
Geraldine Heaney (27 years old); Carragh McLavin (9); Graham Mack (52); Gaby McCann (13); 
Archie Lacey (55); Peter Lannon (26); Lennon Che Campbell (9); Liz Lumsden (57)
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Geraldine Heaney is a professional artist, performer and film-maker, who often works with 
young people49 and Peter Lannon is a professional performer and director who ‘works with 
people of all ages and abilities’ (Lannon, 2015).50 Heaney and Lannon both took part in Wild 
Life as participants and were not involved in the planning and facilitating of the project, 
albeit that their professional experience prepared them for some of the challenges and 
opportunities of working with nonprofessionals of all ages. As the director, I led the project 
and commissioned Heaney and Lannon, as professional artists, to work with me on a two-day 
research and development process before beginning the project with the whole group. 
Through this preparatory phase of work, and in its operation, they provided expert advice and 
perspectives. They were both paid fees for their participation in the whole project. The other 
collaborators responded to call-outs for volunteer participants and were then invited to take 
part. These participants were not trained in performance, but some had previous experiences 
of performing. These participants were not paid artists, but took part because they wished to 
try something new, to work in an intergenerational group and were interested in the 
intentions of the project to explore ‘wildness’. After collaborating with me on Age-Old, 
Carragh chose to continue working with me for Wild Life, and to be part of this larger 
collaborative group. This continued collaboration with Carragh provided me with a useful 
through line, in particular since Carragh had initiated my interest in ‘wildness’.
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Wild Life took place between August and November 2014 and was co-produced and co-funded 
by Platform and Catherine Wheels. Matt Addicott produced Wild Life, with Platform providing 
rehearsal space and technical support during the three months that I worked with the group. 
For Platform, hosting Wild Life was particularly relevant to their remit of developing 
collaborations between artists and people in the local Easterhouse community, and the 
project was also an opportunity for Platform to learn from my particular artistic approach.51 
Fitzpatrick gave me advice throughout Wild Life on project management as well as offering 
artistic support. Glasgow-based performance-maker and researcher Laura Bradshaw came in 
five times in the last three weeks of the process to offer dramaturgical support. Suzie 
Normand, from Catherine Wheels, was the production manager, also leading on lighting and 
sound design.
For the first month I met with the group once a week for a two-hour session. For the next two 
months, we met twice each week, for a two-hour and for a five-hour session. A work-in-
progress was shown in November 2014 as part of the Only Human? festival at the University of 
Glasgow.52 The final performance took place at Platform at the end of November 2014, with 
three showings to a public audience of children, young people, families, people from the 
local area, artists, academics, and a theatre going audience. I engaged in audience feedback 
from child and adult spectators through conversations after the show and conducting 
workshops with the youth groups at Platform. The Wild Life performers also fed back to me 
the responses they had received from their friends and family. Gaining insights from diverse 
audience members was a key part of keeping a track of my research process.
The Performance
The duration of the final performance was 60 minutes. It was shown in the main auditorium 
at Platform, with the seating bank removed. We created a round performance space 
measuring eight meters in diameter by placing the 60 audience chairs in a large circle. There 
were eight gaps placed intermittently in the circle, which the performers stood in at 
moments during the performance. I chose a circular configuration with the audience on the 
same level as the performers in order to have the audience in close proximity to the 
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52  Only Human? was a ‘public festival  of the humanities exploring what it is to be more-than-human in today’s 
world’ (onlyhumanglasgow, 2014).
performers, to enable a diversity of perspectives and for the spectators to be able to see 
each other as well as the performers. I hoped the audience would experience themselves as a 
part of the performance, rather than as separated onlookers.
The performance involved the eight human performers, eight large rocks, and 12 silver metal 
buckets – eight of which each had small stones inside and four of which were filled with 
water.
Brennan described the show as a ‘a far-reaching reminder of who we are, and where we come 
from in time and landscape’ (Brennan, 2014). The audience entered into the performance to 
see the performers already moving in and out of the circle in a high energy choreography – 
the action already in swing. The performance consisted of various parts, including: 
performers greeting audience members; performers traveling the circle close to, and at times 
touching, the audience, moving alone and in various combinations – walking, running, carrying 
each other and large rocks and flicking water at the audience; Pete swinging and carrying 
Lennon; a chaotic head-tapping choreography; performers messing up their hair; 
combinations of the performers spinning each other; dropping large rocks; lighting matches; a 
semi improvised choreography that involved Archie and Liz taking spectators by the hand and 
running with them; a water fight; rhythmically stomping through the water; and, stones flung 
across the floor.
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In what follows, I critically reflect on the process and performance of Wild Life, drawing on 
my experiences of the work and the multi-modal feedback from my collaborators and 
audience members. My reflections further tease out and extend the ecological threads from 
the four performance fields I discussed in Chapter One, and my analyses draw on Bennett’s 
and Barad’s theorisations about material processes that involve human and nonhuman 
actants, as presented in Chapter Two. I demonstrate how my research builds on the 
performance and non-performance areas through presenting and discussing my key finding, 
wilding performance. I explore three distinct but related approaches I developed for wilding 
performance, which I have coined as: wilding performance containers; just doing-ness; and, 
the agency of practice. These approaches correspond to two key practices I developed - 
Instant performances and the Interpretation Practice. I close the chapter with an analysis of 
two specific sections in the final production, demonstrating how these sections might have 
productively engaged with the more negative aspects of the ecological. Together these 
approaches, practices and specific aspects of the final performance, constitute my findings.
Creating and critically reflecting on Wild Life led me to conceptualise ecological performance 
as a practice of ‘wilding performance’, and so I begin these discussions by briefly introducing 
the rewilding field. Whilst the concepts and practices of ‘rewilding’ provide useful reference 
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points for my findings, throughout this chapter I demonstrate how my approach is at once 
similar to, and signals a marked difference from, the predominant notions of ‘rewilding’.
Rewilding
In contemporary Europe rewilding is a land management practice that involves human plans 
and interventions aimed at restoring ‘spontaneous processes’ to ecological systems (Monbiot, 
2013, p. 8; Sandom, Svenning and Ejrnæs, 2012, p. 11). It is a development of, and challenge 
to, the conservation agenda (Bekoff, 2014, p. 9). Whilst conservation has traditionally 
emphasised keeping or returning ‘natural environments’ to a specific ‘wild’ state, 
contemporary rewilding practices contest the notion that ecosystems can or should be 
restored to a fixed condition that is preserve-able. The rewilding agenda focuses on restoring 
the health, resilience and biodiversity of ecosystems so they can become more self-willed, 
self-sufficient and spontaneous (Monbiot, 2013, p. 8, Sandom, Svenning and Ejrnæs, 2012, p. 
11). Rewilding practices are about humans involving themselves in environmental ‘ecologies’ 
in order to advance the recovery of the ecological processes. Rewilding is, paradoxically, a 
type of human interference in, disturbance and management of ecosystems with the ultimate 
aim of letting those systems go in their own ‘wild’ and self-willed direction beyond human 
control: rewilding is the deployment of the ‘human touch to erase the human touch’ (Hall, 
2014, 30). However, the rewilding goal of humans ‘letting go of’ and ‘abandoning’ 
environmental ecosystems problematically assumes that humans are able to ‘hold on to’ and 
‘control’ these ecosystems in the first place. In addition, to speak of erasing or retracting the 
human from ecosystems implies that humans have a choice to step into or out of these 
ecologies. At the very least, this concept of rewilding suggests a privileged vantage point of 
the human as separate from, or even above, environmental ecologies. These are assumptions 
that I have sought to challenge and contest throughout my research. The proposition that 
humans can involve themselves only to step away from an ecosystem is, however, challenged 
by more recent rewilding literature, which helpfully proposes human re-involvement in, as 
opposed to retraction from, environmental ecological systems (Jørgensen, 2014, p. 5; 
Monbiot, 2013, p. 11). The concept of re-involvement is relevant for my use of wilding 
because it does not assume ecology to mean human absence and it takes human participation 
in diverse environmental ecologies as inevitable. The aim with this type of rewilding is for 
less human-dominating involvement, rather than for complete human retraction. From this 
idea, a recent development in the field has been to apply the concept of rewilding to ‘human 
life’ by proposing the ‘wilding of people and their cultures’ (Monbiot, 2013, p. 8). Under 
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these formulations of rewilding, questions can then arise about what could or should be the 
qualities and dynamics of humans’ inevitable involvement in ecosystems. This presents a key 
critical frame for my explorations into performance as an ecology that can enact and say 
something about the wider ecology of Earth and our (human) participation in it. My concept 
of ‘wilding performance’ is about how theatrical performance is at once a human and 
nonhuman ecology and, crucially, what creative practices emerge from recognising that we 
are always already within and part of the wider ecology of Earth. I want to propose that what 
matters when it comes to an ecological performance practice is how we enact our inevitable 
participation in the performance ecology and the wider dynamics of Earth’s ecology. I hope to 
show that performance can be ecological when its practices enable and enact the qualities 
and dynamics of ecological participation, where these practices can be understood as 
methods of wilding performance.
Introducing Wilding Performance
During the creative process of making Wild Life, I often brought in a piece of music that I 
thought would initiate ‘wild’ energies of moving and dancing. This practice of using music to 
prompt ‘wildness’ was my response to a reflection Geraldine made when I asked the group to 
share what and where made them feel ‘wild’. Geraldine replied that, for her, it was being at 
the live gigs of her favourite bands and dancing.53 This demonstrates one way in which I 
continued my findings on immanent authorship from Age-Old into Wild Life, in that my 
artistic ideas often emerged immanently from the process itself, from something someone in 
the group said or did. For one rehearsal I brought in ‘Largs’ by King Creseote and gave the 
group the instruction to dance to the music all together, in partners, alone and in different 
combinations.
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Lennon runs to the middle and the rest of the group follow, they pause in the centre 
and then dance harder, tearing away across the room with a shared impulse of energy. 
Archie is running fast in circular directions, jumping at moments. He is good at dodging 
people, he heads towards the wall, he leaps up and into it . . . there is a loud crack. 
Some folks slow and look at Archie, still moving through the trajectory of their 
movements. Archie looks up, smiling and alive in his eyes, though sheepish and 
shocked. I stop the music. He has cracked the wall, a three foot long bending line 
emerges above the head height of the shortest in the group – Lennon and Carragh. We 
crowd around . . . glances, laughter, ‘oh shit’ in my head . . . some chatter I half 
remember . . . ‘Archie, are you ok?’, ‘I’m ok, but the wall might not be’, ‘wasn’t it 
there before?’, ‘no, I heard the sound of it crack’, more laughter, ‘Archie, why did you 
jump into the wall?’, ‘I don’t know’, ‘have we broken it?’, ‘it can’t be very strong or 
solid if it breaks that easily’, ‘I wonder if anyone else has ever cracked the walls here’, 
‘what have we done?’, ‘will we get into trouble?’, ‘what is the wall made out of?’, ‘can 
it be mended?’, ‘I don’t think it should get mended, I like the shape of the crack’, 
‘maybe the wall will fall down’, ‘it’s lucky you didn’t go through the whole thing and 
come crashing out in the cafe’ . . . laughter . . . alive, alert faces looking from wall to 
each other to wall to me to Archie to wall to beyond the wall. These containing walls 
of the rehearsal room arose now as less solid and more permeable – their structure and 
containment giving us a place to work in, a focus, a shape to our activities, but now, as 
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we are coming up against them, we are sensing the beyond of them. Archie cracking 
the wall did not destroy it but it did rupture our thinking about how solid and fixed the 
walls that were containing us really were.54
The ‘wildness’ of this rehearsal was less the music and dancing and more the cracking of the 
wall and the rupture this enacted to the containment of the activity. Cracking the wall did 
not only crack the wall, but also cracked and ruptured the activity itself and my expectations 
for what this activity would involve. I began to consider that to enact ‘wildness’, we would 
need to be open to the unpredictable and unplanned ways ‘wildness’ might emerge. I became 
interested in how the container-ship of performance structures and boundaries could enable 
me and the group to collaborate with the unpredictable, unplanned, unexpected and 
unknown.
Wilding Performance Containers
‘Performance’, in its theatrical sense, suggests a ‘frame’ or container (Schechner, 2006, p. 2). 
That container can be understood as the rules and boundaries of an exercise, the directives 
given by a director, the physical space(s) of the rehearsals, or even the structure, length and 
spatial configuration of a performance. I discovered a generative tension between the 
containment of performance frames, and the ‘wildness’ of spontaneous unplanned 
enactments – where ‘wild’ suggests something unruly, self-willed and less contained (Griffiths, 
2006, p. 49; Bekoff, 2014, p. 10; Monbiot, 2013, p. 10). Paradoxically, wilding performance 
involves working with the containment of rules, boundaries and predictions in order to work 
with, and respond to, what is unruly and unpredictable. Rewilding perspectives often focus on 
how human involvement in, and management of, environmental ecologies can lead to an un-
managing of, and a less human-dominating involvement in, those ecologies. For example, in 
rewilding practices, the fences (or containers) erected necessarily contain in their making 
their potential to be transgressed, whereby their impermanence allows rewilding. An 
initiative by Rewilding Europe to reintroduce (or rewild) bison in a region of Romania is 
described as not simply about releasing the bison into ‘the wild’ but rather as a process 
where fences are needed to create a ‘recovery and acclimatization’ zone where the bison 
learn survival skills before the fences are broken down and the bison are un-contained 
(Vlasakker, 2014, p. 14). This rewilding process needs the fences to contain the bison and 
needs the bison eventually to transgress those fences (containers). My approach of wilding 
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performance containers is about how management and containment of the performance 
ecology and its human and nonhuman participants is a strategy for working with what is 
uncontainable, unpredictable and unruly.
Watch Clip 2 Wilding Performance Containers, Feeling Faces and Clip 3 Wilding 
Performance Containers, Playing with Boundaries
In rehearsal I give a performance container to Gaby and Carragh in the form of an 
instruction: I ask them to close their eyes, and with their hands feel and trace the 
contours of each other’s face. My idea had emerged from a moment in the previous 
rehearsal when Carragh and Gaby were tracing the lines and shapes of each others 
faces during a warm up activity. They follow my instruction and largely fulfill my 
expectation - they are attentive and responsive to each other and each other’s faces. 
Yet they teeter on the edges of the instructional container: their tracing becomes, 
momentarily, a pressing and rubbing and Carragh, almost too quickly to notice, brushes 
over Gaby’s hair, slightly messing it up.55
This brush at the boundaries of Gaby’s face is also a brush at the boundaries of the 
instructions I gave them and at the boundaries of my expectations about what that instruction 
would prompt. It is a rupture of my directive. This is an example of a momentary wilding of 
the performance container in that Carragh momentarily transgressed my instruction.
From seeing Carragh accidentally brush over Gaby’s hair, I have a new idea. I ask them 
to find different ways of messing up each other’s hair. At first, they simply take turns 
at ruffling each other’s hair. Their ruffling becomes rougher, and they try different 
ways of doing the task – playfully flicking hair upwards, rubbing hair between two 
hands. The physical demands of doing this task produces unexpected and spontaneous 
movements: Carragh creeps up behind Gaby, interlaces fanned-out fingers into Gaby’s 
hair, and, leaping into the air, Carragh swooshes Gaby’s hair from behind her head so it 
falls and fully covers her face. At the same time, Gaby tilts her head backwards, 
causing her hair to bounce about as Carragh attempts to flick Gaby’s hair up. Whilst 
their performances are rougher, they are still enacting the attentive and responsive 
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quality I had originally observed, it is only that the responsiveness between them, and 
between them and their hair, is emerging in ways I could not have predicted.56
Their responsive quality of doing emerged unpredictably and, furthermore, it seemed to 
emerge less from them as individuals and more from the ecology of Carragh, Gaby, me, their 
hair, and the more-difficult-to-name forces such as the breeze from the window and the 
rehearsal room itself: for example, I could not tell whether Carragh flicking Gaby’s hair up 
was a result of Carragh’s hand, the breeze in the room, my instruction, or the way Gaby tilted 
her head at that moment. Some rewilding perspectives focus on rewilding as a strategy, not 
to create something predefined but to restore spontaneity to environmental ecosystems: 
humans work with the unpredictabilities of ecosystems as opposed to trying to control 
ecological processes. George Monbiot suggests rewilding is a process of humans letting 
‘nature decide’ (2013 p. 10), and similarly Dolly Jørgensen emphasises rewilding as a practice 
of ‘letting nature itself decide much more and man decide much less’ (Rewilding Europe 2011 
quoted in Jørgensen, 2015, p. 5). Whilst these rewilding perspectives posit a very problematic 
anthropocentric (and patriarchal) notion that ‘nature itself’ can ‘decide’ if only ‘man’ would 
allow ‘it’ to, they usefully gesture towards the notion that spontaneous process and 
unpredictability are key aspects of healthy environmental ecologies. In a related way, I 
propose that ecological qualities of performing (such as Gaby and Carragh being responsive 
and attentive to each other and each other’s hair) can emerge from working with the 
unpredictabilities of the performance ecology. It was, therefore, vital for me as the director 
to be open to the unexpected and unpredictable. This openness was a key part of sustaining 
the, as it were, ecological-ness of the performance practice. Wilding performance containers 
can be understood as a strategy that allowed me and my human collaborators to participate 
with(in) the unpredictability and spontaneity of the performance ecology, whereby ecological 
qualities of doing could emerge from this participation.
Gaby turns, Carragh jumps away, trying to dodge Gaby’s outstretched ready-to-ruffle-
her-hair hands, dipping under Gaby’s arms and flicking Gaby’s hair from behind her. 
Gaby jumps and twists, bringing her hands gently down onto Carragh’s head, rubbing 
her hair this way and that.57
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Gaby and Carragh are constantly predicting and anticipating what will happen, at the same 
time as having to spontaneously move with, and respond to, what actually happens. Their 
movements emerge between my instructions and their interpretations of my instructions, 
between what they think the other will do and what the other actually does, and between 
their own plans of action and the pragmatics of what is physically possible. Similarly, my 
directing emerges between my expectations of what my prompts will initiate and their 
spontaneous responses to my prompts, between what I plan to do and what I actually do when 
responding in-the-moment to the movements of the girls and their hair. They are following my 
instructions, yet wavering and deviating beyond what I think my instructions will produce: 
their movements are not only messing up their hair but they are also recurrently messing up 
the performances I had envisaged for them. These are the productive tensions of wilding 
performance containers and they present a key finding about ecological practice: 
collaboration emerges between the planned and unplanned, known and unknown and 
predicted and unpredicted. That is, the wilding of the performance container is not 
attributable to Gaby or Carragh or me, but rather wilding emerges through the dynamics 
between what is preconceived and the un-pre-conceivability of spontaneous enactment 
(which includes what their hair is capable of doing). With a wilding performance approach, 
collaboration is therefore not a case of going back and forth between the predicted and 
unpredicted, and planned and unplanned, but collaboration is to ‘transverse’ between 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 27) and to do (in) the betweens. This conceptualisation of 
collaboration challenges the predominant trend in the devising field to pit the openness of 
mistake and accident against the supposed closure of the intended and predicted, evident in 
Tim Etchells’ practice of trusting ‘discoveries and accidents’ and distrusting ‘intentions’, and 
celebrating ‘misunderstandings and misrecognitions’ above ‘clear communication’ (1999, p. 
55). The task for Gaby, Carragh and me was not to not have intentions and clear 
communication – indeed, planning, predicting and clearly communicating were vital aspects 
of this activity. I articulated my instructions and prompts as clearly as possible and the girls 
were constantly planning what to do and predicting what each other would do. Yet the task 
was also not to fulfill predetermined plans: throughout the activity I reminded the girls that 
the task was to interpret my instructions as opposed to do the instructions ‘correctly’ or 
‘right’. I think that we were collaboratively negotiating through this performance practice as 
it unfolded, responding to what emerged immanently from the practice itself. In this sense, 
wilding performance containers can be strategies for human collaborators to neither fully 
lead nor passively follow an activity, but rather the director and (in this case) young 
performers must make their own choices about which possibilities to follow in the very 
118
moments when specific performance possibilities immanently open up in the doing of the 
practice. Wilding performance containers is, therefore, an approach that can work against, 
firstly, any one human leading and, secondly, the director and /or performers passively 
engaging with the performance activity. Rather, wilding performance enables (and needs) the 
director and performers to be active participants in the (unpredictable) performance ecology.
Wilding performance requires that the director provides containers, is open to the 
possibilities of wilding that are entailed in performers enacting through those containers and, 
crucially, is responsive to the moments when the performers transgress the containers (by 
giving further prompts or by letting the performers carry on with what they are doing). 
Wilding also requires the human performers to be confident enough to experiment with the 
container in a diversity of ways so that they can discover the opportunities for wilding and 
can then actually rupture and transgress the container. When facilitating Carragh and Gaby, I 
think that wilding only emerged as a result of the safe and trusting environment that had 
been built up in the group. I was careful and keen to encourage this throughout the creative 
process: I framed exercises by saying that there was no single or right way of interpreting my 
instructions and I gave encouragement to my collaborators – child and adult, and professional 
and nonprofessional – as and when they individually needed it. Often I would work with just 
one, two or three collaborators at a time, which allowed me to focus on individuals and to 
provide them with the support and challenges they needed in order to feel confident enough 
to experiment with the performance containers in their own unique ways. Similar to Kabinet 
K, I found that providing some movement and performance technique enabled my 
collaborators to creatively, uniquely and skillfully ‘struggle’ (Laureyns, 2014) with tasks and 
activities. Part of wilding performance was, therefore, about providing the tools to 
performers for them to be able to enact and transgress the containers I gave to them.
The girls continue moving. They are working through ever-new-reconfigurations of 
doing the task – giving rise to messier and messier hair. They remain committed to the 
task of ‘mess up each other’s hair’, yet they are moving to logics I cannot always fully 
attach to that task: they continue to breach and play with its boundaries.58 
My reflections suggests how their physical enactments were ‘secret’ in the sense that Quick 
uses this term. Quick proposes the ‘secret gesture’ of child performers as spontaneous 
unpredicted movements, which do not appear to have a namable logic and, furthermore, do 
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not unfold in a ‘free’ anything-goes context but rather in ‘rule-bound space’ (2006, p. 153). 
He discusses how rules and boundaries (what I call containers) enable child performers to 
negotiate and play with what is ‘permissible and inadmissible’ where ‘rules are not banished 
or permanently excluded but rather are suspended and pushed aside’ whilst the ‘rule of what 
is being “done” is worked through in the improvisational moment’ (2006, p. 153). He implies 
that it is the live enactments of performers negotiating through performance rules that leads 
to un-namable and spontaneous movements. I found this to be the case when working with 
Carragh and Gaby. Even as they remained fully focused on doing my tasks and prompts, their 
enactments were unruly, unpredictable and ‘secret’, in that I could not always understand 
what their movements were or where their movements were coming from (whether from me, 
them, their hair, or something else). This adds to Quick’s work. Whilst Quick focuses on the 
‘secret gestures’ of child performers in a finished performance from his perspective as a 
spectator, my wilding performance approach was about working with the spontaneous 
movements and gestures of my collaborators throughout the creative process such that their 
unpredictable ruptures and transgressions of the containers I provided to them could 
contribute to leading the process.
Watch Clip 4 Wilding Performance Containers, All Messy Hair
I extended the task to the whole group and there was a section in the final performance 
which involved all the performers messing up their own hair (followed by Gaby and Carragh 
messing up each other’s hair). As is evident in the clip, the ways in which both the child and 
adult performers mess up their own hair is diverse and unpredictable, and they arguably all 
enact spontaneous bodily movements in doing the task of ‘mess up your hair’. In this 
instance, the wilding of the performance container applies as much to the adult as the child 
performers. This is another way in which my research furthers Quick’s work. Whilst Quick 
attributes the ‘secret gesture’ only to the spontaneity of the non-trained child performer, my 
wilding performance approach was about working with the unpredictability and spontaneity 
of both child and adult, and nonprofessional and professional, performers.
To further frame what I mean by wilding performance containers, it is useful to think through 
‘containers’ as Deleuze’s and Guattari’s ‘strata’ and ‘wilding’ as their ‘lines of flight’ (1988, 
p. 2). Understanding performance containers as the imposition of ‘strata’, I found that 
performance containers are ruptured by freeing ‘lines of flight’, whereby wilding 
performance can happen only when humans develop a ‘meticulous’ relation to the 
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performance container or ‘strata’ (1988, p. 187). Wilding performance involves lodging 
oneself on a stratum (working with containers) in order to then experiment and play with the 
opportunities of that stratum for transgressing and rupturing the containment it provides. I 
think it was because Carragh and Gaby were focusing on doing the container / strata (my 
instructions to mess up their hair), that they were then able to momentarily transgress that 
container / strata: it was by their meticulous relation to the instruction that they were able 
to transgress that instruction. So, opportunities for wilding the container happen as a result 
of working with that container: what underpins the wilding performance container is how it 
at once gives rise to, and is transgressed by, the enactments of those it involves. My role as 
the director seemed to largely be about learning to be open and responsive to the 
transgressive enactments of my diverse collaborators.
Carragh is keenly watching Gaby, judging when to jump forward and shake up Gaby’s 
hair. Carragh suddenly and inadvertently shakes her own head. She seems surprised by 
her own spontaneous shaking. Gaby responds by shaking her own head too – more 
fiercely than Carragh. A smile flickers between them. This moment of shaking and 
smiling is a playful experimenting with what the performance container permits: 
another temporary rupturing of the task’s boundaries. This moment suggests to me a 
new direction for this performance activity to go. I respond to their momentary 
transgression of my instruction by encouraging Gaby and Carragh to now experiment 
with messing up their own as well as each other’s hair. As they respond to my 
reconfigured instruction, their movements become bigger and, as it were, more 
flowing. Responding to this new quality of movement, I prompt them to follow through 
with their movements, to see where their movements take them. Soon they are 
shaking heads, pulling and tugging at hair and vigorously moving their bodies, and their 
movements seem to become more responsive and dynamic as they ‘go with’ the 
movements of their own and each other’s moving hair. They are following my 
reconfigured instructions, but they are not tied down by one way of doing them. Their 
following of my instructions and their improvising in response to each other and their 
hair emerges in different ways and uniquely for each of them.59
Gaby and Carragh moved in their own distinct ways, yet they were constantly moving in 
response to each other, me, their hair and much else besides. I think they were able to move 
in their unique and different ways because they were constantly collaborating with and 
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responding to what each other, and each other’s hair, was doing. To put this another way, 
their collaboration did not submerge their differences; rather, their distinct ‘selves’ 
seemingly emerged through their collaborative explorations. Ingold’s metaphor of ‘lines’ as 
human and nonhuman organisms is useful here. He discusses that a ‘line of life’ is entangled 
with(in) other ‘lines’ but that this entanglement does not engulf uniqueness and difference 
but rather continuously constitutes it (2011, p. 232). He implies that all (human and 
nonhuman) ‘phenomena’ are unique and distinct because we are constantly entangled with 
(human and nonhuman) ‘others’. Barad takes these notions of entanglement and difference 
further. She proposes that differences between individuals (whether human or nonhuman) are 
not fixed but are constantly made by the intra-actions of agencies. Wilding performance 
containers can be understood as Barad’s ‘apparatus’, where apparatuses are not pre set-up 
structures but are ‘material-discursive practices’ through which distinctions between one 
‘self’ and an ‘other’ are ‘constituted’ (Barad, 2007, p. 141-142). In this sense, performance 
containers / apparatuses inevitably take part in making and reconfiguring the differences and 
boundaries between one ‘self’ and an ‘other’. Indeed, what Carragh and Gaby were and did 
seemed to emerge differently throughout their ongoing collaborative responses to, and 
explorations of, the performance container or apparatus. This can be understood as a case of 
their unique ‘selves’ emerging in their live collaborative and dynamics enactments and 
transgressions of the performance containers / apparatuses. Therefore, it was not so much a 
collective of individuals that led this activity, but rather it was the dynamics, differences and 
betweens of the performance ecology that led it. This also suggests how, with a wilding 
performance approach, collaboration is not about focusing on prefixed different selves 
coming together but is about working with diverse and unique ‘selves’ as they emerge in the 
collaborative process itself. This reflects the intention in rewilding to help restore the 
diversity of environmental ecosystems, where diversity of life is understood to be indicative 
of the system’s health and sustainability. However, my concept of wilding builds on this 
aspect of rewilding, in that wilding performance containers is an approach that is not about 
conserving a fixed state of diversity but about allowing for diversity to thrive and 
continuously emerge in the performance ecology. It may be that the ephemeral and live 
nature of performance (for example, the performance activity involving me, Gaby, Carragh 
and their hair) can readily expose how diversity emerges (as opposed to being a pre-given or 
fixed thing). Performance ecology thus builds on the ecosystems concept of diversity. 
Diversity emerged in this ‘messy hair’ activity as a case not merely of the differences 
between Carragh and Gaby but also the differences across their own ongoing movements.
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Gaby and Carragh continue exploring the instructions: to mess up their own and each 
other’s hair and to follow through with their movements. They are finding as-yet-
unthought-of ways to mess up hair: they role on the floor, jump up and down, twist in 
side-ways swinging motions. Judging by their expressions of excitement, their 
enactments are not only outdoing my expectations but they are also exceeding their 
own – they are surprising themselves with the diversity of movements they are 
discovering.60 
Their ongoing doing of the task can be understood as an enactment of diversity – they were 
discovering multiple movement possibilities within the limited resources of me, the 
instructions, their bodies, their hair, and the room we were in. This implies how there are no 
orthodoxies in what wilding performance containers looks like: there is no one way to 
transgress the containment of instructions and tasks, but there are specific sets of 
possibilities for wilding that emerge in the enactment of those containers. 
A key aspect of wilding performance is that containment never completely disappears. Gaby’s 
and Carragh’s movements, and my responsive prompts, were not instances of jettisoning 
boundaries but of contesting and reconfiguring what the boundaries were of the activity. 
Barad argues that boundary ‘transgressions should be equated not with the dissolution of 
traversed boundaries . . . but with the ongoing reconfiguring of boundaries’ (2007, p. 245). 
With this frame of reference, wilding performance can be conceptualised as the process by 
which the intra-acting (human) agencies can contest and reconfigure the performance 
boundaries and containers. This entails that we (director and human performers) work with 
containers, rather than seek to wildly jettison or blow them apart. As already discussed, it 
was only by meticulously attending to the containers that opportunities for transgressing 
those containers could emerge. Deleuze and Guattari usefully propose that blowing ‘apart the 
strata’ risks bringing the strata ‘down on us heavier than ever’ and that it is not possible to 
make ‘lines of flight’ but, rather, it is only possible to be open to the opportunities for 
‘freeing’ them (1988, p. 187). Wilding performance is not a process of jettisoning the 
containers of performance rules, instructions and tasks and thus causing ‘wildness’, but 
rather wilding is about committing to containers and, through that commitment, being open 
and responsive to the opportunities for wilding that emerge. Wilding is not, therefore, a 
‘thing’ or a destination: it cannot be grasped or planned. I think that wilding can only be 
anticipated. Furthermore, performance containers do not get wilded once and for all: the 
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transgressions of containers can become new containers. This process is evident in how 
Gaby’s and Carragh’s transgressions of my instructions gave rise to new instructions, which 
they then enacted through and eventually transgressed, which, again, gave me ideas for 
newly reconfigured containers. So, wilding performance is seemingly not a linear process of 
containment to ‘wildness’, but is arguably an ongoing process of rupturing, transgressing and 
reconfiguring containers. The more complex rewilding perspectives offer useful insights in 
relation to this aspect of wilding performance containers. Rewilding is not always seen as a 
linear progression from ‘non-wildness’ to ‘wildness’, but rather is often understood as an 
ongoing process of rewilding ecosystems. Monbiot suggests that rewilding ‘has no end points, 
no view about what a “right” ecosystem or a “right” assemblage of species looks like’ but 
rather merely seeks to reduce human dominating behaviour in order to enable ‘eco-
systems . . . [to be] self-willed’ (2013, p. 10). Similarly, Jørgensen proposes rewilding as an 
ongoing process of partaking in the recovery of an ecosystem that has been damaged or 
destroyed by human behaviours (2015, p. 1). With my approach of wilding performance 
containers, the wilding is not treated as a separated ‘it’ that we can look upon, arrive at or 
(merely) represent in a performance, but rather, wilding is an ongoing process that diverse 
collaborators can enact (in both process and performance event). This approach, therefore, 
neither replaces containment with unbounded ‘wildness’ nor progresses to ‘wildness’ and 
regresses (back) to container-ship: there is no going back and forth between ‘wildness’ and 
containment. Like Deleuze’s and Guattari’s ‘movements of deterritorialization and processes 
of reterritorialization’, containment and wildness are ‘caught up in one another’ (1988, p. 9). 
As already proposed, wilding seems to emerge in the tensions between – it is arguably an 
emergent process that comes up through the middle. This middle is neither a meeting point 
between containment and ‘wildness’ nor the result of two equal opposing forces. This middle 
is the movement of being between.
This further elucidates my new conceptualisation of collaboration. Helpfully, Laura Cull 
proposes that working with ‘chance’ is not about trying to escape intention altogether – this, 
she is clear, is impossible – but rather it is about affirming the multiple forces that author 
works of art, and she argues that art can be a practice ‘that affirms its [own] 
uncontrollability’ (2013, p. 51-52). I think that collaboration can most radically emerge as an 
ecological practice through the play between the structured and spontaneous, rehearsed and 
un-rehearse-able, planned and un-plan-able, expected and unexpected, fixed and improvised 
and intended and unpredictable. Most crucially, wilding performance is an approach to 
collaboration that works with the contained and uncontainable, with this being a dynamic 
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that is arguably resonant in any ecology (whilst it may be possible to place containing 
boundaries around an ecology - whether a performance ecology or an environmental one such 
as a forest - that ecosystem will inevitably impact on, and be impacted by, what is beyond 
those boundaries). In light of my discussions about me and my instructions, and my 
collaborators and their hair, wilding performance containers is arguably an approach through 
which child and adult, professional and nonprofessional (and even human and nonhuman) 
performers can all be participants and agents in enacting and transgressing performance 
containers. My discussions have, however, so far focused on humans and I want to show that it 
is by participating in the dynamics between what are usually conceptualised as oppositions 
that collaborative performance can challenge and transgress fixed hierarchical structures and 
power relations between all – human and nonhuman – collaborators. 
Instant Performances: the Separated and the Relational 
I now further demonstrate my wilding performance containers approach by focusing on a 
specific performance practice I developed called the Instant Performance, which involved the 
human performers and nonhuman materials. I developed this practice over the course of the 
creative process. I began working with it as a result of experiencing a similar one by Kabinet 
K. In August 2014, as part of my research development, and just before beginning Wild Life, I 
participated in a five-day Kabinet K masterclass in Ghent (Belgium) led by Laureyns and 
Manshoven, which was for professional dancers and children. During this masterclass I 
experienced their practice of ‘Instant Compositions’, improvisations that involved performers 
interacting with objects. The objects could be anything: during the masterclass we used 
whatever we found in the studio (clothes, shoes and chairs). Accompanying the objects were 
written tasks on slips of paper – for example, beside a pair of shoes the task read ‘put these 
shoes on your hands without tying the laces and walk in straight lines across the space.’ These 
tasks were either made up by the child and adult participants or prewritten by Laureyns and 
Manshoven. Kabinet K uses this practice as a way to produce material that can then be 
developed for performance. By experiencing their instant compositions as a participant, I 
sensed it could be developed as a productive performance methodology for collaborating with 
nonhuman materials as vibrant matter. My Instant Performances were 45 to 60 minute 
improvisations involving the human performers and nonhuman materials: stones, rocks, 
buckets, water and matches.
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I chose to include materials in Wild Life because I wanted to explore further my findings from 
Age-Old about collaborating with the vibrancy of materials and the entanglements of 
enactment and representation. I felt that by working with different materials rather than just 
one (as had been the case in Age-Old) there would be more scope for developing a practice of 
collaborating with the diverse vibrancy of materials: I might learn more about how different 
materials perform. I use ‘perform’ here to reference the potential of materials to 
meaningfully impact on, and contribute to, the process of making theatrical performance and 
in the productions themselves. I chose these specific materials precisely because they can be 
considered to represent ‘wildness’. I wished to see what meanings, creative ideas and 
performances emerged from focusing on the vibrant materiality of the stones, matches, 
buckets and water, as opposed to (only) emphasising them as symbolic of ‘wildness’. I sought 
to develop a practice that would allow these materials to emerge as a lot more than (only) 
their metaphorical associations of ‘earth’ (stones), ‘fire’ (matches) and ‘water’ (buckets full 
of water). Whilst in Age-Old we had worked only with a manufactured material (plastic bags), 
with Wild Life I wanted to explore both manufactured (matches and buckets) and, what can 
be considered, ‘natural’ materials (stones, water, flames). I hoped that by involving both the 
manufactured / human-made and ‘natural’, there would be more potential for the process 
and performance to work productively with and (even momentarily) reconfigure binaries such 
as culture / nature, human / nonhuman,  literal / symbolic and inside / outside.
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We used the practice of Instant Performances throughout the creative process. I provided 20 
to 30 written instructions alongside the accompanying materials: for example, ‘Tap two 
stones together as fast as you can for one minute’ was placed beside two stones; ‘Splash your 
face with water and then stand in the bucket’ was placed beside a bucket of water; ‘Light a 
match and watch it burn and decide when to blow it out’ was placed beside a box of 
matches; and ‘Line the stones up across the space in order of size’ was placed beside a pile of 
stones. Each instruction can be understood as a potential wilding performance container.
I wrote these tasks in order to encourage the performers to explore different ways of 
interacting with the materials. Performers were invited to pick an instruction and execute it – 
in whatever way they interpreted – before moving on to another instruction and action. A 
variation and development of the practice involved performers choosing to join with someone 
else, if they felt that another person’s actions invited them in. This instruction was intended 
to give more creative freedom to the human performers, and was a strategy for enabling 
unpredictable and unplanned activities and relations to emerge.
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As the director, I set up and watched these performance pieces. I noted particular moments, 
images, ideas and combinations (of people and of people and materials) that stood out, 
sometimes developing them with new instructions for subsequent Instant Performances. 
Furthermore, my ideas for other activities would often come from things I observed during 
this practice. For example, seeing Liz walk in a large circle carrying a heavy rock in one 
Instant Performance gave me the idea to create a dramaturgical structure that involved 
performers circling around the performance space in different ways. This structure or 
container of ‘circling’ became the foundation for the first 20 minutes of the final show. So, 
my ideas for other performance activities emerged immanently from the human performers 
and nonhuman materials and what I saw them do during the Instant Performances. This 
practice was also a key way by which human participants evolved as a group and developed 
their confidence and skills as collaborators and techniques as performers. In response to the 
spontaneous happenings of these improvisations, I sometimes offered encouragement and 
prompts to the performers during their improvisations, coaxing out their unique qualities of 
performing. However, often I simply observed what was going on, this proving an invaluable 
way for me to get to know the diverse qualities and behaviours of the different human 
performers and the different materials.
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When observing the Instant Performances I was struck by how they would often move 
between being dominated by the human performers and being focused on relations between 
nonhuman materials and human performers. Furthermore, sometimes the practice would 
emerge between the human and nonhuman, producing what I saw as an entangled human-
nonhuman theatre performance. These shifts between different modes of performance – 
human dominated, relational and entangled – would occur within one Instant Performance 
itself, as well as at different points during the rehearsal process when we used this practice 
(often weeks apart). The Instant Performance had the potential to be a wilding performance 
container, where the individual written tasks can be understood as smaller wilding containers 
within the larger container of the practice.
At the beginning of an Instant Performance, but also at different moments within it, the 
human performers would often dominate the performance ecology, with the stones, matches 
and buckets of water seeming to be inanimate objects that only became ‘alive’ when human 
performers engaged with them. In these instances, as a spectator, I felt aware of the 
materials as symbolic of the ‘natural’ elements of earth, fire and water. In one rehearsal Pete 
leant over a bucket and splashed his face with water and I read this action as symbolic of 
‘human purification’, with Pete representing ‘humans’ and the water representing ‘purity’.
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When the Instant Performances were dominated by the human performers, the materials  
seemed to emerge, and be largely treated, as theatrical props and metaphors. Their 
significance was predefined, or at least limited to a symbolic function in aid of the human. 
The materials seemed to serve merely as metaphors about, and representations of, ‘ecology’. 
I think it was the type of instruction, and the type of activity which that instruction gave rise 
to, that meant that the group was not necessarily able to work with, or respond to, the 
stones, water, buckets and matches as ‘vibrant matter’, as agents with their own forces, 
trajectories and tendencies (Bennett, 2010, p. viii). Fitzpatrick came into one rehearsal 
during which we did an Instant Performance. Afterwards he commented that when he saw 
Graham placing stones around his body he felt that Graham was making his own grave and 
that the stones represented the ‘earth’.61 This comment implies that Fitzpatrick read the 
stones as a metaphor in relation to the human performer; he did not, and perhaps could not, 
experience the stones as vibrant materials (they could not be more than props in aid of a 
human-focused performance). These activities seemed to uphold a narrative of humans-
animating-materials, whereby the instructions demanded the humans either to make the 
materials into something, such as a line of stones, or to cause them to do something, such as 
clicking two stones together to make a sound.  Perhaps the Instant Performances were, in 
these instances, fulfilling the anthropocentric perspective that Bennett describes as the 
Western view of matter as passive and inert (2010, p. vii)? Under this view, matter is 
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understood to be significant and ‘alive’ only when it is animated by humans or when a ‘soul’ 
or ‘life’ enters it (Bennett, 2010, p. 10; p. 87-89). This is not to say that the materials were 
not vibrant in these instances, but rather that they were being treated and rendered as if 
they were not. As previously discussed in Chapter Two, it is problematic to think that humans 
can cause or invite nonhuman vibrancy. Perhaps it is more realistic to consider how we are 
ourselves always already part of (nonhuman) vibrancy? The question that, therefore, arises 
for me is not whether but how to work with the vibrancy of nonhuman materials?
During an Instant Performance, there would often be a shift into a more relational mode of 
performing. This involved the group ‘getting to know’ the potential of the materials as agents 
with, as Bennett describes it, ‘thing power’ (2010, p. xvi). In one rehearsal, the stones laid 
out by Liz at the beginning of the exercise were later being leapt over, avoided and followed 
by Graham, Gaby and Lennon: the stones were shaping the path of movement that these 
differently-sized-running-humans took. I became aware of the ways the materials were 
shaping the human performances and the humans were shaping the materials’ performances. 
The Instant Performances, in these instances, seemed to implicitly draw my attention to the 
ways in which both the humans and nonhuman materials were co-determining the practice: 
humans and nonhumans were performing. In my notes (overleaf) about one particular Instant 
Performance, I listed the activities of the performance under the headings ‘matches’, 
‘water’ and ‘stones’ and focused on human activities with the materials, which seems to 
imply that my focus was on the relations between humans and nonhumans, as opposed to 
predominantly on the human performers.62
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Fitzpatrick also commented that the symbolic meaning he read of the stones as the ‘earth’ 
for a grave was disrupted when Graham left the stones (in the outline of his body) and later 
Carragh came and pushed them into a pile, proceeding to follow the same instruction, lying 
down and outlining her own body with them. 
Fitzpatrick reflected how his original meaning for these stones was swept away when Carragh 
swept the stones into a pile and began laying the stones around her body with more difficulty 
than Graham as some were very heavy. Carragh’s interactions with the stones made 
Fitzpatrick wonder how Graham had managed to place them around his body so easily and, in 
this moment, Fitzpatrick was drawn to the weight, textures and noises of the stones. As a 
result of focusing on their materiality, a new meaning for the stones emerged: Fitzpatrick 
read the stones as symbolic of a boundary Carragh was making around herself. For a moment, 
Fitzpatrick had ceased to read the symbolism of the stones, with the image of ‘a grave’ 
disappearing, and he had become aware of the stones as physical and present materialities 
with their own qualities and tendencies, albeit an awareness purely in relation to the human 
performer. Symbolism did not, however, completely disappear, but rather his meanings of the 
stones were shifted by the activities of different humans and the behaviours of the stones 
themselves. As a spectator to the Instant Performances, I also found that the diverse ways in 
which different (younger and older) human performers engaged with the materials brought 
attention to the materials as vibrant materials and, at the same time, symbolic meanings that 
I had at first attached to them were simultaneously disrupted and shifted (to a new meaning) 
through the interactions with the stones by different performers. The unique textures, 
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behaviours and tendencies of the materials in combination with the different human 
performers arguably produced different types of performance with different readings, where 
the readings were also dependent on what I (the spectator) brought to the work. In one 
Instant Performance Gaby sat amongst the stones, which Lennon had previously laid out in a 
circle, and lit matches.
Watching Gaby, I was drawn to the playful and inquisitive qualities of how she lit, watched 
and blew out the matches. The unique combination of Gaby and matches produced a specific 
quality of doing. As I continued watching, Gaby and the matches became for me a metaphor 
for how teenagers often create their own ‘space’ in which they can feel at ease and held by 
the boundaries of their created ‘space’ – Gaby’s ‘space’ was represented here by the circle of 
stones in which she sat. In another rehearsal, Lennon lit the matches and my reading of the 
material was different: at first, I saw Lennon as a symbol of ‘young children’ with his actions 
representing to me how children need to experiment with risk. However, this was not merely 
metaphorical as there was an actual element of risk in Lennon lighting and playing with 
matches.
This suggests how the ‘represented’ and the ‘real’ are difficult, if not impossible, to 
disentangle. In light of Fitzpatrick’s comments about, and my experiences of, watching the 
Instant Performances, this inseparability between the represented and real is seemingly the 
case especially when it comes to diverse humans collaborating with nonhuman materials as 
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vibrant matter, where the actualities of these materials can play a significant part in 
producing (and rupturing) theatrical meanings and representations. 
In this relational mode of the Instant Performances, not only did my readings of humans and 
nonhumans shift, but my relationship to them shifted between symbolic meanings and simply 
focusing on their physical qualities and behaviours. In the final performance there was a 
section when Lennon sat lighting the matches, whilst the other performers moved around 
him.
When watching Lennon and the matches in the final performances, any meanings I had would 
often disappear because I was fully drawn to the physical activities of strike-flame-smoke-sit-
watch-burn-flicker-billow. I suspect that other audience members watching this Lennon-
match activity had their own meanings for it and their own moments of focusing on the 
physical qualities of Lennon and the matches.
In the (human-nonhuman) relational performance mode, which occurred in the Instant 
Performances and in parts of the final performance, I was constantly asked to let go of the 
meanings I projected on to this ecology of children, adults, stones, water, flames, etc. The 
diversity of human relations with the materials took precedence, as opposed to humans 
dominating over and fully determining the activities and meanings of the materials. Even as 
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representations, symbols, metaphors and meanings formed, as a spectator I could not hold 
them still, since they were always changing into something else by the different live 
interactions enacted by different human performers. Perhaps live performance has the innate 
potential to enact the ongoing flux and process of how ‘things’ and ‘selves’ materially and 
ecologically emerge? Live performance arguably enacts the constant letting go and 
abandonment of fixed states: even as images, meanings and specific identities form, they are 
always already changing into something else. This may be one of the key and innate 
ecological potentials of performance practice: live performance as a case of performance 
constantly un-doing any fixed sense of the ‘things’ and ‘selves’ it presents.
With the relational mode of the Instant Performances, it was not a case of there being no 
symbolic significance, but that the significance of the humans and nonhumans was constantly 
shifting and was, in part, continuously determined and changed by the relations between 
them. The materials were rendered as collaborators in the performance, albeit that the 
humans and nonhumans were still rendered as separated and separable collaborators. In this 
relational mode, whilst the spectators may become aware of both the ongoing shifts in 
‘things’ and ‘selves’ and how these shifts are intimately tied up with the relations between 
the humans and nonhumans on stage, the opportunities for wilding performance are limited. 
The ‘circling’ section in the final performance exemplifies these limitations. The focus during 
this section was on the relations between different human performers and between human 
performers and nonhuman materials. 
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The performers travelled the inside perimeter of the circular performance space in different 
combinations (singularly, in pairs and all together) by walking, running, carrying and chasing 
each other, balancing a stone on their head, carrying large rocks and holding water in their 
mouths. They also paused together in the large gap: once to each click two stones together 
and again to spray water in a fountain from their mouths. The performers followed a strict 
order of rehearsed activities and each new circling activity was a playful, and often 
unexpected (for the audience) introduction to the diverse intergenerational performers and 
the nonhuman materials.
There were moments during the circling when the performers almost slipped or bashed into 
the audience; Graham accidentally kicked a woman’s bag and almost slipped into her as he 
ran full-pace and Archie nearly tripped over as he ran in the circle calling in a high voice.
Moments like this had the potential to rupture and transgress the performance container, 
however, this section remained within the explicit container of circling and, in turn, within 
the relational mode of performance. As a consequence, I think the audience could only read 
the nonhuman materials in relation to the activities of the humans. One audience member, 
Dan Serridge, spoke to me after one performance, describing how the circling section was, for 
him, about the history of humans or a particular human family; each circle taken by the 
performers represented a period of time, such as a decade or century. Dan Serridge felt that 
he was watching a ‘human saga’ that covered many generations.63 His reading was focused on 
137
63 Journal, 30 November 2014.
the humans themselves and how they represented a human story. Listening to his comments 
made me think that the nonhuman materials could only be viewed in relation to the humans 
and thus there could only be a human-focused reading. As already argued, the relational can 
be rather limiting when it comes to the complexity of ecological entanglement. Whilst I think 
it is impossible to avoid discussing the relations between one ‘thing’ / ‘being’ and an ‘other’, 
solely focusing on relations risks presuming that ‘things’ / ‘beings’ are originally separated 
and separable. I found that the Instant Performances and the final performance of Wild Life 
was - at times - able to go beyond a relational mode, emerging through and bringing attention 
to the betweens of humans and nonhumans. This process of moving between and across the 
separated, relational and entangled (not necessarily in a linear way) is an example of how 
wilding performance is, as I have already proposed, an ongoing process.
Enacting Entanglement
Watch Clip 5 Vibrant Humans and Nonhumans, Water Fight
Archie has his head in a bucket of water, Carragh gurgles a mouthful of water, some 
spilling from the sides of her lips. Gaby sits looking at Archie, her hands cupped inside 
another bucket. Graham and Liz sit on rocks, turning to look around at the different 
human-bucket-water activities. Geraldine sustains a screaming ‘ahhh’ as she brings her 
head in and out of her bucket, causing the sound to playfully chop and change. Gaby 
flings her cupped hands of water towards Archie.
Pete dips his head into a bucket, holding it there for ten or so seconds, before bringing 
it out suddenly, making a huge spraying arc of flinging water – an air-borne stream from 
a dipped-flung-up head. He shakes vigorously, spraying any one and any thing near him, 
including some audience members.
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Soon, there is spitting, flinging, spilling, ducking. Lennon escapes out of the circle, 
trying to avoid Gaby who splatters towards him with mouth and cupped hands full of 
water: a human transgressing the boundaries of the contained performance space. 
Carragh holds a bucket, almost too heavy for her, and swooshes it towards Pete but the 
water escapes before Carragh means it to because of the weight and slipperiness of the 
metal bucket. The water goes towards Geraldine who, surprised, gasps and twists on 
the spot as a walloping splash extends across her, some water missing her and carrying 
on to land on Graham. Lennon creeps up behind Gaby, flicking his hands to spray the 
back of her neck – his flicking wetting his face as much as Gaby. Pete drops the biggest 
rock into another bucket, masses of water splashing out in all directions. I am not sure 
who / what made the splash – Pete, the rock, the shape of the bucket, the amount of 
water or the people avoiding it.
Water spreads across the floor, some traveling under the feet and chairs of the 
audience, escaping the perimeter of the performance space: a nonhuman material 
transgressing the boundaries of the contained performance space. Graham and 
Geraldine attempt to whisk the water back into the centre of the space by splashing-
whipping-kicking their feet across the layer of spreading-out-moving water, spraying 
each other as they go.
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The movements of water are shaping the activities of humans, who are never quite 
sure where the water and themselves will end up. Odd human stances and curious gaits 
are produced, different in every performance and led by the pragmatics of negotiation 
across a wetter and wetter floor. The unpredictability of escaping water encourages 
humans to escape the predictable and the humans must also negotiate with the 
unpredictable movements of each other as they step between rocks and buckets, trying 
not to slip in the water. The speeds and slownesses of spreading water across the floor 
is different with each performance, persuaded in certain directions by the buckets, 
rocks, chairs, audience’s feet and the pattering tip-toe feet of the performers.64
When watching different iterations of the water fight (during the Instant Performances and in 
the final performances) I felt that the activities arose in a non-locatable way. I experienced 
the work as brought forth and shaped neither by humans, nonhumans nor the relations 
between them, but immanently through intra-actions occurring across distinct yet inseparable 
human and nonhuman bodies. This practice of the performance ecology extends and 
challenges Bennett’s notion of ‘assemblage’. Bennett focuses on how humans and nonhumans 
are ‘actants’ who produce ‘effect’ and exist in assemblages or confederations with other 
‘actants’ (2010, p. 103; p. 21). Her arguments, however, fall back on the presumption that 
there are, in the first place, individual entities: agency is attributed either to individual 
actants or to the ‘assemblages’ that individual actants make up (Bennett, 2010, p. xvii). 
Either way agency is presented as something to have or not have. The water fight seems to 
demonstrate agency differently. This performance ecology (of children, adults, water, 
buckets, rocks, chairs and more) was not so much an assemblage of human and nonhuman 
actants but rather a case of un-locatable actions emerging between humans and between 
humans and nonhumans. This un-locatable-ness of ‘agency’ is a key aspect of wilding 
performance. I think certain performance containers, such as the water fight, can enable 
human and nonhuman performers to rupture and transgress the containments of the 
performance event, where agency is dynamically distributed across and between the diverse 
humans and nonhumans involved.65 The water fight in the final performances was contained 
by human rehearsed actions – actions discovered during earlier Instant Performances – dipping 
heads, cupping hands, gurgling and screaming mouths, dropping rocks, techniques of 
splashing, chucking, and flicking. Yet the live performance involved spontaneous, 
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65 I further discuss this more complex notion of ʻagencyʼ later in this chapter.
unpredictable and diverse movements of (its entangled) human and nonhuman performers. 
Arguably, the performance ecology needed, and was sustained by, these unpredictable 
human-nonhuman movements. Perhaps the performance activity was wilded by the 
unpredictabilities of diverse humans and nonhumans?
At the end of the film clip of the water fight, the human performers try to splash each other 
by kicking the water. Like the humans’ kicking feet attempting but failing to control or 
capture the water, I could never wholly encapsulate this performance, just as no one (human 
or nonhuman) performer seemed to ever fully capture or dominate the performance ecology. 
In this entangled mode of performing, I think that the humans performed with what the 
materials and each other vibrantly do rather than with what they preconceive the materials 
and each other to be. Each time I watched the water fight (in rehearsals and in the final 
production) I had a sense that at any moment something could change, the slightest shift in 
angle could cause water to spray me or cause a performer to duck and bash into a bucket or 
rock. Whilst in an ecological practice diverse humans must have a say in the work, I do not 
think it is a case of the human collaborators having the dominant or the final say in where the 
process goes or what constitutes the final performance. Rather, an ecological practice is 
about finding ways for the different humans and different nonhumans to mark and co-
determine the process and performances, and, more precisely, for the unpredictable 
dynamics and betweens of the human-nonhuman performance ecology to steer the work. The 
Instant Performance has the potential to be an ecological practice because it can enable any 
(human or nonhuman) participant to transgress and reconfigure the performance containers 
and, therefore, play a part in what theatrical performances emerge.
When discussing Wild Life with audience member Hayden Foreman-Smith, he commented that 
the water fight was the most ‘wild’ because he felt that it was not only he (and the rest of 
the audience) who did not know what was going to happen next – he said he was on the edge 
of his seat – but he also observed that the performers themselves did not always know what 
was about to occur. He could not distinguish between what was rehearsed and not rehearsed. 
He could not tell whether Lennon chucking a bucket of water across Pete’s back was planned 
or not, because Pete looked so surprised and Lennon looked so pleased with himself. Not 
knowing what was known and unknown to the performers made Hayden Foreman-Smith feel 
that he was part of the performance – the audience and performers were all in this 
(performance) together.66 His comments offer further evidence that wilding emerges between 
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what is planned and unplanned, predicted and unpredicted, known and unknown and, 
ultimately, between the human and nonhuman. An ecological practice is, in part, about how 
the process and final performance is always subject to being changed by the 
unpredictabilities of human and nonhuman performers. During the process of making Wild 
Life, I noted that even when performance activities, such as the Instant Performances, 
reached a climax they often carried on from what might, at first, seem an end or fixed point. 
Furthermore, the final performance of Wild Life was not something assembled out of ‘parts’ 
made during the process: the performance was not a culmination, summary or representation 
of the process. Rather, the performance carried on (with) the process: in fact, I would suggest 
that the performance carried on, and was carried on by, the diverse and unpredictable 
performances of my (human and nonhuman) collaborators. I think a key aspect of ecological 
performance practice is incompleteness, where the final performance is constantly 
completed by the unpredictable human-nonhuman (intra)activities that issue forth through 
the performance containers. Ingold offers a useful insight here: he argues that ‘it is precisely 
because no [art] work is ever truly “finished” . . . that it remains alive’ (2013, p. 96). 
With the water fight performance, it can be argued that the ‘water’ and ‘humans’ (and other 
nonhuman materials) were all processes, becoming as definable ‘things’ only inasmuch as 
they were intra-acting. The performance was not, therefore, the result or bringing together 
of a network of a priori separable ‘water’ and ‘humans’. Rather, it was (a)live evidence of a 
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complex of non-isolatable (human and nonhuman) performers: the doing of the water fight 
was led by the vibrant (rehearsed and un-rehearse-able) enactments of dipping-splashing-
colliding-slipping-spreading. The performance was an instance of ‘water’ and ‘humans’ being 
performed by, and differentiated with(in), the vibrant performance ecology. As discussed in 
relation to Barad’s ‘agential realism’ (2007) in Chapter Two, relations and collaborations do 
exist but only inasmuch as what / whom relates or collaborates with what / whom is intra-
actively constituted in enactment itself. The ‘water’ and ‘human’ agencies did not precede 
but rather emerged through their intra-actions: their separations and relations were intra-
actively constituted in the doing of this performance. Perhaps ecological performance is, in 
part, about how humans and nonhumans can emerge, and be revealed, as ‘entangled’ and 
intra-acting agencies (Barad, 2007, p. 33)?
These notions of human-nonhuman intra-activity and entanglement are evident in the review 
of Wild Life by Mary Brennan. Brennan’s reading of the performance focuses on ‘wild’ as 
something unfixed and un-locatable: ‘“wild” selves . . . surface’ and the ‘wildness’ of 
Geraldine’s dancing is simultaneously ‘pure 21st century’ and ‘timeless’ (Brennan, 2014). 
Brennan reads ‘wild’ as emergent across humans and nonhumans, both metaphorically, in 
terms of what meanings the performance represented for her and literally, in terms of the 
human bodies and nonhuman materials physically onstage. She sees metaphors of the human 
and nonhuman in what the human performers do: their movements are ‘animalistic 
lumberings’ with ‘hints of pack behaviour’ and these movements are set ‘alongside the 
beginnings of tribal rituals’ (Brennan, 2014). She also focuses on what the human and 
nonhuman performers do: when the ‘significant elements’ of ‘stone, water, fire’ come into 
play, there are ‘complex meanings’: the water fight is an ‘outburst of mutual drenchings’ that 
feels ‘like the anarchic predecessor of ancient mid-winter rituals’; the ‘stone circle’ in the 
middle of the performance space is a ‘home’ for the performers; the ‘flaring light’ of the 
‘short-lived’ flames of the matches vanish ‘into the darkness of history’; and the ‘clatter of 
skimming stones clutter [the stone] circle into anonymity’, making her ‘realise how easy it is 
to walk past, without noticing, the traces of humanity in the wild’ (Brennan, 2014). Brennan 
discusses the human and nonhuman in a way that does not separate them out into categories. 
Her meanings and readings of ‘wild’ evidently emerged from the vibrant matter of the 
humans and nonhumans onstage. That is, the live (intra)activities of humans and nonhumans 
led Brennan to read ‘wild’ not as something separate from humans and human culture, but 
rather as something human ‘selves’ can actually be and as somewhere where the ‘traces’ of 
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humans can be found.67 Her review implies how the final Wild Life performance may have 
enacted human-nonhuman, mind-matter, metaphor-material and culture-nature 
inseparability. Brennan’s reading of Wild Life suggests that the theatrical performance  was 
able to implicitly show that ‘humans’ and ‘human culture’ are not, and have never been, ‘of 
our own making’ but rather humans and their cultures are infused ‘by biological, geological, 
and climatic forces’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 115). With Bennett’s vital materialism there is no 
human-nonhuman, mind-matter or culture-nature division and so human cultural practices 
(such as performance) is not separable from wider ecological and material processes, and 
performance cannot construct independently (of the materials) what the materials mean. 
With my ecological practice, the vibrancy of the materials is not an add-on to human 
experiences and meanings, but rather is co-constitutive of those experiences and meanings.
I had discovered some specific aspects of ‘wildness’ and ‘ecology’ in the creative process, 
which I hoped the final performance would communicate (which I discuss later in this 
chapter), yet a key aim was to create a performance that would allow the vibrant, unique 
and unpredictable activities of entangled human and nonhuman performers to ‘meet’ with 
the unique perspectives of audience members, resulting in rich and multiple readings of 
‘wildness’, ‘humans’, ‘nonhumans’, and ‘ecology’. I was not aiming for an absence of 
ecological metaphors, representations or meanings, but rather by not prescribing a narrative 
or fixed meaning to the work I wanted the entangled human and nonhuman participants of 
the performance ecology (including me, the group, the nonhuman materials and the 
audience) to continuously co-determine what the work was and meant. A key aspect of my 
ecological practice is that vibrant human performers collaborate with nonhuman vibrant 
matter, instigating unpredictable human-nonhuman entangled performances that might 
implicitly invite audience members to have unique experiences of, and meanings about, the 
work. This may result in audience members experiencing themselves as vibrant parts of the 
performance ecology, whereby they might even become aware of being active participants 
(along with the human and nonhuman performers onstage) in constituting what the work is 
and means. This is evident in Hayden Foreman-Smith’s comments about how he felt a part of 
the performance because of the unpredictabilities of the water and human performers during 
the water fight, and is also evident in Brennan’s reading, where she does not separate the 
humans and nonhumans out, but rather writes about them simultaneously in terms of what 
they literally do and what they symbolically mean.
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Wilding Performance Through a Just Doing-ness Approach
Watch Clip 6 Working With and As Vibrant Matter, Sliding Stones
In one rehearsal I give Liz the instruction to fling and slide a stone across the floor. It is 
difficult to know where the stones will go when thrown – whether they will end up 
under chairs, banging into feet or simply arrive at a particular spot on the floor. I invite 
the whole group to participate: each member stations her or himself at different spots 
around the edges of the circular performance space. Soon stones are being sent 
spinning in a multiplicity of pathways, going in unintended directions due to the forces 
of the throw and / or as a consequence of other stones bashing into them. The textures 
of uneven stones sliding across hard-stage-flooring produce a grating-thundering sound 
that rises and falls depending on the amount of stones in motion and their various 
speeds.68
The human performers were not just letting the stones go from their hands, but they were 
also letting go of trying to fully control and predict the stones. Even as the group became 
more skilled at judging how far the stones would slide, individuals were never able to know 
fully what the stones would do. The activity enabled them to work with and respond to the 
stones in their (a)live vibrant materiality. They were fully committed to, and wholly focused 
on, the task of sliding and flinging, which meant that their ideas about how to slide the 
stones emerged inseparably and immanently from the vibrancy of the stones. I think that by 
focusing on the just doing-ness of sliding stones, the humans performers emerged as 
themselves vibrant matter. The positions of the humans, textures of the floor, collisions of 
stones with other stones and harder-to-name forces, all played a part in constituting what the 
stones and humans did: vibrant humans were collaborating with(in) vibrant nonhumans. With 
my just doing-ness approach it is necessary, however, to be wary of translating what I might 
frame as humans-immersed-in-the-vibrancy-of-the-nonhuman into the idea of humans-
passively-immersed-in-the-nonhuman. My term ‘just doing-ness’ risks giving the impression 
that we must surrender to whatever happens in performance because it just is what happens, 
it just is the doing-ness of vibrant matter. ‘Just doing-ness’ risks becoming what Morton 
describes as a ‘laissez-faire’ or ‘let it be’ mentality (2010, p. 101). Morton discusses the 
tendency in ecological thinking to relegate the human to a position of ‘passive immersion’ in 
the ‘web of life’ or ‘more-than-human’ (2010, p. 122; p. 8; p. 76). This scenario rests on the 
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idea that there is little we can do and less for which we can be responsible – it proposes that 
we are not in full control so we must simply accept what(ever) occurs. However, my just 
doing-ness approach does not manifest as an amoral attitude of ‘anything goes’ but rather 
involves human performers actively committing and attending to performance tasks. I 
developed an approach in which human performers, by (just) doing a performance task, were 
arguably able to become responsive and responsible to their entanglements with each 
(human) other and the (nonhuman) materials. 
To do the sliding stones task, the performers had to be responsive to the unpredictabilities of 
each other and the stones, which also meant that they had to be responsible for how they 
participated in the performance ecology of humans and stones. They each decided when to 
slide the stones depending on how many other stones were moving across the floor: they slid 
them differently depending on the size, weight and texture of each stone. They had to be 
careful about and focused on what they were doing and how they were doing it, deciding 
when and how they flung stones and how many to fling at a time, and choosing the amount of 
force they gave in each fling. The humans were neither passive to the stones nor did they do 
whatever they felt like with them. Just doing this performance task demanded the human 
performers to make responsive choices from within the performance ecology, whereby they 
could not fully control what happened but they could play responsible parts in what 
happened.
Just doing-ness is a performance approach in which entangled but distinct human and 
nonhuman participants are exposed as collaborators in what the performance is, whereby 
humans are not passively immersed in the nonhuman vibrancy but rather are active 
participants within it. A just doing-ness approach is about practicing how we (humans) are not 
(ever) the full scope of things. It is an approach that can potentially produce theatrical 
performances that implicitly enact how what we are and what we do is never a matter of just 
‘us’. My job as the director was often to simply prompt and encourage the performers to 
focus on the task at hand and the materials they were working with, which included the 
stones, water, buckets and matches and each (human) other. Perhaps a just doing-ness 
approach allows the performance production to implicitly demonstrate how ‘we’ are always 
already entangled with ‘many other strivings’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 32)? Furthermore, by 
focusing their attention on the specifics of a task, each other and / or the nonhuman 
materials, I think that my human collaborators were able to participate more responsively 
and responsibly in the performance ecology.
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Just doing-ness is also about the particular performance style and quality that emerges when 
performers focus on the actualities of doing a performance task. Performers do not attempt 
to overlay narratives, emotions or meanings onto their actions, but focus on the pragmatics of 
physical enactment. With the water fight performance, the human performers did not try to 
represent, demonstrate or act out a ‘wild’ water fight: they did not try to make this activity 
have a certain narrative or symbolic meaning of ‘wildness’. Rather, they simply did a (real) 
water fight as themselves, whereby they attended to the pragmatics of buckets, rocks, each 
other, and an increasingly wetter floor. In Chapter One I discussed nonprofessional performers 
in contemporary performance, drawing on Quarantine and Kabinet K. In my interview with 
Quarantine’s Gregory he described his preference for working with people not trained in 
acting or performing, saying that nonprofessionals give performances that are ‘quotidian’ and 
‘ordinary’, which have none of the pretense that he associates with the trained actor or 
performer (2014). He added that, whilst they do have ‘skills’ and ‘they are performing’, 
nonprofessionals ‘are not attempting to reproduce some kind of paradigm of what 
performance on stage should look like or feel like’ (Gregory, 2014). Similarly Kabinet K 
emphasises how child and nonprofessional performers are more likely to be ‘normal’ and 
‘themselves’ onstage as opposed to the trained actor who has learned to represent and 
pretend (Manshoven, 2014). Just doing-ness builds on the approaches and conceptualisations 
of nonprofessional performers presented by Quarantine and Kabinet K. Firstly, Gregory’s 
notion that nonprofessionals do not try to reproduce a paradigm of what performance should 
be – they are not actors or performers trained in certain ways of presenting themselves to an 
audience – resonates with my notion of just doing performance tasks, where the pragmatics 
of what is being done takes precedence over performing narratives, meanings or emotions. 
Gregory hopes that in his shows the performers are not acting or showing, but rather ‘they’re 
doing’ (2014). Whilst I disagree with his proposition that nonprofessionals’ performances are 
implicitly ‘everyday’ and ‘ordinary’, his emphasis on ‘doing’ is useful for articulating my just 
doing-ness concept. Kabinet K take a similar approach, yet offer a more complex practice in 
terms of disrupting the professional-nonprofessional binary. The company encourages 
performers to focus on the actualities of doing, rather than on trying to show an emotion. 
Laureyns and Manshoven argue that their dance performances have their own ‘colour’ 
precisely because the child, professional and older dancers are ‘dedicated’ to their tasks and 
do not try to overlay ‘colour’ onto their movements (2014). Laureyns comments that the 
‘meaning’ of their work is ‘not described in emotions . . . [but] it’s described in physical 
presence’ (2014). They aim for performers to ‘be as normal as possible onstage’, proposing 
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that if the child and adult (nonprofessional and professional) dancers are ‘fully occupied‘ in 
doing the specific performance task – if they do it sincerely and ‘profoundly’ – then the work 
will have ‘the colour but they [the performers] don’t have to know what the colour is’: the 
performers themselves should ‘not give the movements colour, that’s very 
important’ (Laurens and Manshoven, 2014). Their approach resonates with my concept of just 
doing-ness insomuch as they do not wish the human performers to dominate the performance 
by prescribing meanings, narratives and emotions to their own activities. Laureyns and 
Manshoven imply that they want enactment itself to determine what the work is and means. I 
take this a step further by proposing that it is not merely the enactments of diverse humans 
that can determine and ‘colour’ the performance, but it is the enactments of distinct yet 
entangled humans and nonhumans.
I also further Kabinet K’s notion that by performers not ‘colouring’ performance the 
performance has rich ‘colour’ for an audience. (Laureyns, 2014). I propose that by fully 
committing to the (just) doing of tasks / containers, performances emerge that are vibrant 
and complex and open for audience members to find within them rich meanings, narratives 
and emotions. In Brennan’s review she describes how ‘simple tasks take on complex 
meanings’: she asks is ‘the lifting of large stones a test of stamina, or the start of henges 
past?’ (2014).
I suggest that spectators’ readings and experiences of ‘wildness’ emerged not from the 
performers trying to ‘colour’ what they did with ‘wild’ meanings, but from the performers’ 
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focus on (just) doing the particular performance tasks. This is not to say that the human 
performers did not have meanings and emotions about ‘wildness’, but rather I wish to 
emphasise that the performance ecology was more open and vibrant – more wild perhaps? – 
when performers did not try to colour what they did with predetermined ideas and meanings 
about ‘wildness’. I think that wilding emerged in the process and final performance by me 
and my collaborators indirectly approaching ‘wildness’, which involved performers focusing 
on specific kinds of performance containers and on the pragmatic demands of doing those 
containers. I understand just doing-ness as an approach to performance where we do not look 
upon the ‘wildness’ of ‘nonhumans’ or ‘ecologies’’, but rather we work from the reality of 
being in a performance ecology and find strategies for wilding, and for letting ourselves be 
wilded by, that performance ecology. This idea is evident in the programme notes I wrote for 
Wild Life. I do not propose that the show is (only) about ‘wildness’ but rather I describe it as 
a live ‘meditation and celebration of wildness’, framing the performance by writing: ‘We are 
asking what it is to be wild. We would like to know about it with our bodies – alone, together 
and with what we don’t yet know or understand. We are not just us. There are children, 
adults, water, stones, matches and other ‘goings ons’. Each of us are here, and since each of 
us are multiple, we are quite a crowd. We would like to go into the wild life. You are 
welcome.’ (Hopfinger, 2014).69
The line ‘You are welcome’ implies my aim for audience members to experience themselves 
as participants in, as opposed to onlookers of, the performance ecology. The openness of the 
performance ecology was, in part, I suggest a result of the diverse child and adult, 
professional and nonprofessional performers I collaborated with. Reflecting on Wild Life, 
researcher and artist Robert Walton proposed that by having such a diverse group of people 
onstage interacting and moving with and as vibrant matter, the experience for him as an 
audience member was one where he could see himself onstage – ‘I look like the people I am 
watching, so it is easier for me to feel a part of what they are doing’.70 This relates to my 
finding from Age-Old that children could access the work more easily due to the child 
performer (Carragh) onstage. Walton felt that he was like the people in Wild Life because 
they were not (all) trained performers / dancers. He could see himself fitting into this 
intergenerational group – in terms of age he would fit between Geraldine and the older 
adults, and in terms of things he would enjoy doing he could imagine himself participating in 
the water fight. Walton implied that the intergenerational performance ecology was an 
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intrinsically open one, whereby he could directly and immediately feel himself a part of it. 
Related to this, the feedback I received from a number of child and adult audience members 
was that they wished they could have joined in more with the performance, citing the water 
fight, lighting matches and flinging stones as things they would like to do themselves. They 
also commented that one of the most exciting and memorable moments was when Archie and 
Liz took audience members by the hand and involved them physically in the movements of 
the performers.71 This feedback implies the performance was open, inviting and accessible to 
adult and child audience members because there was a diversity of humans and nonhuman 
materials onstage. Walton described how he was seeing ‘normal’ people ‘intra-acting’ within 
‘vibrant matter’ live onstage, and that having ‘normal’ people enacting ecological 
entanglement meant he could experience ecological entanglement for himself. This furthers 
my finding from Age-Old and suggests that an intergenerational performance ecology may 
well make it easier for audience members to experience how the ecological is something that 
is an everyday material reality of being alive. Through the intergenerational, professional-
nonprofessional and human-nonhuman collaborations of my practice, it seems that 
performance – specifically under my just doing-ness approach – can be an enactment of how 
we are all, in performance and in life, participants in the dynamic vibrant matter of 
ecologies. Walton’s feedback also suggests to me that Wild Life offered an alternative to the 
trend in some ecological performance practices, and specifically in ecological movement and 
dance practices, to relegate experiences of ecology to the singular adult professional able-
bodied artist. Working with an intergenerational collective allowed me to develop an 
approach (wilding performance) that is not limited to certain types of performers, but rather 
is one that can account for the dynamics, differences and betweens of child / adult, 
professional / nonprofessional and human / nonhuman. I think that ecological performance 
practices must necessarily not enact orthodoxies about what ‘the ecological’ looks and feels 
like and who gets to experience it (paradoxically, this statement about non-orthodoxy could 
itself be an orthodoxy). What I think matters in ecological practice is whether we can be 
responsive and responsible to the live moment and mode of ecological participation.
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The Interpretation Practice: Responsively and Responsibly Participating in the Agency of 
Performance Practice
Watch Clip 7 The Agency of Practice, Interpretation Practices
I developed my Interpretation Practice by converging Goat Island’s ‘Impossible Tasks’ and with 
another Kabinet K technique called ‘Movement Interpretation’. I participated in a workshop 
with Hixson and Goulish in January 2014 at the Royal Conservatoire of Scotland (RCS). During 
the workshop we worked with ‘Impossible Tasks’ to generate performance material. I had 
previously developed this practice during my education and training at the RCS in 
Contemporary Performance Practice. An ‘Impossible Tasks’ exercise is given in detail in Goat 
Island’s School Book 2 (Goat Island, 2000, p. 2). My Interpretation Practice differed from Goat 
Island’s practice in that I provided instructions specifically for movement explorations.
I devised, what I chose to call impossible instructions, with a view to instigating and 
experimenting with different qualities and dynamics of movement. I chose to create the 
instructions, as opposed to asking the performers to write them, because I wanted the 
performers to respond to an instruction without thinking about whether the instructions were 
‘good’ or who wrote them. It was important that they could simply focus on and commit to 
interpreting the instruction. Each instruction was conceived of as a container for a performer, 
who was invited to interpret the instruction through movement. One person’s movement 
explorations become a container for another performer’s movements, with other performers 
interpreting that person, observing and interpreting the qualities and dynamics of their 
movements. Different instructions suited different performers, and performers would often 
choose to return to one or two instructions they particularly enjoyed interpreting. For 
example, Gaby and Graham each focused on the instructions overleaf:
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Interpreting an instruction is a process of ongoing experimentation in the creative doing of 
that instruction, rather than being a mime or literal demonstration of it. Interpreting 
someone else’s movements is similarly a continual process of observation and doing, and was 
never to be understood as the mimicking of someone else and their movements. In keeping 
with my findings from Age-Old, I discovered that representing either the instruction or the 
person’s movements can be a strategy into interpretation, but I encouraged performers 
neither to mime nor to copy but to discover their own version of doing the instruction or of 
doing the person’s movements. The Interpretation Practice can be understood through the 
lens of my just doing-ness approach: the task is to just do the instruction or to just do their 
version of the movements they see someone else doing, rather than seeking to overlay 
narratives, emotions or ‘colour’ onto movements.
Rehearsals would often involve improvisatory processes based on the Interpretation Practice, 
which lasted between 30 and 90 minutes.
Pete is exploring the impossible instruction ‘be spirals’, Archie is exploring ‘sink into 
the earth while holding up the sky’ and other performers are interpreting their 
movements. I have a pile of slips of paper with impossible instructions I have 
prewritten on them, which I pick from in order to give people new instructions 
throughout the structured improvisation. About five minutes into the activity, I stand 
against the rehearsal room wall looking in on the performers. From this ‘outside’ 
position I find it difficult to know what prompts to give the performers. The prompts I 
do give are general and un-inspiring for those moving in response to them – they come 
out in ways that work against, rather than with, the performers and their movements. I 
call to Graham and Liz to interpret Archie, but as soon as they do so I know this was 
not the right decision, because Liz and Graham lose the flow of what they were each 
doing (exploring different instructions) and Archie is jolted out of his focused 
movements. I ask Lennon to interpret Pete’s movements, but Lennon seems unable to 
‘get into’ what Pete is doing: Lennon is immediately distracted and bored. My 
instruction to Lennon was not immanent to his activities but was a preformed notion I 
had about how it would be interesting for Lennon and Pete (a young boy and young 
man) to work together. I am unable to sense the possibilities of the performers’ 
movements and the practice itself.
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I begin moving in and out of the performance space, and find myself turning and 
traveling in amongst the performers. I start to give prompts to them that spur them on. 
I turn, dipping under Gaby’s flinging arm, and I catch up alongside Archie and Graham, 
whispering to them to interpret Carragh. I chase after Gaby, and prompt her to carry 
on her ‘swinging’ but to allow her movements to propel her across the space. I see 
Archie poised on tiptoes as if he is about to run, so I instruct him to run between the 
other moving bodies and into the empty spaces he sees. Carragh and Graham almost 
start to move with Archie when he passes them by, so I say to Carragh and Graham that 
they can join Archie running when they choose to, and then I let all three of them 
know that they can choose when to return to doing their instructions and when to start 
running again – they can change between these tasks as and when they wish to.
My prompts are in-the-moment responses to their movement interpretations, and I am 
transgressing my own expectations for the Interpretation Practice with my nuanced and 
spontaneous prompts. I am on the go – experiencing and contributing to this 
performance practice by responsively moving with(in) it. I jump to avoid Archie 
bashing into me. I come across Geraldine and Pete – I feel there is potential for them 
moving together and so I instruct Geraldine to interpret Pete. It is as if they were 
almost doing this before I suggested it: my instruction encourages them to go in a 
direction they were already sensing the possibility of. 
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I stand still for a few moments, feeling the air currents rustling through my hair and 
skin – air stirred up by these moving bodies. The performers and I are whipping up, and 
being whipped up by, the movements of this practice. We are moving with(in) the 
practice, rather than trying to make the practice move.72
When, in the first part of the session, I stood ‘outside’ the activity, I was trying to fully lead 
the practice by my directives: I was attempting to be the agency of the practice. When I 
began weaving within, and in and out of, the activity, I ceased trying to fully determine it. My 
directing became a matter of being a participant in, rather than leader or separated onlooker 
of, the performance ecology. Letting the practice happen took precedence over making it 
happen, yet ‘letting it happen’ was not about me becoming passive but about me becoming 
actively responsive and responsible to the performance ecology. By letting go of (fully 
controlling) the practice, I could get to know what I was capable of doing with(in) it: I was 
able to try things out, be braver, and more experimental – discover and play with ideas. I 
could feel what was immanent in the practice, sense something of what the performers were 
capable of and respond to the vibrancy of the movements themselves. This can be described 
as a case of ‘composing’ with the ‘force of technicity’ (Manning, 2013, p. 39). I was not 
weaving the practice, but rather weaving with, and as part of, it. This demonstrates how 
directing was not always a cause-and-effect process of me bringing in ideas, offering them to 
my collaborators, and then reacting to what happened. Rather, my ideas for Wild Life often 
emerged through the live enactments of me and my collaborators: through responsively and 
responsibly participating in the agency of the practice. I want to propose this as ecological 
directing.
This type of directing seemed to encourage the human performers to also become more 
responsive and responsible participants of the practice. When I directed the Interpretation 
Practice by working as a participant in it, the performers began to collaborate with each 
other, and with each other’s movements, in more dynamic and open ways. Graham reflected 
that when I asked Gaby and Carragh to interpret his movements, he felt that he was 
‘mutating’ between himself and the other performers and that his movements became more 
‘empathic’ and ‘responsive’ to the energies, movements and bodies around him. Since he 
knew that Gaby and Carragh were interpreting his movements, he felt more responsible for 
the movements he was exploring, as his movements were now not just ‘his own’.73 His 
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comments imply that the Interpretation Practice can be a process of performers becoming 
responsive and responsible to each other and to the dynamic and ongoing agency of the 
practice. Ingold’s notion that markers and plans are vital ways for ‘wayfarers’ to interweave 
‘attentively and responsively’ within the becoming world (2011, p. 251) is useful here. My 
agency of practice approach is about plans, markers and containers (in the form of, for 
example, the impossible instructions and my prompts) that enable myself and my human 
collaborators to enact our participations in (rather than ownership of) agency. As already 
proposed, I do not think agency is attributable to singular (human or nonhuman) ‘things’ or 
‘selves’, and neither is agency something that can be assigned to a network or assemblage of 
humans and nonhumans. Rather, drawing from Barad’s notion, agency is an enactment, ‘a 
matter of intra-acting’, a ‘“doing” / “being” in its intra-activity’ (2003, p. 826-827). With this 
frame of reference, doing performance (in process and product) is always already an 
involvement in agency – we inevitably take part in its ongoing and dynamic ‘ebb and 
flow’ (Barad, 2003, p. 817). I thus extend Barad’s concept of ‘agency’ by applying it to 
something specific: theatrical performance practices. I think that performance practices 
themselves have, or rather are, agency and I want to propose that ecological performance 
practice is about director and human collaborators learning to play our parts responsively and 
responsibly in the ebbs and flows of the agency of our practices.
My practice and conceptualisation of ecological directing is similar to Hixson’s approach in the 
context of Goat Island. Cull describes Hixson’s position as ‘a kind of immanent or internal 
outside’ (2013, p. 44), emphasising that she works as part of the collaboration at the same 
time as having a different role than her collaborators. Cull explores how Hixson works with, 
and responds to, what is immanent to the creative process (a bottom up approach). This 
directing practice has not, however, been extensively explored and demonstrated through 
practice-based scholarly research, and so my concept of ‘ecological directing’ makes visible 
directing and collaboration in ways that have not yet been iterated in theoretical discourse. I 
also extend Hixon’s approach by understanding and including nonhumans as collaborators in 
performance and acknowledging human collaborators as human-nonhuman entanglements. 
Ecological performance is a complex matter of intra-human and human-nonhuman 
entanglement and, crucially, a matter of humans as always already human-nonhuman 
entanglements. In my research practice, I tried to embrace the complexity of entanglement, 
which involves a concept of ‘humans’ as themselves always already ‘confederations of tools, 
microbes, minerals, sounds, and other “foreign” materialities’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 36). As 
previously stated, I do not propose that entanglement is a case of humans entangling with 
156
other originally separated humans or nonhumans, but rather humans are always already 
constituted in and by our entanglements. As such, focusing on human performers – as was the 
case with my Interpretation Practice – does not necessarily mean we are denying the 
nonhuman forces and trajectories at work within and across us and our practices. Ecological 
practices of collaborating and directing are seemingly not about ‘right response[s] to . . . 
radically exterior / ized other[s]’, but rather a matter of accounting for how ‘one’s very 
embodiment is integrally entangled with the other’ (Barad, 2007, p. 393; p. 158). The 
Interpretation Practice can be understood as a method that potentially enabled this kind of 
collaboration.
Graham provided another insightful reflection on the Interpretation Practice. He described 
how he had been aware of me giving him impossible instructions and encouraging him to 
continue interpreting one specific instruction, but he could not tell whether the impulses for 
his movements were coming from inside or outside of himself, himself or the other 
performers, inside or outside the rehearsal room, the instruction itself or my 
encouragement.74 His reflections resonate with Barad’s notion of intra-activity, in terms of 
her proposition that humans and nonhumans are constituted through ongoing intra-actions 
(2007, p. 140). Barad proposes how differences between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and ‘self’ and 
‘other’ are not fixed but rather intra-actively and differentially constituted. She points out 
that ‘intra-activity’ enacts both boundaries and their reconfigurations: intra-activity is an 
ongoing process that ensures boundaries between all (human and nonhuman) phenomena ‘do 
not sit still’ (2003, p. 817). The boundaries between one thing and another – between the 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of Graham – do not sit still but are continuously and intra-actively 
produced. The Interpretation Practice can be understood as a performance strategy for 
human collaborators to experience intra-activity, a practice for humans to experience that 
what they are and do and the differences between them, are a matter of intra-action ‘with / 
in and as part of the world’s differential becoming’ (Barad, 2007, p. 361). Using Barad’s 
concepts of ‘intra-action’ and the ‘agential cut’, the Interpretation Practice can be 
understood as a practice for constituting and transgressing boundaries: the ongoing 
movement explorations and interpretations seem to continuously make, transgress and 
reconfigure the boundaries between the moving bodies. Thinking and doing the ecological in 
performance is, I think, about practicing how we are caught up in, and constituted by, our 
ongoing entanglements in the performance ecology. My agency of practice approach is about 
how collaborative performance making can be a radical practice of being and playing 
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responsive and responsible parts in the performance ecology, which involves being 
accountable for the cuts, boundaries and transgressions we continuously help to enact 
through our (collaborative) intra-actions. I use the term ‘responsible’ in relation to Barad’s 
notion that intra-acting ‘responsibly as part of the world means taking account of the 
entangled phenomena that are intrinsic to the world’s vitality’ (2007, p. 396, my italics).
Being a responsive and responsible participant in the agency of practice did not, however, 
mean that my collaborators and I were always explicitly involved in the performance 
activities. In the same rehearsal session when I had discovered my approach of moving with
(in) the Interpretation Practice, I soon felt that I did not need to always give instructions or 
be (literally) moving within the activity: the performers did not always need my direct 
involvement and encouragement. Furthermore, the practice could carry on without all the 
performers being directly in it all the time. This prompted me to say to the performers that 
they could choose to step out of, and back in to, the performance activity as and when they 
felt the activity needed, or did not need, them and their movements. This was not about 
leaving the practice to see it fully from the ‘outside’ as a separated onlooker, but about 
varying our involvements in response to the dynamic agency of the practice. Sometimes the 
most responsible way of participating in the performance ecology was to merely attend and 
listen to it, which involved not being physically in the activity.
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However, that attending and listening did not mean that we were not (still) actively part of 
the practice. In Chapter One I discussed Heddon’s ‘entangled listening’ concept, through 
which she usefully re-thinks doing and performing as an active attending and listening 
(Heddon, forthcoming). This resonates with my finding that part of an ecological practice is 
about responsively choosing when, and when not, to be directly involved in the performance 
practice. I think that shifting between different levels of participation in response to the 
dynamics of agency is a key way for us to play responsible parts in the ongoing and 
differential becoming of the performance ecology.
The dynamic of varied involvement in the performance ecology corresponds to Kershaw’s 
proposition that ‘we are fundamentally performed by Earth’s ecologies’ (2015, p. 113, italics 
in original) and his implication that we often need to do less in order to allow ecologies to be 
and do more. Kershaw’s project, Meadow Meander, is based on a path that has been 
trodden / scythed into the grass. He describes how, at his home in Devon, he had set out to 
cut the grass, but soon realised that he had inadvertently made a path that was not straight 
but ‘all twists and turns looping back and around to end up where it started’ (2015, p. 126). 
This suggested to him that his movements and the path were not merely his, but they had 
emerged from the ecology of where he was: he was being performed by the ecology of the 
meadow, wind, earth, sky and more. He developed the project, inviting others to experience 
walking the path. Participants took a meander with the only ‘rules’ being to ‘always stay on 
the path; avoid walking / moving against the lay of the grass’ (2015, p. 127). Under the 
container of these simple rules, Kershaw found that participants ‘appear to experience both 
performing and being performed by the environment of path, meadow, field, earth, water, 
sky . . . and beyond’ (2015, p. 131). He proposes his meadow meanders as instances of ‘the 
patent and profound environmental dynamics that bind humans incontrovertibly to Earth’s 
ecologies, ephemerally performing together as vitally material life’ (2015, p. 131). He 
suggests that the ‘simplicity’ and ‘minimality’ of the performance activity led to ‘an overall 
scale and complexity of experience’, putting forward his concept of ‘minimalist-units of 
human performance’ (2015, p. 131; p. 123). Similarly, I found that the simplicity of a 
performance container can give rise to ‘minimal’ - or, as I put, just doing-ness - human 
performances, where perhaps human performers can experience themselves as being 
performed by, rather than (only) performing onto, the performance ecology? The 
Interpretation Practice may an an example of this happenning. 
Watch Clip 8 The Agency of Practice, Leaping and Being Leapt
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We are using the Interpretation Practice as a basis for an improvisation. Gaby is 
exploring the impossible instruction, ‘fire the darkness’. She whips up her arm in a 
pulling-upward twist, her body following the force of her wielding arm. With each 
twisting jump she finds herself somewhere, a new place to jump up and release from. 
Her movements are a simultaneity of her forceful arm, her bodily yielding to where 
that force takes her and the movements of other human bodies around her. Her 
movements arise between her intention and her openness to where she might be taken 
– she collaborates with indeterminacy.75
This was arguably ‘movement beyond position’ (Manning, 2013, p. 30). Gaby seemed to 
discover her movements not by leaping but by letting herself be leapt. The container of the 
Interpretation Practice arguably allowed her to enact a minimal or just doing-ness 
performance: she neither fully led nor determined her movements, but the movements 
variously determined her. I hoped that the movements would emerge for the audience as a 
matter less of an individual human body doing movements and more of a human body being 
moved. Watching Gaby, to me it seemed as though she could never fully predict, and thus 
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could never be fully responsible over, what her movements emerged as live in the space, yet 
at the same time I could see that she was responsible for the (intra)active part she played in 
(doing) these movements. 
Perhaps when humans are given certain types of ‘concise and open-ended’ performance 
containers to explore movement through, they can move with movements as opposed to 
singularly making movement happen? Manning discusses ‘enabling constraints’ (2013, p. 30), 
which are types of dance ‘propositions’ offered by the director that give dancers a means not 
of moving but of being moved, not a way of dancing but of being danced. Manning’s 
‘propositions’ seem to be akin to my wilding performance containers. The container of the 
instruction ‘fire the darkness’, along with the rules of the Interpretation Practice, seemed to 
give Gaby the means to move beyond being a body performing movements to being a bodying 
that is performed by the movements of what is beyond her ‘body’. My research thus builds on 
the critical theories about movement and ecology. This notion of ‘bodying’ challenges the 
widely used concept of ‘embodiment’ in the movement and ecology field: the ‘body’ that 
‘embodies’ is always a human one. Recognising the limitations of the concept of 
‘embodiment’, Ingold helpfully argues that ‘embodiment’ is not an appropriate term because 
it suggests ‘closure’ and ‘a body wrapped up in itself’ (2013, p. 93-94). Conversely Gaby’s 
movements seem to happen across her, and I hoped that for an audience her movements were 
not fully determined or attributable to her singular body. Perhaps, even, Gaby’s spinning 
movements are an example of, what Manning describes as, being ‘moved’ by the movement 
of ecologies or ‘milieu’ (2013, p. 32)?
Interestingly, when I used over general instructions the performers seemed less able to 
responsibly participate in the dynamic agency of the performance practices and there seemed 
to be less scope for performers to become responsive to the the performance ecology.
Watch Clip 9 Over General Instruction, Bending
I give Carragh the generalised instruction, ‘bending’, which results in Carragh doing 
simplistic imitations and mimes of bending: she merely bends different parts of her 
body without much focus on what she is doing and seems to be showing me, the 
spectator, ‘bending’ as opposed to doing bending. Gaby interprets Carragh’s 
movements, and Gaby’s movements are equally unfocused and forced.76
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Their movements seemed to me to be over-thought, over-determined and over-performed. 
This less precise instruction (‘bending’) arguably inhibited the performers: they seemed 
unable to respond to the dynamic agency of the practice or be open to the performance 
ecology (of other human and nonhuman bodies, such as Graham, Lennon and the matches). 
Conversely, the open-ended yet precise instruction of ‘fire the darkness’ seemed to enable 
Gaby to join (in) with forces and trajectories within and beyond herself. By leaping and being 
leapt, Gaby did not show movements, but arguably moved responsively and responsibly with
(in) the dynamic movements of agency. I think that we need to learn to tread lightly within 
the performance ecology and the agency of our performance practices. I want to propose the 
Interpretation Practice as a potential performance method for learning ‘to simply and calmly 
perform exponentially more responsively with . . . ecologies’ (Kershaw, 2015, italics in 
original), where performing with the performance ecology may be one strategy for learning to 
perform more responsively with wider environmental ecologies. Another way that this 
learning might occur is through our openness and responsiveness to the negative feedback 
from the performance ecology.
Responding to Negative Feedback
I work with Graham on the movements he has been exploring during the last four 
rehearsal sessions of using the Interpretation Practice. On top of his usual 
interpretation of ‘widen the air’, I give him two new instructions: ‘gather in the 
oceans’ and ‘shake the world’. I watch him explore new movements and I decide that 
these should be added to his part in the whole group activity. However, when Graham 
brings these new instructions in to his explorations in the context of the whole group, 
he and his movements appear closed. Carragh begins, as she usually does at some 
moment in this activity, to interpret Graham’s movements, but Graham does not seem 
to notice Carragh and Carragh gives up trying to move with him, and is only able to 
watch him as an ‘outsider’ to the activity. This diminishment of energy, and lack of 
openness, spreads across the whole group. Liz and Archie have been running holding 
hands, exploring the directions their running takes them in and darting in amongst the 
other moving bodies. However, their running now becomes forced, and is reduced to 
jogging in a circle. Carragh would usually join hands and run with them, and then trail 
off to interpret Graham’s or Gaby’s movements, but she is unmotivated to do any of 
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these things. Geraldine is interpreting Pete’s movements, and both performers have 
been twisting this way and that in ongoing spiraling explorations. Yet, now their 
movements are feeble and half-hearted: they are unable to find energy. The 
performance practice is losing its dynamics and is closing in on itself, and the 
performers become less and less responsive to, and responsible for, the practice. This 
activity usually spirals into ever-varying eddies of energy, where unexpected and 
unique movements emerge from the performers. The performers normally respond to 
each other and where the practice is going – responsibly coming in and out of the 
activity. There is typically a kind of whipping up of movement, and a being whipped up 
by the movements of the practice. Yet, now, the activity is almost non-existent.77
Graham had discovered and explored his movements in the context of moving amongst and in 
relation to the manifold forces and movements of different bodies. Yet, I took him out of this 
ecology, developed his movements in isolation from the rest of the group, and then put him 
back in. I had over-directed Graham and tried to, as it were, sever Graham’s movements from 
their relations to other moving bodies. I had treated his movements as though they were 
isolatable from the ecology within which the movements had emerged. There was, as it were, 
an overproduction of Graham’s movements, which I think is what caused the whole group 
performance activity to dissipate in dynamic and energy. An ethos in the rewilding field is for 
humans to be involved in environmental ecologies in non-dominating and non-damaging ways 
such that humans do not try to ‘control’ ecologies but rather work as part of their dynamics, 
allowing ecosystems to find their ‘own way’ (Drenthen, 2014, p. 159; Monbiot, 2013, p. 9). I 
had over-managed the performance ecology and treated Graham’s movements as though they 
were separable from that ecology, where my extra work with Graham had, as it were, done 
more harm than good. I propose that the dissipation of energy across the whole group was, in 
fact, negative feedback from the performance ecology.
As discussed in Chapter One, Kershaw suggests that ecosystems are ‘open and sustained 
through the positive effects of negative feedback circuits’ (2007, p. 53). Responsiveness to 
negative feedback, he explains, prevents any ecology (whether a performance or an 
environmental ecology such as a riverbank) from running out of control through 
overproduction in any one or more of their parts (2007, p. 52). By not responding to negative 
feedback there can be a critical loss of ecosystem diversity, dynamism and resilience. I 
reflected on what had happened and, in the next rehearsal, I asked Graham to let go of the 
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solo we had worked on together and to choose the one instruction he felt most energised by. 
He chose the instruction ‘widen the air’, which was what he had already been exploring when 
working with(in) the ecology of the whole group. When Graham worked with his chosen 
instruction again and when his movements could emerge within the performance ecology of 
other moving bodies, the practice quickly (re)emerged as vibrant and dynamic. The 
performers were responsive to each other’s movements and energies, and the practice 
seemed to open up and gather momentum, with performers taking responsibility for their 
parts in the ongoing dynamics of the practice. By responding to the negative feedback we 
were arguably able to contribute to sustaining the performance ecology. This contribution is, 
surely, a key aspect to wilding any ecology?
I do not think performance ecologies suffer when we over-direct them and / or treat specific 
elements (such as Graham’s movements) as though they are isolatable - these difficulties will, 
I think, inevitably emerge in the process of making a performance. Rather, I think that 
performance ecologies suffer and cannot sustain themselves when we do not respond to the 
negative feedback – when difficulties and issues in the performance process are ignored or 
denied. Crucially, this feedback often emerges in the betweens of the performance ecology 
(such as between Graham and the other moving bodies). Responding to negative feedback 
may be a vital way in which we humans can contribute to the resilience and sustainability of 
performance ecologies. I think that negative feedback occurs because we and our practices 
are unavoidably entangled within the vibrant matter of our performance ecology and within 
the vibrant matters of other ecologies. Performance can, perhaps, be an ecological practice 
when it allows us to learn to attend and respond to the ‘outbreaks’ and ‘negative feedback 
loops’ – the difficulties – of performance ecologies? This connects with Bennett’s notion that 
vibrant matter is not only a case of positive vibrancy but that there are also negative aspects 
and potentials of vibrant matter. Whilst I have considered how we might engage with these 
negative aspects of the ecological in terms of the creative process of making performance, 
these aspects also emerged in the final production.
The Production
Whilst I did not aim for Wild Life to have one reading, I did structure the final production in 
order to communicate and do specific aspects of the ecological. In my role as practitioner-
researcher, I wanted to see whether the final performance could enact not only the positive 
ecological qualities of responsiveness, openness and attentiveness, but also more difficult 
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ecological dynamics that had emerged over the creative process. The two sections that I have 
already discussed - the water fight and the sliding stones - happened during the second half 
of the production and were dramaturgically structured to be reflective of each other. I want 
to show that the performance structure of these two sections allowed for two different 
performances of violence: firstly, the water fight consisted of, what can be seen as, intra-
human aggression and, secondly, the sliding stones proposed relational violence between the 
human and more-than-human.
As already discussed, the performers conducted a real water fight live onstage, through which 
a performance of spitting-chucking-chasing-splashing-pouring-whacking-kicking emerged. The 
activity was a playful one, yet involved aggressive - even violent - human actions: the fighting 
part of the ‘water fight’ was clearly real and happening. One audience member described this 
section as ‘fun’, ‘scary’ and ‘alarming’ because they thought the performers might throw the 
water at the audience too. Hayden Foreman-Smith talked about how the ‘atmosphere 
changed’ when the ‘fighting started’.78 
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During the water fight in all three of the final performances, I could hear audience members 
not only laughing at the trickery and surprise of the performers soaking each other, but also 
letting out calls of ‘ahhh’ and ‘ohhhh’ with some young audience members covering 
themselves with their coats for ‘protection’. Listening to and watching these live vocal and 
physical reactions I felt that the spectators were joining in with the playful yet very real 
qualities of the water fight. These live reactions, along with the audience comments I have 
referenced, suggest to me that the water fight was a kind of safe expression of intra-human 
aggression and violence: the human performers were safely and playfully doing aggression.
In the final section of the production, the sliding of the stones happened. As already 
discussed, part of collaborating with the stones involved the human performers letting go of 
having any full control over what the stones did. The stones slid across the wet floor, violently 
bashing into each other, some cracking and splitting from the force of their collisions, and 
some even sliding under the chairs of audience members and hitting spectators’ feet. It was 
simultaneously a performance of humans thrusting-flinging-throwing and of nonhumans 
sliding-bashing-splitting-cracking-banging-hitting. Brennan described this moment in the 
performance as a ‘clatter of skimming stones’ that destroys the central circle (made of large 
rocks) by cluttering it ‘into anonymity’ (Brennan, 2014).
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Another audience member specifically remembered this section of the performance because 
‘there were no humans left in the space, just the stones banging into the rocks and matches, 
destroying what had been there’ and the sound of the stones sliding across the floor was like 
‘an avalanche’ or the ‘roaring of water’ and felt ‘dangerous’.79 These responses from 
spectators suggest to me that the audience was able to experience the violent and dangerous 
potentials of vibrant matter. The performance ecology, therefore, may have enacted how 
matter has ‘destructive’ powers and effects (Bennett, 2010, p. 54). The performance of the 
destructive and violent stones was not, however, a case of only the more-than-human, in that 
the movements of the stones was in part down to the ways that the human performers 
variously slid them. This section was, perhaps, not only an example of destructive nonhuman 
vibrant matter but also an enactment of the way violence can be relational between the 
human and more-than-human?
The water fight and sliding stones can be understood as homologous to each other, in that the 
structures of these performance sections similarly, yet distinctly, performed violence: one 
intra-human violence and the other human-nonhuman violence. Kershaw proposes that ‘there 
are structural ecological principles common to the “cultural” and “natural” realms that are 
homologous because they emerge through similar shared or overlapping performance 
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systems’ (2007, p. 21). The two sections I have discussed could be deemed indicative of this 
homological connection between the ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ realms, where the water fight 
focused on the ‘cultural’ intra-actions of different humans ‘play fighting’ and the sliding 
stones focused on a ‘natural’ nonhuman material. The violence in both of these sections can 
perhaps be understood as a ‘structural ecological principle’ that emerges across the human 
and nonhuman? The intra-human aggression of the water fight and the relational violence 
between the human and more-than-human of the sliding stones suggest a key idea about what 
it means for performance to be and do the ecological: that the ecological involves not only 
positive qualities but also negative ones (such as aggression and violence). In order to engage 
with ecology through performance practice, it may be key that we must (learn to) responsibly 
work with both positive and negative aspects of the ecological. Perhaps performance ecology 
can be a strategy for embracing, what Bateson describes as, the ‘charm and the terror of 
ecology’ (1972, p. 510)? The performance ecology, in these two sections of the production, 
was arguably able to, in some sense, demonstrate how we humans might safely, responsively 
and responsibly work with violence as it variously plays out across intra-human and human-
nonhuman material processes.
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Conclusion: Towards an Ecological Politics and Ethics
My practice-based research explored and developed methods for an ecological performance 
practice. I have argued that all theatrical performance is inevitably an ecology, and that all 
theatrical performance (in process and product) unavoidably marks and is marked by wider 
Earthly ecology. I have proposed, therefore, that what is at stake when it comes to ecological 
performance is how our work – in process and product – can enact the qualities and dynamics 
of ecological participation. I have argued that performance can be ecological by its 
approaches to and methods of creative collaborative practice, with the process and the 
production enacting ecological qualities and dynamics in their very moments and modes of 
doing. In this conclusion, I will summarise my findings and their contributions to the different 
fields that my research engages with, and, in doing so, I speculate about how my research 
into performance (in) ecology could have political and ethical consequences within and 
beyond theatre and performance.
I have focused on how Age-Old and Wild Life were made and performed, revealing the 
complexities of a lively performance ecology that involves a diversity of distinct yet 
entangled human and nonhuman collaborators. I have developed two key ecological 
performance practices: the Instant Performances and the Interpretation Practice. These 
practices are performance strategies for wilding performance, where wilding performance is 
about doing ecological qualities and dynamics. The key terms of these qualities and dynamics 
include openness, listening, responsiveness and responsibility. Furthermore, I found that 
doing the ecological involves an openness not only to these affirmative and positive dynamics 
of the performance ecology but also to its more difficult and destructive dynamics, which 
involves engaging with qualities such as aggression and violence as they emerge across human 
and nonhuman actants. I think that by working with, and by being open and responsive to, 
the different (positive and negative) aspects of the ecological, performance practice can be 
understood as an ethical approach. I want to propose wilding performance is an ecologically 
ethical approach to creating and doing performance. I have developed three approaches for 
wilding performance: wilding performance containers, just doing-ness and the agency of 
practice.
My three approaches build on and extend the practices and critical discourses of 
‘collaboration’ and ‘directing’ in devised performance. In Age-Old I found that collaboration 
was neither about equality between Carragh and me, nor about us contributing to the process 
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and performance in similar ways, but about how the dynamics between us in our 
intergenerational relationship might be able to lead the process and performance. In Wild 
Life I furthered this approach and discovered that collaboration most radically emerged when 
diverse human and nonhuman participants are understood as collaborators, whereby attention 
is paid to the differences, dynamics and betweens in the performance ecology. Wilding 
performance containers is an approach that allows for these differences, dynamics and 
betweens to lead the work. They are strategies in the form of directives, propositions, tasks, 
instructions and prompts that enable diverse humans and nonhumans to contribute to, and 
co-determine, the creative explorations and developments of process and performance. They 
are particular types of containers – precise yet open-ended, simple yet complex – that contain 
in them the potential for their own transgression and reconfiguration. It is an approach where 
container-ship is experimented with in order to wild the performance ecology, where wilding 
the performance ecology is to contribute to sustaining its diversity and dynamism. Wilding 
performance containers can be understood as an ethical approach to collaborative 
performance-making, in that they are strategies for meaningfully including diverse child and 
adult, professional and nonprofessional, and human and nonhuman collaborators. Perhaps the 
most significant aspect of this approach is that it can enact a politics of inclusion, whereby all 
the participants of the performance ecology can mark and co-determine the process and 
product?
Just doing-ness is also an approach for involving diverse collaborators in performance. Just 
doing-ness is about attending and responding to what human and nonhuman performers do, as 
opposed to focusing on what ‘child’, ‘adult’, ‘professional’, ‘nonprofessional’, ‘rocks’, 
‘stones’, ‘water’ and ‘fire’ are pre-conceived to be and mean. It is an approach that gives 
human and nonhuman collaborators their due as vibrant and dynamic entanglements of 
matter. By attending and responding to what materials do, my human collaborators and I 
were able to work with materials in ways that allowed those materials to mark and co-
determine the process and performance. Furthermore, I found that when human performers 
attend to the pragmatic doing-ness of a task, attention is brought to their entanglements with 
each other and with the nonhuman materials they are working with. Nonhuman materials are 
not treated as props or objects in aid of human-focused performances: rather, just doing-ness 
is about how the process and performance emerges through the inseparability and shared 
vibrancy across human and nonhuman collaborators. Whilst devised performance practices 
and scholarship entail complex and nuanced accounts and concepts of ‘collaboration’, there 
is a gap in the field when it comes to accounting for the complexities and realities of human-
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nonhuman entanglement. In this field ‘collaboration’ is ultimately presented as a human 
practice in which different human ‘selves’ work together. By treating and presenting humans 
and nonhumans as collaborators, my research builds on collaborative devising practices and 
critical perspectives: my work offers a radical re-conceptualisation of who / what 
collaboration involves. My practice further contributes to the field by treating humans not as 
separable fixed individuals but as intra-actively produced unique and ongoing ‘selves’, where 
these ‘selves’ are constantly entangled and entangling with other human and nonhuman 
‘selves’. Importantly, emphasising entanglement does not subsume difference but rather 
demonstrates how differences are constantly emerging and being made: humans are 
understood to be distinct ‘selves’ precisely because we are always more than just ‘us’. Just 
doing-ness seems to be an implicitly ethical approach in that it involves attending and 
responding to the vibrancy and ‘aliveness’ of matter, where value is placed across human and 
nonhuman material ‘bodies’. Perhaps just doing-ness can, therefore, be considered a 
practical strategy that fulfills Bennett’s ‘ethical aim . . . to distribute value more generously, 
to bodies as such’ (2010, p. 13)? Perhaps the political and ethical import of collaborative 
performance practice is that it is able to enact how humans are performers within a whole 
host of other (human and nonhuman) performers on Earth?
My third approach - the agency of practice - builds on conceptualisations of ‘directing’ in the 
devised performance field. Through Wild Life, I developed an approach where the director 
does not give agency to, or enable agency in, children, adults, professionals, nonprofessionals 
and nonhuman materials, but rather the director and human collaborators participate in the 
agency of performance practices. Considering agency as enactment (as opposed to something 
individuals have), then the director, human collaborators and nonhuman materials are always 
already participating in agency. Following this, I found that how we participate in the 
dynamics of agency is what matters. I developed a practice of, what can be called, ecological 
directing, which involved me aiming to work as a responsive and responsible participant in 
the agency of performance practices, whereby I was neither the leader nor dominant force, 
but a distinctive and active part of the performance ecology. My job as the director was to 
find strategies that allowed me and my human collaborators to responsively and responsibly 
participate in agency, which involved varying our involvements in activities and responding to 
the negative feedback from the performance ecology. I found that an ecological performance 
practice requires that we utilise the ongoing dynamics of (human and nonhuman) 
collaboration in order to heed the destructive potentials of our practices, whereby the 
director learns to listen and respond not only to individuals but also to the dynamics and 
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betweens of the performance ecology. This presents a new conceptualisation of ‘the 
director’ for the devised performance field. The politics of an ecological approach to 
directing are a politics of openness and responsiveness, where the director responds not only 
to human individuals but also to the human and nonhuman dynamics and betweens of the 
performance ecology. As such, ecological directing may be a case of an ethics of listening, 
where listening is expanded outwards to the dynamics and betweens of humans and 
nonhumans. Furthermore, since the agency of practice approach is about how director and 
human collaborators can become responsible for how we participate in the performance 
ecology, this approach could be considered an ethical practice of learning to responsively and 
responsibly play our parts in wider Earthly ecologies. This seems to correspond to Barad’s 
notion that ‘ethics is about accounting for our part of the entangled webs we weave’ (2007, 
p. 384). Perhaps the agency of practice approach to directing and collaborating can be 
understood as a kind of creative strategy that can prepare us ‘individually and collectively for 
performing ecology more ethically’ (Kershaw, 2015, p. 126)? Perhaps theatrical performance 
(in its collaborative creative processes and productions themselves) can be an ecologically 
ethical practice when it enables us humans to explore and experiment with how we play our 
parts in the performance ecology and thus how we play our parts in wider Earthly ecologies? 
Performance ecology might be a radical enactment of how we humans cannot (ever) fully 
control nor determine the wider ecology of Earth, at the same time suggesting how we can be 
responsive and responsible for the parts we play in how that ecology plays out. Performance 
ecology may therefore demonstrate a non-anthropocentric politics of displacing human 
exceptionalism at the same time as demonstrating the possibilities for humans to positively 
and actively participate in ecology.
Wilding performance containers, just doing-ness and the agency of practice will be 
particularly useful for practitioners who are concerned with devising new strategies for 
directing and collaboration that are less human centered and more suited to ecological 
imperatives. These three approaches can be adopted and adapted in relation to the specific 
(human and nonhuman) collaborators a practitioner is working with. All three approaches also 
offer a new contribution to the emerging, but still very marginal, field of adult-child and 
professional-nonprofessional collaborative practice, evidenced by the companies explored in 
this thesis – Quarantine, Kabinet K and Glas(s) Performance – and other companies such as 
Fevered Sleep whose current show Men and Girls is a collaboration between male professional 
dancers and young girls (Fevered Sleep, 2016b). These approaches may be relevant for 
practitioners who are already, or who wish to begin, working with children and 
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nonprofessionals in professional devising performance contexts, in that all three approaches 
enable people not normally involved in the devising and performing of professional work to 
contribute creatively and skillfully to the process and product. Since an intergenerational 
practice has not yet been conceptualised in scholarly discourse, I hope this thesis opens up 
this emerging practice to critical development. Furthermore, my research has made 
connections between intergenerational collaboration and ecological performance, a 
connection not yet extensively explored in practice or scholarship. In my future work as a 
practitioner and researcher, I hope to continue creatively and critically developing an 
intergenerational performance practice and exploring the connections between the 
intergenerational and ecological.
I have found that intergenerational performance has the potential to enact the ecological as 
an open and accessible experience. This aspect of my research fills a gap in ecological 
movement practice and scholarship, where the tendency has been to inadvertently present 
and discuss ecological performance in relation to specific types of people, places and 
activities (predominantly adult professional artists working and moving in outdoor ‘natural’ 
environments). Working with a diverse group of people between nine and 60 years and of 
varying performance experience has led me to realise that thinking and doing the ecological 
cannot, and should not, be an orthodoxy. This further presents a politics and ethics of 
inclusion when it comes to doing ecology: the intergenerational context of my work can 
implicitly demonstrate how the ecological is something that we can all think and do. I have 
found that intergenerational collaborative performance is a productive and radical practice 
through which we can explore and experiment with and, crucially, enact ecological qualities 
and dynamics. It is, however, important to note that, whilst the intergenerational context has 
been a constant throughout my research, my findings are not tied down to the 
intergenerational per se: on the contrary, I do not wish to posit ecological performance as a 
practice that requires a particular set or combination of collaborators. Perhaps this illustrates 
another aspect of the ethics of engaging with ecology: ecological engagement is always 
already a matter of specifics (particular people doing particular practices in particular places) 
but must necessarily not be limited to those specifics?
My research makes a contribution to the scholarly discourses and performance approaches in 
the field of performance and ecology. As argued in Chapter One, the scholarship and artistic 
practices tend, at some point along the way, to presuppose that ‘performance’ and ‘ecology’ 
are separated or, at least, separable domains. Practitioners often treat ‘ecology’ merely as a 
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theme or issue for theatrical performance to represent or be about, and the scholarship often 
treats theatre and performance as a medium for bringing ‘performance’ and ‘ecology’, 
‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’, and ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ closer together. I have shown that, 
since performance is an ecology, the ecological is something that can neither be brought into 
performance nor that performance can go out to and find: I have sought to explore and 
develop the implicit ecological-ness of process-led collaborative devising practices, 
movement and choreography approaches and materials-focused performance. I have proposed 
that, since performance is an ecology that involves distinct yet entangled humans and 
nonhumans, and since we are always already (intra)acting within and as part of diverse social 
and environmental ecologies, we – quite literally – do not have a choice about our, and our 
performance practices’, ecological participation. Thus, I have proposed that what matters 
when it comes to developing ecological performance practices is how we enact the qualities 
and dynamics of this inevitable participation. I have put forward the Instant Performances 
and the Interpretation Practice as methods for enacting - or, at least, potentially enacting - 
these qualities and dynamics. Whilst I have not denied ecology as a subject, theme or issue 
that emerged in the final Age-Old and Wild Life performances, I have specifically developed 
practices that enable the process and performance to enact the ecological. I have discovered 
methods of collaborating, directing, making and performing, which can be understood as 
ecological in their very doing.
My explorations into performance ecology also have political and ethical implications for the 
meanings of, and theorisations about, ‘ecology’ in non-performance fields. Kershaw draws on 
the general scientific definition of ‘ecology’ as the ‘interdependence between organisms and 
environments’ (2007, p. 15) and Bateson describes ecology through his argument that the 
‘unit of survival is organism plus environment’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 489). The focus in scientific 
‘ecology’ disciplines is thus predominantly on nonhuman organisms in ‘the environment’ and / 
or on the human as an organism in relation to other nonhuman organisms. However, 
performance ecology arguably demonstrates that thinking and doing the ecological is not only 
about re-focusing our attention towards nonhumans and human-nonhuman relations, but is 
also about the social ecologies of diverse humans. Thinking and doing the ecological through 
performance process and product has demonstrated to me that intra-human relations and 
intra-human performances are part of what it means to engage with the ecological. What is 
at stake with performance ecology is how to simultaneously explore and do intra-human and 
human-nonhuman entanglement.
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Performance ecology also impacts on those ecological perspectives that emphasise human 
enmeshment in the more-than-human at the expense of exploring intra-human relations. For 
example, the image of ‘ecology’ that deep ecologists often present is largely predicated on ‘a 
human’ who is deeply enmeshed within the more-than-human world of nonhuman beings. 
Naess locates the human as deeply interconnected within a web of the more-than-human, 
contextualising the human as embedded within and in ‘dynamic equilibrium with other forms 
of life’ (1976, p. 23). The focus, for Naess, thus seems to be on presenting a singular human 
(who supposedly represents all humans) in their deep interconnectedness with nonhuman life 
forms, where intra-human relations seem to figure as less important (or even not figure at 
all). Conversely, the intergenerational performance ecology of Wild Life was able to 
contextualise different humans not only in relation to the nonhuman but also in relation to 
other humans of similar and different life stages and ages. Intergenerational performance 
ecology has shown me that thinking and doing ecology is not simply about shifting our focus 
away from human exceptionalism towards the more-than-human: there is no binary choice 
between focusing on the nonhuman or the human. Rather, the social relations between 
diverse humans is equally a part of the ecological as is the relations across the human and 
nonhuman. Perhaps performance ecology can remind us that intra-human relations are as of 
much ecological concern as human relations to the more-than-human? Perhaps performance 
practice can simultaneously do the three ecologies that Guattari posits as environmental 
ecology (the environment), social ecology (social relations) and mental ecology (human 
subjectivity) (Guattari, 1989, p. 41)? That is, maybe performance practices that involve 
diverse humans and nonhuman materials can demonstrate that how we think (mental 
ecology) and what we do (social ecology) is entangled with the more more-than-human 
(environmental ecology)? Performance ecology, by its inclusion of diverse humans and 
nonhuman materials, can perhaps be a practice of ‘group being’, a ‘new micropolotical and 
microsocial’ practice of the ecological (Guattari, 1989, p. 34; p. 51)?
In these ways, my research also builds on Bennett’s politics, where she focuses predominantly 
on one human in relation to nonhuman matter: she proposes that the ‘ethical task at hand 
here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to 
it’ (2010, p. 14). Whilst Bennett’s politics focuses on how a human might learn to discern 
nonhuman vibrant matter, my explorations into performance ecology imply an ethics that 
involves a shift both in doing diverse human relations and human-nonhuman relations. I think 
that intra-human relations dynamically emerge and change when the focus is placed on the 
human and nonhuman in the performance ecology. In other words, the ways that human 
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relations are done is different when there is a wider perceptiveness to the more-than-human: 
how we work with each (human) other matters ecologically. Perhaps performance ecology can 
demonstrate an ethics of intra-human relations that reflects how these relations are 
inevitably entangled with(in) the nonhuman? Perhaps performance ecology is important to the 
wider disciplines and theorisations about ‘ecology’ because it can simultaneously explore 
intra-human relations and human-nonhuman entanglement? Performance ecology may, 
therefore, be a radical practice of renegotiating how to perform our human-ness and human 
interrelations. These ethical consequences of performance ecology also build on Barad’s 
work, in that her theorisations also seem to neglect any sustained discussion about human 
relations and intra-actions. She focuses largely on the parts that the nonhuman plays in 
material-discursive practices, drawing on nonhumans such as the ‘brittlestar’ animal to 
illustrate her ideas (2007, p. 369). By not putting humans centre stage and by not losing sight 
of, or forgetting about, humans and intra-human relations, performance ecology offers a 
unique way of expressing, exploring and doing the ecological, where the ecological is as much 
about how we enact intra-human relations as it is about how we enact our relations beyond 
the human.
The ethics and politics involved in performance ecology also emerge in the ways it can 
perform intra-human aggression and relational violence between humans and nonhumans. I 
found that doing ecology necessarily involves not only engaging with the life-giving and 
positive qualities of material ecological processes but also with the destructive and violent 
aspects of these processes (where these processes involve human and nonhuman actants). If 
we are to live as part of this diverse ecology that we call Earth then perhaps we must learn to 
engage with its negative, destructive and violent aspects as well as its life-affirming 
processes? The ways that we involve ourselves in material ecological processes matters 
because the different possibilities for life-giving or destructive qualities (and all between) 
already exist in the ongoing material processes that continuously constitute what the world 
is. Therefore, how we intra-act with each (human) other and with nonhuman ‘others’ impacts 
the kinds of material processes that we and nonhumans go on. So we need to find ways to 
work with the less attractive ecological qualities (such as violence and aggression) as they 
play out across humans, across human-nonhuman relations and across the more-than-human.
In conclusion and in response to my initial concern of how to live as part of ecology and how 
to develop ecological ways of being and doing, performance ecology has demonstrated to me 
that what we humans need to do – the best we can hope to do – is to explore and experiment 
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responsibly, responsively, attentively, openly and collaboratively with the (positive and 
negative) qualities and dynamics of our inevitable participation in the material ecological 
processes that continuously constitute the Earth.
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Appendix A: Age-Old programme
Audience programme for the final performance, shown at Platform, 23 November 2013.
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Appendix B: Wild Life programme
Audience programme for the final performance, shown at Platform, 23 – 24 November 2014.
Front of programme
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Back of programme
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Appendix C: Age-Old review
Four star performance review by Mary Brennan, ‘Buzzcut/ Por Sal y Samba, Summer hall, 
Edinburgh’, Herald Scotland, 5 February 2013. Available at: http://www.heraldscotland.com/
arts_ents/13090933.display/.
Take the warren of interesting spaces that exists at Summerhall, add in the programming 
flair of Glasgow's Buzzcut, with its emphasis on new work by radical young artists, and you 
have a really enterprising start to Manipulate 2013 – one that flags up the potent energy of 
visual imagery in performance.
Sarah Hopfinger's Age Old revisited an earlier solo where she gently melded childhood 
memories of place with shifts in outlook brought about by an adult perspective. This new 
episode saw her in cahoots with the unselfconsciously-forthright Carragh McLiven, aged 
seven. Again, a core strand was the natural world both real and as filtered through the prism 
of a child's imagination. But Carragh was no mini-Sarah, even when she echoed Hopfinger's 
movements or picked up on games-playing cues. What emerged was a tender, merry yet 
affecting dialogue about the distances – in noticing, understanding, believing –that grow in, 
and with us across years. The footage of them attempting to fly, with air-filled plastic bags 
as wings, was a joyous reminder that age needn't wither dreams or optimism.
Murray Wason's Automaton, originally a durational process, is now a handsomely distilled 
solo full of mischievous humour and profound humanity. And if his discourse on machines, his 
intense anthem of memories to a much-loved Grandfather, underline the automaton's 
inability to feel emotions he still celebrates the fact that to be fascinated by their 
technology is only human.
For Carles Casallachs and his dance partner in Por Sal y Samba, the slinky-sexy Latin 
American moves swiftly shimmy from flirtation to power struggle and a physical brutality 
that leaves him retching, and some onlookers feeling wretched at the well-crafted cruelty. 
Not Strictly – but very Manipulate.
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Appendix D: Wild LIfe review
Four star performance review by Mary Brennan, ‘Wild Life, Platform, Glasgow’, Herald 
Scotland, 26 November 2014. Available at: http://www.heraldscotland.com/arts_ents/
13191174.Review__Performance/.
Hey! Hey! Everyone is running and jumping, children and adults alike - as if the Platform 
studio was their playground. We are sitting in a circle round them, a part of the game-plan 
that Sarah Hopfinger has initiated with the group, because Wild Life is a far-reaching 
reminder of who we are, and where we come from in time and landscape.
Hopfinger's gung-ho wild bunch is a mix of ages and performance experience: two children, a 
teenager, five adults (including two men of mature years) who plunge wholeheartedly into 
what it means to be "wild".
There are animalistic lumberings, hints of pack behaviour - like childhood "Simon says" 
capers - alongside the beginnings of tribal rituals. Is the hefting of large stones a test of 
stamina, or the start of henges past? If a cross-generational community emerges through the 
mischief and collaboration of games-play, individual "wild" selves can, and do, surface, never 
more joyously than when Geraldine Heaney cuts loose and dances. The groove is pure 21st 
century, the energy and exhilaration is timeless.
Gradually, as significant elements - stone, water, fire - come into play, simple tasks take on 
complex meanings and the "archaeology" of Wild Life jigsaws into images of how our roaming 
ancestors settled into hearth-land ways.
An outburst of mutual drenchings now feels like the anarchic predecessor of ancient mid-
winter rites. Soaking, the group clusters in the stone circle that has become home, the 
flaring light of their short-lived matches vanishing into the darkness of history. When a 
clatter of skimming stones clutter that circle into anonymity, you realise how easy it is to 
walk past, without noticing, the traces of humanity in the wild.
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